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ARTICLES
On The Limits of Charity:

LOBBYING, LITIGATION, AND ELECTORAL
POLITICS BY CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS
UNDER THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE AND
RELATED LAWS*

Oliver A. Houck'

I. INTRODUCTION

This is an article about what is good, and the limits of
what it is good to do. If there is a single document that defines
these values in American life it is the Internal Revenue Code,
whose rewards and penalties rate nearly every activity in
which Americans engage. High on the ratings is a category of
groups organized and operated for "religious, charitable,
scientific, testing for public safety, literary or educational
purposes," collectively known as public charities.' Charities are
© 2003 Oliver A. Houck. All Rights Reserved.
Professor of Law, Tulane University. The research assistance of William
Hancock, Tulane '03, David Nicolardi '05, Olivia Orza '04, and Tara Pierre, '03 is
acknowledged with gratitude, as are the comments and criticisms of Professors John
Eason, Cynthia Samuels, and Keith Werhan of the Tulane law faculty and John
Pomeranz of the Alliance for Justice, Washington, DC.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000). See also 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1) (2003)
(listing charitable purposes eligible under this section). The first legislation in the
United States recognizing charitable status was the Revenue Act of 1894, imposing an
income tax but exempting "corporations, companies, or associations organized and
conducted solely for charitable, religious, or educational purposes." Act of Aug. 27,
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blessed not only with exempt income but also with itemized
deductions for their contributors.! Few get more favorable
treatment under the Code.3
It is a large and consequential world. As of 1998, more
than one million charitable organizations qualified under §
501(c)(3) of the Code,4 and another 140,000 social welfare
groups qualified under § 501(c)(4).' They attended to the needs
of the blind, the aging, racial minorities, the natural
environment, the urban poor, as well as issues such as tobacco
smoking, gun control (both sides), women in banking, children
in sports . . . a list thousands of causes long.' These
"independent sector" organizations employed nearly eleven
million people and accounted for 6.1 percent of the national
income, $665 billion a year and rising.' The value of their time,
1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 556 (1894). The Act did not take effect because it was
declared unconstitutional on other grounds - the graduated income tax. Pollock v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895). However, its provisions on charities
became the prototype for the 1913 Revenue Act, Pub. L. No. 63-16, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 172
(1913) (codified at I.R.C. § 501) and has remained verbatim in the Code from that date.
A classic text on public charities and related tax exempt organizations is BRUCE R.
HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (7th ed. 1998); see also JAMES J.
FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARTZ, NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS (2d ed. 2000).
2 I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D) (2000). The 1917 Revenue
Act introduced parallel
provisions allowing contributions to charitable organizations to be deducted from the
donor's gross income. See Act of Oct. 3, 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-50, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 43
Stat. 314 (1917) (gift); Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, ch. 234, § 303(a)(3), 43
Stat. 306 (1924) (estate).
3 For fiscal years 2002-06, the Joint Committee on Taxation estimates
that
charitable deductions will cost the Treasury a total of $243 billion. Estimates of
Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2002-06, prepared by the Staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation for the Ways and Means Committee and the Committee on
Finance, U.S. Government Printing Office, (January 17, 2002), Table 1, at 20-28
(combining $27.0 billion to health institutions, $37.1 billion to educational
organizations and $178.9 to other charities). These costs, of course, exclude the
charitable income exception. By comparison, veterans and military personnel benefits
are estimated at $25.9 billion, tax credits for education at $96.9 billion, tax credits for
minors at $142.3 billion, the exclusion of capital gains at death, $216.6 billion, and the
home mortgage deduction, $365.5 billion. Id.
' See National Center for Charitable Statistics, at http://nccs.urban.org/
n entities2.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2003). In 1998, 734,000 charities were registered
with the IRS under § 501(c)(3). This figure only partially includes some 344,000
religious organizations, which are not required to register. Id.
5 Id.
Section 501(c)(4) exempts the income of a broad category of social
welfare organizations. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4). Contributions to these organizations are not,
however, made deductible to the donor. See § 170(c)(2)(D) (providing deductibility only
to 501(c)(3) organizations).
6 For a fuller sample listing, see infra
note 263.
7 See National Center for Charitable Statistics, at
http://nccs.urban.org/
n entities2.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2003). Charitable revenues rose from $211.9 billion
in 1982 to $664.8 billion in 1997. See Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal
Years 2002-2006, supra note 3.
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paid and volunteer, was another $226 billion It is hard to
imagine the work of this country - and particularly that work
not directed to private gain - without the support, education,
leadership, and compassion contributed by public charities.
These are without question the good guys. The question is how
active they may be in accomplishing their charitable ends
before running afoul of the law. It has never been an easy
question to answer, and the answers remain in motion.
Consider the case of the hypothetical Save The Birds. It
tends to injured wildlife. It can only wipe off so many oilslicked sea gulls, however, before it begins thinking about
curbing oil spills. At what point does its lawsuit against the
Exxon Valdez, its support for the Oil Pollution Control Act of
1990,' or its favor for Senator George Mitchell become a noncharitable activity threatening its deductions, exemptions, and
the future of the organization itself? Must Save The Birds and the American Lung Association, the National Urban
League, and Mothers Against Drunk Driving - do only the
little stuff, the mop-up, and leave the remedy to others? That is
the question posed by this study. It has been around for more
than one hundred years.
The answers arrived at by the Internal Revenue Code
lie in their history. There was no grand plan. Congress and the
Internal Revenue Service dealt with the political activities of
charities at widely-spaced moments in time, each treating a
separate part of the elephant - early Code rulings (1920s),
lobbying (1934), electoral politics (1954), and litigation (1970).
It was then up to the courts to interpret what had been done
and to provide reasons where reasons were thin, or lacking
altogether. In the 1970s, Congress retook the stage with new
Code provisions and companion rules under the federal election
campaign laws, followed by new rounds of regulation and
litigation. These histories, and their rationales and outcomes,
form the base of this Article.
The Article turns its final attention to where we have
come with charitable restrictions, and where we could still
usefully go. For one, time has softened their blow. On the other
hand, we have developed an anomaly: a hierarchy of charitable
values that most highly favors the least effective action and
' See National Center for Charitable Statistics, at http://nccs.urban.org/
n-entities2.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2003).
9 Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 486 (1990) (codified as amended at 33 USC
§§ 2701-2761 (2000)).
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most highly penalizes activity that, in other areas of law, we
reward with the highest protections. We need to separate the
history of these restrictions from that which persuades us
today. There are valid reasons for restricting the involvements
of charities in politics, but we fail to recognize them and to
limit the restrictions to those ends. For such purposes, this
study may be useful.
II. THE DEBATE BEGINS
"The past is never dead. It's not even past."
William Faulkner"°
From an early date, courts, legislatures, and
administrative agencies have wrestled with the notion of
charity. Perhaps the most commonly-stated rationale for
charitable organizations and their favorable treatment under
the law has been that they provide public services
supplementing those of government and beyond the ability of
government to provide." Well and good, and easily applied to
an organization that sheltered homeless animals. The problem
came when this same organization began to advocate in favor
of animal rights. The question became whether the measure of
a charity was its ends (animal welfare), its means (advocacy),
or both.
English and then American courts began asking this
question more than a century ago and arrived at opposite
conclusions, first under the law of trusts and then under newlyevolving income tax laws. Left to their own devices, the
American courts trended toward a policy that permitted a wide
range of political activity for charitable organizations. They
were not, however, left to their own devices for long.

10 WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN, Act I, Scene III (1951).
, See HOPKINS, supra note 1, at 11-18; see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574, 591-92 (1983) ("Charitable exemptions are justified on the basis
that the exempt entity confers a public benefit - a benefit which the society or the
community may not itself choose or be able to provide, or which supplements and
advances the work of public institutions already supported by tax revenues."). See also
LESTER M. SALAMON, AMERICA'S NON PROFIT SECTOR: A PRIMER (2d ed. 1999) at 11-13

(identifying several reasons supporting favorable treatment of nonprofits, including
"market failure" and "government failure").
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A.

The Law of Trusts

The question of whether political activities are
charitable first arose - before the dawn of income taxation and
exemptions - in the law of trusts. At issue was whether the
courts would validate trust funds operated to carry out a
donor's social agenda."2 High on any one agenda might appear
such controversies as temperance,'3 vivisection," women's
suffrage," and the abolition of slavery.'" One of the most
controversial, apparently, concerned the belief that there could
be no absolute ownership of real property and that land titles
were a form of robbery.'" The common denominator of all of
these trusts was that, through a mix of public education,
lobbying, and even outright electioneering, they intended to
change the status quo. Their reception at the bar was mixed,
and the rationales offered for limiting their political activity
even more so.
Early English cases approved trusts with the purpose of
law reform. Funds to oppose vivisection,'8 to support
prohibition,'9 and even vegetarianism,"' were upheld, literally
without discussion of their political character. By the early
twentieth century, however, the English rule and its
applications had evolved to the point where political activity legislative or electoral, exclusive or ancillary - was fatal.2' The
original reason given was a tidy syllogism: if government is
beneficial (a given), then efforts to change it simply could not
be. As one commentator argued it, the law "could not stultify
itself by holding that it was for the public benefit that the law
" Trusts were intended to avoid the early English mortmain statutes and the
rule against perpetuities. See AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN
FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 348.2 (4th ed. 1989).
13 Inland Revenue Comm'rs v. Temperance Council, 42 T.L.R. 618 (K.B.
1926).
1 In re Foveaux, 2 Ch. 501 (1895).
15 Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. 539
(1867).
16 Id.

17 George v. Braddock, 18 A. 881 (N.J. 1889).
18 In re Foveaux, 2 Ch. 501 (1895).
19 Farewell v. Farewell, 22 O.R. 573 (1892).
20

In re Slatter, 21 T.L.R. 295 (1905).

' See Nat'l Anti-Vivisection Soc'y v. Inland Revenue Comm'rs, [1948] A.C. 31

(H.L. 1947); Bowman v. Secular Soc'y, Ltd. [19171 A.C. 4016]; Inland Revenue Comm'rs
v. Temperance Council, 42 T.L.R. 618 (1926) (legislative activity disqualifying even
though it was fully non-partisan); In re Jones, 45 T.L.R. 259 (Ch. 1929) (any political
motive sufficient to defeat a trust despite other laudable objectives).
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be changed";" testators, like courts, would have to operate on
the principle that "the law is right as it stands." 3 Gilbert and
Sullivan could not have written it better. While this rationale
might be news to English legislators whose very reason to exist
was to improve the nation's laws, trusts such as one intended
to aid the London Anti-Vivisection Society were, accordingly,
ruled invalid.2
Subsequent English trust cases offered a more practical
rationale, bottomed on the courts' professed inability to
distinguish good political agendas from bad. Although it might
be perfectly legal to promote changes in law, the court had no
means of judging whether a proposed change in the law would
or would not be for the public benefit, and so a trust to secure
religious freedom (for non-Christians) through education,
legislation, and electoral politics failed to qualify."
Unexplained, of course, is how the courts had any better means
of judging whether an educational campaign that did not
challenge existing law was for the public benefit. The answer
may lie in the litigation over a trust to propagate "the sacred
writings of the late Joanna Southcoate,"' an authoress who
labored "under the delusion that she was with child by the
Holy Ghost."27 The trust, while acknowledged to be "very
foolish," 8 prevailed, leading to the hornbook conclusion that a
trust may be "both absurd and valid."' In this and like cases,
22 AMHERST

D. TYSSEN, THE LAW OF CHARITABLE

BEQUESTS, WITH AN

ACCOUNT OF THE MORTMAIN AND CHARITABLE USES ACT, at 177 (1st ed. 1888), quoted

in Nat'l Anti-Vivisection Soc', [19481 A.C. 31 (H.L. 1947). As an American
commentator has observed, "It seems difficult indeed to justify such view as to the
perfection of the law." ScoTw & FRATCHER, supra note 12, at § 374.4.
23 Nat'l Anti-Vivisection Soc'y, [1948] A.C. 31 (H.L. 1947).
24 See id.
25 Acknowledging that a campaign for religious freedom, even
for nonChristians, was within "the decencies of controversy," one court noted:
A trust for the attainment of political objects has always been held invalid,
not because it is illegal to advocate or promote by any lawful means a change
in the law, but because the court has no means ofjudging whether a proposed
change in the law will or will not be for the public benefit, and therefore
cannot say that a gift to secure the change is a charitable gift.
Bowman, 31 A.C. at 421, 422.
As a description of the law of the time, the statement is simply flawed. See
cases discussed supra notes 18-20. See also Note, Charitable Trusts for Political
Purposes, 37 VA. L. REV. 988 (1951).
26 Thornton v. Howe, 54 Eng. Rep. 1042 (H.L. 1862).
27 Id. See also Louis Bartlett, Note, CharitableTrusts
to Effect Changes in the
Law, 16 CAL. L. REV. 478, 482-23 (1927-28).
?S Thornton, 54 Eng. Rep. at 1043-44.
29 CARL ZOLLMANN, AMERICAN LAW OF CHARITIES
149 (1924).
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the question as to whether such an activity was for the public
benefit was simply avoided. An absurd, and therefore nonbeneficial, trust was perfectly fine; the problem was not the
purpose, but rather the political activity itself.
The English rule was followed in America more than a
30
in which the Massachusetts
century ago in Jackson v.Philips,
Supreme Court ruled on one trust to promote the abolition of
slavery, and another to support women's suffrage. Focusing on
the political nature of these agendas, the court explained:
[Tirusts whose expressed purpose is to bring about changes in the
laws or the political institutions of the country are not charitable in
such a sense as to be entitled to peculiar favor, protection and
perpetuation from the ministers of those laws which they are
designed to modify or subvert.3"

The Massachusetts court saw its duty as upholding the law and
not "the overthrowing or changing of them.' ' 2 From this
starting point, it went on to uphold the trust for abolition (its
political demise, in 1867, was by then imminent), but to
invalidate the trust for women's suffrage (which still faced a
long political road ahead). Massachusetts stuck to its guns a
half century later in Bowditch v. Attorney General33 approving
a trust to promote temperance (a fait accompli), but again
rejecting a trust for women's suffrage.
Whatever personal biases may have affected the dogged
insistence of these (male) justices that women's suffrage was
not a charitable cause, their opinions also reflect the English
view: It is not charitable to change the status quo. They apply
the language of illegal acts, of revolution itself - "subvert,"
"overthrow" - to advocacy for legislative and political change.
They add, as well, a corollary that would grow tall in American
law and beyond the law of trusts: The more hard-fought and
controversial the objective, the less likely it would be favorably
viewed.
Most American courts, however, indeed all beyond the
state of Massachusetts, rejected this conclusion. A trust would
not be invalidated simply because it sought to achieve its
objects by, inter alia, political means.3 4 A leading explanation
30
31
32

96 Mass. 539 (1867).
Id. at 555 (emphasis added).
Id. at 571.

33 134 N.E. 796 (Mass. 1922).

' See SCOTr & FRATCHER, supra note 12, § 374.
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for this position comes from Taylor v. Hoag,3 where the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
To hold that an endeavor to procure, by proper means, a change in a
law is, in effect, to attempt to violate that law would discourage
improvement in legislation and tend to compel us to continue
indefinitely to live under laws designed for an entirely different state
of society. Such view is opposed to every principle of our government
based on the theory that it is a government "of the people, by the
people, and for the people," and fails to recognize the right of those
who make the laws to change them at their pleasure, when
circumstances may seem to require.3

This reasoning has since been cited and followed as the trend of
modern authority in the United States.
In sum, to the English courts and their followers in
Massachusetts, there was something unseemly about political
activity of any sort. To the American majority, however,
legislative activity and the political push and pull that
attended it, distortions and agendas included, were all part of
the Big Democratic Bazaar. Against this backdrop, itself in
evolution, the Internal Revenue Code was born and began
taking on a shape of its own."
B.

Early Tax Rulings

Early federal tax rulings on the treatment of advocacy
were indirect, and mixed. The political activity prohibition first
appeared in federal tax law as a restriction on the activities of
business corporations, without reference to charities at all. The
tax code of 1913 permitted the deduction of "ordinary and
necessary" business expenses.' In 1915, the Bureau of Revenue
(Bureau) promulgated regulations defining these expenses to
exclude "sums of money expended for lobbying purposes and
contributions for campaign expenses.""' While the Bureau
provided no rationale for this exclusion, the Supreme Court
35

116 A. 826 (Pa. 1922).

36

Id. at 828. Even this statement drew a dissent, however, that preferred to

follow the Jackson rationale. Id. at 826 (Schaffer, J., dissenting).
37 This American majority, while approving
legislative activities, appeared to
draw the line at outright support for political parties, see Buell v. Gardner, 144 N.Y.S.
945 (Sup. Ct. 1914), or for the "advancement, by political intrigue or otherwise, of the
fortunes of a political party," Int'l Reform Fed'n v. Dist. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 131
F.2d 337,340 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
38 Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, ch. 16,
§ 2(b), 38 Stat. 167 (1913).
39 T.D. 2137, 17 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 48, 57-58
(1915).
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upheld it,' observing that "[c]ontracts to spread such insidious
influences through legislative halls have long been
condemned."" The first restrictions, therefore, targeted not
political activity per se, but rather the undue influence of
business in politics.
In 1917, Congress amended the Code to allow
individuals to deduct contributions to charitable organizations
provided that these organizations
from their gross income,
"exclusively" served 2 "religious, educational, scientific or
charitable" ends. 3 Two years later, the Department of the
Treasury (the Treasury) adopted a regulation defining the term
"educational" for these purposes. Without explanation, it
declared that "associations formed to disseminate controversial
or partisan propaganda are not educational within the
meaning of the statute."" Whether this regulation was based on
English charitable trust law or was simply a case of parallel
evolution does not seem to be known. No Bureau rulings
subsequent allude to trust law for their reasoning or support. 5
One commentator speculates that the limitation merely
extended the limits placed on business corporations a few years
earlier. If so, one wonders whether "insidious influences" by
charities on legislation had, likewise, "long been condemned";
one also might wonder how a limit so justified could survive
once Congress amended the Code to favor business deductions
for lobbying expenses.47 Whatever the answers, reliance cannot
be placed on trust law or the business exclusion to explain the
Treasury's position.
Little more illuminating were the Treasury's first
interpretative rulings. In an odd parallel to the early
development of the English rule on trusts, the very first rulings
recognized that activity towards political ends was in fact
charitable. Sequential opinions of the Solicitor in 1918
approved an organization "operated solely in order to educate
40 Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
4, Id. at 338.
42

War Revenue Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-50, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 330

43

Id.

(1917).
T.D. 2831, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 285 (1919).
45 As well they might not, given the weight of American trust law to the

contrary. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
46 William J. Lehrfeld, The Taxation of Ideology, 19 CATH. U. L. REV. 50,
53

(1969).
41

See infra note 391.
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the public sentiment of a State in favor of prohibition on the
sale of intoxicating liquors"48 and another "to educate public
sentiment in favor of the doctrine of prohibition."49 The latter
opinion went so far as to declare that "[tihe work of the club is
propagandist, but none the less educational.""0
Two years later, however, in a ruling on an organization
formed "to encourage the study of labor conditions in the
United States with a view to promoting desirable labor
legislation," the Solicitor reversed field.' The ruling, numbered
S. 1362, reflected a division of opinion within the Treasury.
Despite the rulings noted above, the agency's Administrative
Unit had been denying exemptions to the "National Dry
Federation and other abstinence societies" as "distributors of
partisan propaganda."" This time, the Solicitor found the
Administrative Unit's position correct, by looking at the
dictionary:
The prime purpose of education is to benefit the individual. Century
Dictionary, page 1845. On the other hand, the primary purpose of
propaganda is much more narrow. Propaganda is that which
propagates the tenets or principles of a particular doctrine by
zealous dissemination. Century Dictionary, page 4774. It is a matter
of common knowledge that propaganda in the popular sense is
disseminated not primarily to benefit the individual at whom it is
directed, but to accomplish the purpose or purposes of the person
instigating it. 3

In its 1917 legislation allowing charitable deductions,
the Solicitor reasoned, Congress had this distinction in mind,
intending neither to assist "the aims of one class against
another," nor "one doctrine as opposed to another," nor "the
profit of one class versus the detriment perhaps of another. " '
Rather, Congress wished to advance "the interest of all, over
the objections of none. " " A lofty goal, to be certain, and one that
left no room for advocating anything controversial.'
" S. 1362, 11-2 C.B. 152, 153 (1920) (citing S. 200 (May 16, 1918)).
(citing S. 455 (Aug. 28, 1918)).

49 Id.
5

Id.

5' Id. at 152-54. In so doing, S. 200 and S. 455 were specifically overruled. Id.
52 Id.
S. 1362, 11-2 C.B. 152 (1920).
5

Id.

5 Id. ("A magazine is published, discussion
is stimulated, memoranda are
prepared and distributed, and, in short, all of the ordinary means are utilized to place
before the public matter which will press labor's interests.") Id.
Treasury regulations contemporaneous with S. 1362 explicitly
added, as a

disqualifying factor, that the subject matter was of a "controversial nature." O.D. 704,,3
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Several aspects of this seminal ruling are worth noting.
First and most obviously, it dealt with the issue of labor rights
which, along with women's suffrage, were the hottest and most
establishment-resisted domestic issues of their day. Second,
although the activities of the organization in the ruling were
57
expressly limited to public education, the Treasury was
prohibiting activities that could if successful, simply lead to
legislation. Third, although the ruling arose in the context of
defining an "educational" organization, its prohibition would
logically extend to charitable organizations qualified as
scientific and religious as well. And finally, the relied-upon
congressional intent had to have been defined by informal, if
not supernatural, means; no congressional intent appears in
the 1917 amendment or its legislative history.
The most apparent difficulty in the opinion however,
was the opacity of its distinction between education and
propaganda - a distinction that would prove to be
uncomfortably subjective. The decade that followed saw a
string of rulings applying this distinction in which
"educational" meant activities that appeared to the Treasury as
socially acceptable, while "propaganda" meant those that were
unpopular, and against the status quo. On the approved side
were an organization to secure legislation for the welfare of the
American Indian (since "all that concerns his property and
person is in a peculiar sense subject to legislative control,"
political activities were the only means of protecting him and
hence were educational),' another to promote legislation
regulating the taking of fish and game (without explanation),'
and the activities of the National Rifle Association, already a
powerful legislative force (but "educational" nonetheless, as the
nation's defense rested upon arms training for this "obligation
of citizenship").' During the same decade, the Treasury denied
charitable status to, among others, several temperance
organizations," including the Civic Fund of the City Club of
New York, whose "advocacy of or opposition to candidates and
C.B. 240 (1920).
57 For a detailed discussion of these rulings, see Lehrfeld, supra note 46, at
56-63.
58 Gen. Couns. Mem. 3830, VII-1 C.B. 114 (1928).
59 I.T. 2546, IX-2 C.B. 122 (1930).
6o Gen. Couns. Mem. 443, VII-1 C.B. 114 (1926).

See Appeal of Herbert E. Fales, 9 B.T.A. 828, 832 (1927) (involving the
Federation and the Massachusetts Anti-Saloon League).
Temperance
Scientific
61
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proposed municipal measures carries [the Fund] beyond the
exclusively educational purposes, " " and the League for
Industrial Democracy, whose campaign for the public
ownership of property, in the eyes of the Board of Tax Appeals,
advocated a "new social order" including "drastic political and
economic changes which are directly at odds with existing
economic theories and practices upon which society is
founded.... "
Two sides of the same coin are at work in these
opinions: mainstream and change. If an organization's agenda
was in the mainstream of public opinion, it could include a
healthy element of political action. If, however, its agenda
proposed ideas not (yet) widely accepted, it would not be
recognized as charitable, even though no political action was
involved.'
Further exploration of the early Treasury rulings serves
little purpose. No distinctions are drawn between legislative or
electoral activity, nor do additional reasons for prohibitions on
either type of activity appear. Several of their more extreme
applications have since been modified by Service rulings and
regulations. They are, in this sense, history. They are also,
however, the earliest record on the origins of the political
prohibitions and their rationales. Suffice it to say, the
rationales were not overwhelming. It would be up to the courts
to give these restrictions legitimacy, or a decent burial.
C.

Early Court Rulings

The judicial reactions, too, were mixed. Controversy
arose in 1929 over contributions to the American Birth Control
League, formed to disseminate health information through
clinics, a magazine and scientific journals on birth and birth
control... and to advocate the repeal of anti-birth control laws.
The Board of Tax Appeals denied the deduction on the basis of
S. 1362,' and the case came to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals as Slee v. Commissioner.' Writing for the court, Judge
Joseph M. Price v. Commissioner, 12 B.T.A. 1186, 1189 (1928).
Bertha Poole Weyl v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 1092, 1094 (1930), rev'd,
48
F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1931).
See supra text accompanying note 11. See also Vanderbilt v.
Commissioner,
34 B.T.A. 1033 (1936), afftd, 93 F.2d 360 (1st Cir. 1937).
See Slee v. Commissioner, 15 B.T.A. 710 (1929).
42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930).
62
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Learned Hand began his opinion by recognizing the social
value and benefit of the League's work ("[tihat the League is
organized for charitable purposes seems to us clear"), and that
the legislative agenda was related, if incidental, to this larger
purpose. 7 Nevertheless, in language that has become a
cornerstone for later cases approving political activities
restrictions, Judge Hand wrote:
Political agitation as such is outside the statute, however innocent
the aim, though it adds nothing to dub it "propaganda," a polemical
word used to decry the publicity of the other side. Controversies of
that sort must be conducted without public subvention; the Treasury
stands aside from them.'

Having so concluded, however, the opinion proceeded in
the next sentence to sanction some types of political activity:
"Nevertheless, there are many charitable, literary and
scientific ventures that as an incident to their success require
changes in the law."" They included, by way of illustration: a
charity seeking laws "allowing it to receive 'larger gifts'; a
"society to prevent cruelty to children, and animals," seeking
legislative power "to coerce parents and owners"; a state
university "trying to get appropriations," or "leave to teach
evolutionary biology"; and last, a society of book lovers seeking
7
"to relax the taboos on works of dubious propriety." All such
activities were "mediate" to the exempt purposes, "ancillary to
the end in chief," and hence not disqualifying.' By contrast, it
would be "a perversion of the statute" to exempt persons who
seek "the more general acceptance of beliefs which they think
beneficial to the community at large," including those
concerning prohibition, the League of Nations, the size of the
Navy, "or any other of the many causes in which ardent
persons engage. " "

6'7

Id. at 184, 185.

The only part of [the League's] activities which can be thought to touch upon
legislation is in directing persons how best to prepare proposals for changes
in the law, and in distributing leaflets to legislators and others
recommending such changes, chiefly by bringing before them such
information as is supposed to 'enlighten' their minds.
Id. at 185.
68Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Slee, 42 F.2d. at 185.
72 Id.
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Judge Hand's opinion has been as much admired for its
eloquence as criticized for its content.7 It appears to stand on
two legs, both of which are required for the opinion to remain
upright. The first simply asserts that Congress chose not to
"subvene" something called "political agitation."
This
explanation goes no further, because Congress of course made
no expression on what it chose to subvene, other than that it be
exclusively charitable. The opinion cites no congressional
language, mentions no Treasury rulings, and cites no case law.
The explanation does infer, however, a congressional policy of
neutrality: to exempt (although ardent persons on all sides
would be eligible for exemptions) would be to take sides.
The second leg, defining political agitation, is also
necessary, because political agitation is what Congress
allegedly chose not to subvene. Here the waters become even
more murky. One is hard-pressed to find a common
denominator of those listed activities Judge Hand excludes
from
the
prohibition:
agitation
for
a university's
appropriations, for example, and lobbying by the Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals for an ordinance on
mistreating the family dog. What does emerge as exempt in
Judge Hand's mind, however, are those political activities of a
relatively smaller nature and motivated by a group's
immediate self interest - more gifts (money), more
appropriations (money), greater latitude in teaching (one's own
curriculum), fewer mistreated dogs to care for (admittedly a
stretch), and more (interesting) books to read "of dubious
propriety." As such, the opinion gets the traditional notion of
charity exactly backwards: One might agitate all one wishes for
personal gain and qualify as charitable; what is prohibited are
activities intended for a greater public good.
Federal opinions immediately following Slee limited its
reach, and qualified as charitable the work of other, equally
ideological and equally aggressive organizations. Within the
next ten years, a federal district court approved an antivivisection society with a legislative agenda that the Board of
73 See, e.g., Elias Clark, The Limitation on
PoliticalActivities: A Discordant
Note in the Law of Charities, 46 VA. L. REV. 439, 447 (1960) ("In retrospect it may be
suggested that this deference [to Slee] is due more to the decision's primacy in the field,
as well as the eloquence and illustrious name of its author, than to the cogency of its
argument"); BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, TAX EXEMPT & NON PROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS § 100.5.1 (2d ed. 1989) ("an urbane but debatable opinion"); Lehrfeld,
supra note 46, at 60 ("suspect"). This author has found no commentator purporting to
understand, or support, the Slee opinion.
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Tax Appeals considered "substantial."" The Second Circuit,
father of Slee, reversed the Board of Tax Appeals to exempt
organizations promoting a doctrine similar to socialism and
achievable only through legislation." The Third Circuit found a
religious organization with a frank and forceful legislative
program supporting prohibition to be qualified." The Fourth
Circuit approved the World League Against Alcoholism,
although its member organizations advanced this controversial
77
issue through legislation and "indulged in political activity,"
and the District of Columbia Circuit approved a charity that
had "boasted" of having "at one time or another written 36 bills
on moral subjects for submission to various state legislatures,
and 18 that have been passed by the Congress. " 7
These cases, allowed to grow and solidify, might well
have overruled Slee entirely and produced a very different rule
from the one we live with today. As it happened, however, they
were overtaken by the politics of the New Deal, which resulted,
unpredictably, in legislation amending the exempt organization
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Welch, 25 F. Supp. 45, 46 (D. Mass. 1938).
Weyl v. Commissioner, 48 F.2d 811, 812 (2d Cir. 1931); Leybscher v.
Commissioner, 54 F.2d 998, 999 (2d Cir. 1932).
76 Girard Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 122 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1941). The case
involved the legislative agenda of the Board of Temperance, Prohibitions and Public
Morals of the Methodist Episcopal Church, of which the majority opinion held:
The advocacy of such regulation before party committees and legislative
bodies is a part of the achievement of the desired result in a democracy. The
safeguards against its undue extension lie in counter-pressures by groups
who think differently and the constitutional protection, applied by courts, to
check that which interferes with freedom of religion for any.
Id. at 110.
17 Cochran v. Commissioner, 78 F.2d 176, 178
(4thCir. 1935).
71 Int'l Reform Fed'n v. District Unemployment Corp. Bd., 131 F.2d 337 (D.C.
Cir. 1942). The majority found that the legislative activities did not "accomplish a
metamorphosis in appellant's character whereby it . . . changed from a charitable
educational to a political organization." Id. at 340. It continued:
Here we have no actual difference between the education of the individuals admittedly proper - and the education of the legislator, where both are
directed to a common end, and that end, not the advancement, by political
intrigue or otherwise, of the fortunes of a political party, but merely the
accomplishment of a notional social improvement.
Id.
The dissent argued, in vain, that the activities in question, although
lawful, were not charitable in the sense for which charities are recognized: "the
performance of duties which, otherwise, the government would itself perform . . . ." Id.
at 346.
On the other hand, the movement was not all one way. See Vanderbilt v.
Commissioner, 93 F.2d 360, 363 (1st Cir. 1937) (bequest to organization with legislative
agency promoting woman's rights held not deductible).
74
75
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III. THE LEGISLATIVE PROHIBITION AND SENATOR DAVID AIKEN
REED
"There is no history, only biography."
Ralph Waldo Emerson"'
In 1934 Congress first amended the Code to prohibit
political activity by charities. To the Internal Revenue Service,
the amendments may have served, if selectively, to confirm its
previous rulings. To some commentators, the amendments
codified Judge Hand's opinion in Slee.' Although the
amendment was raised and discussed on the Senate floor, no
mention was made by proponents of the pre-existing Service
policy, or of Slee." Indeed, if the amendment was intended
simply to reflect an existing prohibition, it is not easy to
understand why anyone would have thought it necessary to put
it into the Code. Apparently, however, at least one senator
believed them to be quite necessary, and his reasons largely
constitute the record for their adoption.
The story begins with veteran's benefits and the Great
Depression. At the turn of 1933, America was deep into its
worst economic depression in history, and torn between those
who saw the solution through government intervention and
others who saw it in government restraint. The issue was
pressing and, in language the Bureau of Revenue would
understand, controversial. With President Herbert Hoover in
his twilight and the policies of President-elect Franklin D.
Roosevelt not yet formed, the very course of government
seemed at stake. Of the voices raised to set this course, none
was more strident on the side of government restraint than a
tax-exempt charity named the National Economy League (the
League)." In January 1933, the League boasted a membership
79 JOURNALS

OF

RALPH

WALDO

EMERSON,

1838-1841

(Edward

Waldo

Emerson & Waldo Emerson Forbes eds., Houghton Mifflin 1911).
80 See Laura B. Chisholm, Exempt Organizations Advocacy: Matching the
Rules to the Rationales, 63 IND. L.J. 201, 232 n.141 (1987-88); Miriam Galston,
Lobbying and the Public Interest: Rethinking the Internal Revenue Code's Treatment of
Legislative Activities, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1269, 1285 n.46 (1993); Kevin M. Yamamoto,
Taxing Income from Mailing List and Affinity Card Arrangements:A Proposal,38 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 221, 230 n.40 (2001).
81 See 78 CONG. REC. 5, 861 (1934).
82 See infra text accompanying notes 97-98.
See also MARK HUGH LEFF, THE
LIMITS OF SYMBOLIC REFORM: THE NEW DEAL AND TAXATION, 1933-1939, at 162 (1984).

Such leagues were in vogue. The similarly-named National Economic League, another
powerhouse of fiscal conservatism, possessed an almost equally illustrious leadership,
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of two hundred thousand, representation in every state, and
leadership that included leading giants of finance and such
luminaries as Rear Admiral Richard E. Byrd, General John J.
Pershing, Alfred E. Smith, and former President Calvin
Coolidge.' High on the League's target list were government
benefits to Spanish-American and Great War veterans, benefits
that, in its view, would bankrupt the government."
The Spanish-American War was a relatively small and
bloodless affair, but World War I was another matter. In 1918,
more than one million servicemen came home and returned to
civilian life.' Low-income Americans in the main, these men
were among the first and hardest hit at the onset of the Great
Depression ten years later.' By 1932, twelve million formerly
employed Americans were out of work, twenty-five percent of
the workforce. 7 The hit song of that year began:
Once in khaki suits
Ah gee, we looked swell,
Full of that Yankee Doodle-dee-dum!
Half a million boots went sloggin' through hell,
And I was the kid with the drum!
Say, don't ya remember?
I'm your pal.
Buddy, can you spare a dime?'

The war veterans held government bonus certificates,
payable years into the future. Feeling that their past service
and current stress entitled them to immediate payment, they
and their families came to Washington in old cars, on freight
trains, hitchhiking, on foot - a grassroots, disorganized force
that grew to more than twenty thousand, intent on making its
including former Attorneys General and a former Vice President of the United States.
For a description of its similar agenda, which also featured "efficiency and economy in
government," see THURMAN. W. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM 105-07 (Yale

Press 1937).
84

Anti-Bonus Group in Economy League, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1933, at 7.
Urges Veto on Bill for Veterans' Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1933, at 2.

About 1.3 million servicemen had seen combat; in all, the Army reached 4
million by the end of the war. See SAMUEL ELIOT MORRISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, 866 (Oxford Univ. Press 1965).
See HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLES' HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1942-

PRESENT 381-82 (Harper Perennial 1995).
87 See MORRISON, supra note 85, at 944.
88 Jay Gorney & E.Y. Harburg, Brother, Can You Spare a Dime? (Harms Inc.
1932) (from the Broadway musical AMERICANA, which opened on October 5, 1932 and

was popularly recorded on October 25, 1932 by Bing Crosby with Lennie Hayton and
his orchestra).
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case. They marched, they stayed for weeks and then months,
they lived along the Potomac in makeshift camps, they received
media attention and public sympathy, they called themselves
the "Bonus Expeditionary Forces," and they went down in
history as the Bonus Army."
To President Hoover, their demands were budgetbreaking, extortionist, and a threat to public order.' To his
Army Chief of Staff, General Douglas MacArthur, they were
Communists. Hoover ordered the real Army to evict them.
General MacArthur led the charge in person. With four
companies of infantry supported by cavalry, a machine gun
squadron and six tanks, the Army marched into the camps
firing tear gas and setting the shanties on fire. It catalyzed a
riot, and by the time it had ended there were two veterans
dead, many more injured, and thousands gassed. General
MacArthur won the battle, but he lost the war. Public opinion
turned sharply in favor of the veterans, who were not only
ignored by their government but, now, gassed and killed as
well.'
The result was another overreaction, this time by the
Congress. It soon passed a supremely generous benefits
package for veterans of both the Spanish-American and First
World Wars. 2 The package covered not only those who had
fought abroad or served on the home front, but all who had
served in whatever capacity for the previous thirty years.' It
amounted to twenty million dollars a year, about one-seventh
of the cost of running the government;' overall, veteran's
benefits totaled more than one billion dollars, nearly half the
federal budget. 5
Incoming President Roosevelt would have to mitigate
the impact of these payments on monies needed to finance the

89

See ZINN, supra note 86, at 381-82; see also Federal

Bureau

of

Investigation, Freedom of Information and Privacy Act: The Bonus March (May-July
1932), at http://foia.fbi.gov/bonmarch.htm (last visited Aug. 12, 2003).
9o See ZINN, supra note 86, at
382.
9' See PBS, AMERICAN EXPERIENCE, The Bonus March (May-July, 1932), at
http://www.pbs.orglwgbh/amex/macarthur/peopleevents/pandeAMEX89.html
(last
visited Aug. 12, 2003).
92 Senate Votes 51 to 39, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1933, at 1.
93 Id..
Editorial:How to Save $400,000,000, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1933, at 18.
95 J. Garry Clifford, Grenville Clark: World Peace Through
World Law, at
http://www.harvardsquarelibrary.org/unitarians/clark grenville.html (last visited Aug.
12, 2003).
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New Deal. One way was to cut them back.' Corporate America
and its allies led the charge. In February 1933, the National
Economy League called on President Hoover to veto the entire
government appropriations bill because veteran's benefits,
although reduced, were still too high. 7 At the same time the
League was drumming up the grassroots, obtaining a
resolution from "the members and friends of the Women's
National Republican Club" that endorsed its agenda and its
"campaign of education" throughout the country. 8
On the other side of this controversy stood, as could be
expected, the veteran's organizations themselves.' With them
stood an otherwise unlikely champion of veteran's benefits, the
conservative Republican Senator from Pennsylvania, David
Aiken Reed. ' Senator Reed was to the manor born, son of a
wealthy industrialist, Princeton-educated, top of his class at
the University of Pittsburgh Law School, and a successful
defense attorney representing, among others, the United States
Steel Corporation.'"' Reed was a natural, one would have
expected, for the National Economy League . . . but for one
additional fact. He had also served as a Major in the Field
Artillery for three years of the Great War, and had since been
appointed to the American Battle Monuments Commission."
He was a veteran. Reed was also pugnacious in combat on
Capitol Hill, outspoken in his beliefs and not afraid of taking
on even the President of the United States. 3 He could also be
vindictive.'" He was not the person with whom one would
choose to pick a fight.
The veteran's benefits issue came to a head in June of
1934. The Roosevelt administration announced a compromise
with the House of Representatives that included some
additional benefits, but not all.' 5 The Senate's more generous
LEFF, supra note 82, at 97-119.
97 Urges Veto on Bill for Veterans' Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1933,
at 2.
98 Finds Government Still Too Wasteful, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 14,

1933, at 1.
Senate Votes 51 to 39, supra note 92.
100Princeton University, Rare Books and Special Collections, Description
of
David Aiken Reed Scrapbooks: Biographical Sketch, at http://libweb.princeton.edu/
libraries/firestone/rbsc/finding-aids/reed.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2003).
101 Id.

102 OFFICIAL CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY, 73d Congress, 97 (1934)
103

See infra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.

'04 See Reed to Ask Party to Drop Bolters: Will Ask Senate Caucus to Cut Ties
with Four Republicans Who Backed Roosevelt, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1933, at 6 (Reed
threatens to remove those who vote with the President from the party caucus.).
"' Compromise Near on Veterans' Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1933, at 3.
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plan was rejected by the administration, to which Senator Reed
responded by promising veterans that the compromise would
have to be "modified" to provide a "new deal" for them.'06 On
June 14, the Senate passed its own bill restoring more benefits,
but the margin was close and the bill appeared unlikely to
survive a presidential veto."7 The lobbying on this measure was
reported as fierce, with the administration using "every
conceivable argument""' to deal with the "pro-veteran
uprising.""' The debate took a personal turn when Reed
described his opponents as "under the White House lash," an
accusation that drew angry attack, and an "avalanche" of
counter-attacks by no fewer than eight senators, Democrat and
Republican, including Senator Reed himself."' The debate also
included an "attack on the National Economy League," whose
lobbying activities against the benefits in question were
apparently sorely felt. 1 '
The administration ultimately prevailed."2 The National
Economy League went on to other battles with the President,"3
and Senator Reed, over tax legislation.14 The League was not
the only pro-business lobby at work in the capitol; other
corporate-sponsored organizations with names like "The
Liberty League" rose up against tax reform and other
legislation that affected the interests of their backers."' But the
scars of the veteran's benefits war remained. It had been a
relatively long war, as legislation goes; it had made headlines
and provoked considerable anger. The National Economy
League won, and boasted about it."' Senator Reed lost.

106Reed PleadingsAid to Veterans, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1933, at 3.
107 Senate Votes 51 to 39, supra note 92.
108 Id.
109 Id.

11o Id.

...Veto Already Written, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1933, at 8.
112 Thomas and Curran Debate on Budget, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1934, at 2.
Henry H. Curran, of the National Economy League, declared, "In 1932, they told me
that the National Economy League could never win its fight for the elimination of
pensions to veterans who never got sick or wounded in the war. Now in 1934, people
tell me that our nation's budget cannot be balanced. I say that this budget can be
balanced." Id.
113

114
115
116

Id.

Republicans Balk at Tax Bill Report, N.Y. TIMES, April 27, 1934, at 1.
LEFF, supra note 82, at 162-63.
See Thomas and Curran Debate on Budget, supra note 112 (statement of

Henry Curran).
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On April 2, 1934, as the veteran's benefits issue reached
full boil, the Senate Committee on Finance reported legislation
to the Senate amending the charitable contribution provisions
of the Code."7 As proposed, the amendment was sweeping. For
an organization to qualify as charitable, no "substantial part"
of its activities could involve "participation in partisan politics
or in carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to
influence legislation."'.. When this language reached the Senate
floor, however, Senator Reed, a committee member and the
amendment's chief spokesman, explained with evident
discomfort that, as worded, the prohibition would apply to the
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, to the Society
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, "or any of the worthy
institutions that we do not in the slightest mean to affect... 9
However, Reed continued:
There is no reason in the world why a contribution made to the
National Economy League should be deductible as if it were a
charitable contribution if it is a selfish one made to advance the
personal interests of the giver of the money. That is what the
committee were trying to reach; but we found great difficulty in
phrasing the amendment. I do not reproach the draftsmen. I think
we gave them an impossible task; but this amendment goes much
further than the committee intended to go. 29

The National Economy League and its "personal
interests" were the problem. But the solution cured too much,
and Senator Reed knew it. As he pointed out in a colloquy with
a colleague over "tuberculosis societies" and "children's welfare
societies" that have substantial legislative agendas, those
groups that argued for public health or child labor laws were
certainly "not acting from selfish motives," but would
nevertheless fall within the sweep of the new prohibition.''
"' The amendment was offered by Senator Harrison, the Finance Committee
Chair, but its explanation and defense was carried by Senator Reed. See 78 CONG. REC.
5861, 5959 (1934). That Senator Reed was the moving force became apparent in the
presentation of the final compromise. See infra note 123.
18

119

78 CONG. REc. 5861 (1934).

Id.
120 Id. In the view of Senator Harrison,
this sauce-for-the-goose-sauce-for-thegander approach was appropriate. Id. As far as he was concerned, the prohibition
would extend even to "some war organizations," a heresy to which the Congress has yet
to subscribe, allowing veterans groups to lobby with impunity, muting testimony to the
lasting effects of the Bonus Army war. See I.R.C. § 501(C)(19) (2003). For an
unsuccessful challenge to the constitutionality of this unequal treatment, see Taxation
With Representation v. Regan, 676 F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
121 78 CONG. REC. 5861 (1934).
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With the question so raised and unresolved, the Senate
deferred the amendment.
When the Senate later returned to the amendment, the
Finance Committee Chairman explained that there were
"certain organizations which are receiving contributions in
order to influence legislation and carry on propaganda. The
committee thought there ought to be an amendment which
would stop that, so that is why we have put this amendment in
the bill.' 2 Reed reiterated that the committee was not proud of
the language of the amendment, but urged its adoption to allow
"better phraseology" to be offered in conference with the
House.'23 To Senator Robert LaFollette, however, Reed was
attempting the impossible. In Senator LaFollette's view, the
"mistakes of administration" and "decisions which may seem
like favoritism" would never abate until all organizations of
this type were disqualified." In other words, once the National
Economy League was up for challenge, so were all of the
others.'2
As it turned out, Senator LaFollette's blanket approach
prevailed. The conference committee was either unable or
unwilling to distinguish between the National Economy League
and the Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, and,
instead, retained the language prohibiting "substantial"
activities in "carrying on propaganda or otherwise attempting
to influence legislation."2 6 At the same time, however, the
122

78 CONG. REC. 5959 (1934) (statement of Sen. Harrison).

113

Id. (statement of Sen. Reed).

124

Id. (statement of Sen. LaFollette). Certainly one such "mistake," or

decision that may have seemed like "favoritism," would have been the Roosevelt
administration's failure to challenge the exempt status of the National Economy
League under existing IRS policy; a similar reluctance to challenge the exemption of a
politically-active charity would lead, years later, to a more explicit sanction on
participation in elections. See infra text accompanying notes 400-19.
125 Senator Reed's concerns over corporate lobbying re-surfaced the following
year when the Metropolitan Edison Company blanketed members of Congress with
several thousand letters opposing federal utility legislation. Anyone's Name Put on
Lobbyist Wires, Utility Man Says, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1935, at Al. The letters, it
turned out, were fraudulent, written by a utility company lobbyist who affixed the
names of company employees, most of whom had no knowledge of the letters or their
content. Id. For congressional reaction, see LEFF, supra note 82, at 162-63. Incidents
such as these served to reinforce the position of Senator LaFollette the previous year: If
restricting corporate lobbying through charitable organizations meant restricting all
charities, then so be it.
126 100 CONG. REC. 9599, 9604 (1954). Senator Reed's only comment was
that
he had "discussed the matter within the Chairman of the Committee, the Minority
ranking member of the Committee, and several other members of the Committee, and I
understand that the amendment is acceptable to them." Id. The Conference Report is
no more enlightening. H.R. REP. No. 83-2543, at 46 (1954).
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committee reported a "substantial concession" on part of the
prohibition that was "too broad"; it had succeeded in getting
the conferees to drop the prohibition on "participation in
partisan politics." Three months after the lobbying prohibition
was enacted, the IRS revoked the exempt status of the
National Economy League." 7
As of 1934, then, the lobbying restriction was made
explicit and ostensibly freed from its "controversiality"
underpinnings. Its expressed concern was with the economic
self-interest of contributors who controlled these organizations,
but unable to draw a line to limit them, it limited, instead, the
lobbying activity itself. By retaining the restriction on
"propaganda" and by prohibiting only "substantial" lobbying,
however, the Congress left the Service extremely wide
discretion on whom it wished to challenge, and why discretion that would remain influenced by the controversial
nature of the position advocated as viewed by the Service and
the administration in power. At the same time, and for the first
time, Congress explicitly focused on participation in electoral
campaigns and decided that prohibition of politics in this form
would simply be "too broad." The first time, then, that the
Congress looked at electoral activities by charities, it blinked.
IV. THE ELECTORAL POLITICS PROHIBITION AND SENATOR
LYNDON

B. JOHNSON

In 1954 Congress again amended § 501(c)(3), this time
to add the language it had rejected twenty years earlier. The
reasons it did so again lie in the history of the amendment and
its sponsor, this time an even more influential figure in the
Senate of his day, Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas.
By contrast to the 1934 amendment, the legislative
history here is minimal. No committee proposal was made; no
Treasury proposal was made; no committee hearings were held.
There was no discussion of the amendment on the floor of
either chamber. On July 2, 1954, without explanation, Senator
Johnson simply offered an amendment to prohibit political
campaign activity by charities, as part of general revisions to
the Internal Revenue Code.'28 The amendment was prepared in
Lobbying and PoliticalActivities of Tax-Exempt Orgs.: HearingsBefore the
Subcomm. on Oversight of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 100' h Cong., 1st Sess. 124,
27

139 (1987) (statement of William J. Lehrfeld) [hereinafter Lehrfeld Statement].
121 See infra text accompanying
notes 162-65.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69: 1

such haste, and its consideration so brief, that it failed also to
amend the provisions of § 170 relating to charitable deductions,
leaving an anomaly in the law that thenceforth allowed
deductions to non-exempt organizations and that was only
corrected years later."n
Commentators have explained that Senator Johnson
was motivated by the activities of charities allied to his
opponent in a recent campaign.'3 ° At least two commentators
identify those charities as creations of the wealthy Texas
conservative H.L. Hunt.'3 ' More recent evidence confirms that
the Senator was reacting to material circulated during the
1954 Democratic primary campaign by a nonprofit organization
called the Committee for Constitutional Government.'
To Senator Johnson, the 1954 primary - which he
ultimately won in a landslide - was an anxious matter. ' " He
had won his first term by the razor thin margin of eighty-seven
votes, a margin some maintained did not exist at all.14 He was
a Democrat in the Republican Senate, with an extremely
popular Republican in the White House. No sooner had his
principal rival for reelection, Texas' Governor Allan Shivers,
chosen not to run, then into the lists came a young, millionaire
rancher-oilman with a conservative agenda: Dudley T.
Dougherty.'

1
See Lehrfeld Statement, supra 127, at 144; Letter from Thomas A. Troyer,
former member of IRS Commissioner's Advisory Group on Exempt Organizations and
former member of the Treasury Department's Advisory Committee on Private
Philanthropy and Public Needs, to Oliver Houck (July 20, 1988) (on file with author).
130 HOPKINS, supra note
1, at 504.

" See Lehrfeld Statement, supra note 127, at 144 ("Senator Lyndon Johnson
was facing a difficult re-election campaign, strongly opposed by H.L. Hunt and his
Lifeline Foundation."); NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION TAX LETTER, Vol. 22, Mar. 23, 1984,
at 2 ("Senator Johnson was irritated at the H.L. Hunt Foundation activity against him
when he ran for the Senate in Texas[.]").
112 Lehrfeld Statement, supra note 127, at 144. For a more recent account, see
Patrick L. O'Daniel, More Honored in the Breach: A Historical Perspective on the
Permeable IRS Prohibitionon Campaigning by Churches, 42 B.C. L. REV. 733 (2001)
(Johnson suspected Hunt was clandestinely supporting his opponent through the
Committee for Constitutional Government).
See ALFRED STEINBERG, SAM JOHNSON'S BOY: A CLOSE-UP OF THE
'
PRESIDENT FROM TEXAS 383 (1968); MERLE MILLER, LYNDON: AN ORAL BIOGRAPHY 24042 (1980); ROWLAND EVANS & ROBERT NOVAK, LYNDON B. JOHNSON: THE EXERCISE OF
POWER 72-73 (1966).
'3
EVANS & NOVAK, supra note 133, at 73. Suspicions about the legitimacy of
this vote, and victory, continued long afterwards. See id; see also STEINBERG, supra
note 133; MILLER, supra note 133.
135 EVANS & NOVAK, supra note 133, at 72; STEINBERG, supra
note 133, at 383.
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In the early 1950s, American conservatives felt their
agenda as strongly as today. The Great Depression may have
passed but international Communism loomed abroad and, in
the view of many, at home as well. The Cold War dominated
American politics, fueled by the investigations and accusations
of Senator Joseph McCarthy who, by 1954, if not widely
followed, was still widely feared.1 31 Organizations formed in
opposition to the New Deal now sounded the alarm over
appeasement of Communism and international treachery. One
such organization was the Committee for Constitutional
Government (the Committee),' 3 described by a political advisor
to Johnson as "the wealthiest and most powerful of the extreme
right-wing groups in the United States.' 3.
In 1954 the Committee launched a campaign to
distribute material supporting the Bricker Amendment, a
proposal to limit the treaty-making authority of the
President.' Were that all it distributed, § 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code might not to this day mention
participation in an electoral campaign. In addition, however,
the Committee's solicitation attached several articles from its
magazine, Spotlight for the Nation, one of which, authored by
"Noted Economist, Radio Commentator and Author" Willis
Ballinger, was entitled The Texas Story.' ° The Texas Story
began by identifying the three groups that threaten traditional
America - Communists, Socialists and Internationalists supported by "numerous dupes who suffer from delusions
induced by propaganda about 'economic justice,' 'abundance for
all,' 'world peace,' or the 'brotherhood of man. '1.
Fortunately, The Texas Story continued, a young
aspirant had arisen in Texas like "a sort of political Moses,"
with the courage to challenge for a seat in the United States
Senate an incumbent who, in the view of "Nationalist-minded
Texans," was "a slavish partisan of Franklin Roosevelt," a
supporter of NATO ("the military phantom which, under the
EVANS & NOVAK, supra note 133, at 72.
from Sumner Gerard to J.R. Parten, Chairman of the Board,
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (May 1954) (on file with author).
t3
Memorandum from George E. Reedy, Jr., Aide to Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson,
to Lyndon B. Johnson, Senator, U.S. Congress (May 27, 1954) (on file with author).
139 Letter from Sumner Gerard, supra note 137.
140 Willis Ballinger, The Texas Story, HuMAN EVENTS (Washington D.C.),
136

137 Letter

reprinted in SPOTLIGHT ON THE NATION No. D-269 (Committee for Constitutional Gov't
Inc., New York, NY) (on file with author).
141Id. at 1.
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pretense that it protects us and our allies against the Kremlin,
has cost us untold millions"), a supporter of the United
Nations, and an opponent of the Bricker Amendment. 14 Indeed,
a vote for the incumbent, "many Texans felt," was a vote for
Socialism in Washington and in favor of "covering up
Communist infiltrators.' 43 The incumbent was of course
Senator Johnson. The young Moses was Dudley Dougherty.
The campaign itself became somewhat bizarre.
Dougherty, who toured the state speaking from the back of a
shiny red fire truck, "managed to combine religion,
McCarthyism, and anti-federalism into the single slogan:44
'Clean the Godless Commies out of the State Department.",
He mounted a twenty-nine hour telethon during which he
called Eleanor Roosevelt an "old witch,"'145 and gradually selfdestructed to the extent that Johnson chose not to run a
campaign in Texas at all.141 At the outset, however, any
opponent was a genuine threat to the Senator, and the tactics
irritating. Among
used were particularly
Dougherty
Dougherty's backers was the multi-millionaire H.L. Hunt, and
the language Hunt's followers used was "vicious."'47 Johnson
"obviously wanted to lash back in some fashion" and his aide
George Reedy "had to restrain him (by persuasion, of course,)
from making statements on more than one occasion.' 8
The Committee for Constitutional Government came to
Johnson's attention in May of that election year. The
Committee had sent its fundraising solicitation to the
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, J.R. Parten, 49
at 1-2. A notice "to the public," appended to the article, concluded:
142 Id.
Dudley T. Dougherty, with courage, forthrightly states his platform. Which of
his planks do you agree with and/or oppose? It would no doubt, interest him
to have your frank opinion regardless of whether you support his position or
are critical of the stand he takes; regardless also of whether you are a fellow
citizen of Texas or resident elsewhere in the country. His address is: Hon.
Dudley T. Dougherty, Beeville, Texas.
Id. at 2.
143

Id. at 2.

144 STEINBERG, supra note 133, at 383.
145 MILLER, supra note 133, at 161-62.
146 STEINBERG, supra note 133, at 383-84.

Deirdre Dessingue Halloran & Kevin M. Kearney, Federal Tax Code
Restrictions on Church PoliticalActivity, 38 CATH. LAW. 105, 107 (1998) (citing Letter
from George E. Reedy, Jr. to Deirdre Dessingue (Oct. 11, 1985)).
148 Id.
149 Letter from J.R. Parten, Chairman, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, to
Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson, Senator, U.S. Congress (May 28, 1954) (on file with
author).
147
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on the not-unreasonable assumption that he might support the
Bricker Amendment campaign. Parten, as it happened, was a
Johnson supporter and wrote at once to the Senator,
questioning whether it was "legal and legitimate" to expend
corporate funds for political purposes."5 Johnson assigned the
letter to his aide, George Reedy,'5 ' and replied to Parten that he
was having the question "explored by experts.. 5
To Reedy, the Committee was better left alone. In a
memo dated May 27, 1954, he informed Johnson that it was
"highly unusual" for the Committee to take a stand on a
candidate for public office, as it had done here.' Reedy noted
further that the Committee - managed by an individual who
had been convicted of contempt of Congress a few years earlier
and for trafficking with Germany during the First World WarTM
- was quite vulnerable to exposure, if it became a problem. The
Senator was unmoved.
On June 15, 1954, Johnson received an opinion on the
legality of the Committee's actions from his counsel, Gerald
M In circulating
Seigel."
an article favorable to Dougherty
throughout Texas, and in urging people to write to Dougherty,
the Committee had, Seigel concluded, violated Texas election
laws." Under federal law, however, while the Committee, "has
clearly engaged in an indirect, if not direct, effort to influence a
senatorial election by aiding the candidacy of Dougherty and
attempting to defeat your candidacy," the applicable
prohibition concerned only legislation and was therefore, by
inference, inapplicable.'57
Johnson pursued his grievance. As he explained to a
friend, here was a candidate for the Senate from Texas
M

15 Id.
151 Memorandum to George E. Reedy, Jr., Aide,
Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson (June
1, 1954) (on file with author).
152Letter from Lyndon B. Johnson, Senator,
U.S. Congress, to J.R. Parten,
Chairman of the Board, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (June 3, 1954) (on file with
author).
15 Memorandum from George E. Reedy,
Jr., supra note 138, at 1. The memo
continues: "As a rule, the Committee confines itself to generalities and only makes
attacks upon such people as the Roosevelts, Frankfurter and other obvious targets for
right-wing sniping." Id. at 2.
154 id.
'5
Memorandum from Gerald W. Siegel, Counsel, Senator Lyndon B.
Johnson, to Lyndon B. Johnson, Senator, U.S. Congress (June 15, 1954) (on file with
author).
'5'

Id.

Id. at 2.
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"without a single plank" devoted to Texas problems and "whose
major backer is an organization controlled by New Yorkers. " "
On June 18, the question of the tax status of the Committee for
Constitutional Government was transmitted through a
member of the House of Representatives to the United States
Treasury. ' On June 28, the Commissioner acknowledged its
receipt, announced the documents to be "no less amusing and
shocking to me than they are to you," and promised
"appropriate steps" to see "what, if anything, can be done"
about these groups under the exemption provisions of the
Code." On July 1, Congressman John McCormack transmitted
the Commissioner's reply to Johnson.' 1 It cannot have provided
much satisfaction.
On the very next day, July 2, Johnson introduced the
amendment. 2 At this point, the documentary evidence
disappears." As a Washington, D.C. tax newsletter notes, both
Johnson and the Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on
Internal Revenue Taxation, Lawrence Woodworth, "had a good
record on the Hill of leaving little evidence as to what they
did."" One prominent tax lawyer who worked with Woodworth
at the Joint Committee has written, however, that according to
Woodworth, Johnson came to him and told him that "'some
foundations' in Texas were giving him trouble in his reelection

'58 Letter from Lyndon B. Johnson, supranote 152.
'59 Letter from T. Coleman Andrews, Commissioner, U.S. Treasury, to John
W. McCormack, Congressman, U.S. Congress (June 28, 1954) (on file with author).
Also questioned was the tax status of the Constitution and Free Enterprise
Foundation, Inc., referenced as an IRS qualified charity in the Committee's letter of
solicitation. Id.
160 id.
' Letter from John W. McCormack, Congressman, U.S. Congress, to Lyndon
B. Johnson, Senator, U.S. Congress (July 1, 1954) (on file with author).
162 See 100 CONG. REc. 9604 (1934); Lehrfeld Statement, supra note 127, at
144; NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION TAX LETTER, supra note 131, at 2.
'6' NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION TAX LETTER, supra note 131, at 2 ("The
prohibition against election activity by a §501(c)(3) organization has no written
legislative history or explanation for why it was inserted in the Code."). In 1985, at the
beginning of research for this study, the author spoke with four Washington, D.C. tax
attorneys, each of whom had practiced with either the Joint Committee on Taxation or
the Internal Revenue Service and who were acquainted with the Committee's Chief of
Staff at the time, Lawrence Woodworth. Each stated that Woodworth introduced the
amendment in haste, at Senator Johnson's urging, in response to the election activity
of unnamed foundations against him. These attorneys expressed their preference that
they not be quoted to this effect in this Article.
164

Id.
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campaign, and directing Larry to draft an amendment which
would stop them. '"" Which he did.
These events, then, and this reaction, are the reasons
why the prohibition on participation by charities in electoral
campaigns, a prohibition not even qualified by the word
"substantial," found its way into § 501(c)(3) of the Code. From
this point forward, the treatment of the legislative and
campaign prohibitions of § 501(c)(3) would take on a new
dimension. Congress had spoken, the question of whether such
prohibitions were wise was foreclosed, and it would be for
courts to decide whether they were constitutional.
V. LITIGATION RESTRICTIONS AND THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION

In 1970, a third assault was launched on the political
activity of charities, this time against public interest litigation.
It came not from the Congress but from the Nixon
administration, and it had been building for some time.
Charitable litigation arose early in the 1900s, when
American cities began establishing legal aid programs for
immigrants, and then more broadly for the urban poor.' In
those same years, the American Civil Liberties Union was
created to protect pacifists and peace protesters; by 1974 it had
become an organization with nearly three hundred thousand
members, fifty-two staff lawyers, and hundreds of volunteers
litigating civil rights and individual liberties across the board.
In 1939, the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People founded the Legal Defense and Education Fund
to challenge public school segregation, and then voting
restrictions, housing discrimination, and the death penalty. In
the 1960s, the federal Office of Economic Opportunity began
funding independent legal services, and in 1974 Congress
created the independent Legal Services Corporation.'67 Such
legislation does not pass without considerable popular support.
On the other hand, there were those, including the President of
'

Letter from Thomas A. Troyer, supra note 129, at 2.

16 The description of the ACLU, the NAACP, and legal services programs

that follows is taken from Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on
Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207, 207-31 (1976) (providing detailed references
for the early history of the ACLU and NAACP) and from COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC
INTEREST LAW, BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: FINANCING PUBLIC INTEREST LAW
IN AMERICA 21-57 (1976).
167 The Legal Services

Corporation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-55, 88 Stat. 378 (1974)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (2000)).
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the American Bar Association, who viewed the "greatest
threat" to America, apart from Communism, to be the
"propaganda campaign" in support of "a federal subsidy to
finance a nation-wide plan for legal aid and low-cost legal
service. " "'
It was not these activities, however, that brought down
the house. Rather, it was a fresh wave of litigation by dozens of
newly-formed organizations claiming to defend not the
interests of identifiable immigrants, pacifists, or black
Americans, but rather those of a diffuse majority concerned
with consumer safety and, above all, environmental protection.
The literature of the time, Silent Spring69 and Unsafe at Any
Speed,'70 cried out for protection of the public in general. New
doctrines on standing and administrative review facilitated
challenges to industry and government conduct that had
theretofore been verboten.'7' New and old foundations were
catching the wave, funding existing charities in litigation
projects and establishing new ones whose primary activity
would be litigation.' 2
'
Robert G. Storey, The Legal Profession Versus Regimentation: A Program
to Counter Socialization, 37 A.B.A. J. 100, 101 (1951). Two decades later, however, a
subsequent ABA President would write:
While activity on behalf of the indigent is laudable and must continue, it is
now apparent that this concern is only one part of the total obligation of the
legal profession to ensure that each and every segment of society is
adequately represented .... There are both individuals and groups who, for
practical purposes, are barred from the courts and from legal process
generally because they lack sufficient commitment and resources to support
litigation on the same scale as their adversaries. Environmental and
consumer concerns are two immediate and obvious examples.
Chesterfield Smith, President'sPage, 60 A.B.A. J. 641 (1974).
169 RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962). Originally published in
the New
Yorker magazine, this book is generally credited with bringing the problems of
pesticide pollution to the attention of the American public, and with it a concern for
environmental protection.
170 RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED (1965). This book and
its attendant
publicity became moving forces for consumer protection.
171 See Sierra v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (allowing citizen standing for

aesthetic interests); Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359
F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (opening FCC proceedings to public intervention); Scenic
Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966) (opening FPC decisions to a judicial review, the court
dismissed the FPC's argument that citizens groups lacked standing because of
insufficient economic interest in the controversy, and went on to state that "the right of
the public must receive active and affirmative protection at the hands of the
Commission").
172 The law reform programs of the ACLU and the NAACP/LDF
and the
newer programs of the Environmental Defense Fund and the Center for the Law and
Social Policy were created and originally supported through foundation grants. See
Rabin, supra note 166.
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Worse, unlike the ACLU and the NAACP, this new
brand of public interest litigation seemed perversely targeted
at American business and industry, the heartland of the
Republican Party. The Environmental Defense Fund was born
over lawsuits to control the manufacture and sale of
pesticides.'73 The Natural Resources Defense Counsel rose from
cases contesting the water discharges of Con Edison at Storm
King Mountain.'74 The Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee
took on a nuclear power plant in Maryland, "5 the Center for
Law and Social Policy took on the Alaska Pipeline,'76 and
Unsafe at Any Speed took on General Motors.' No business
interests appeared safe, and the reaction of otherwise
responsible leaders approached paranoia. In a report to the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce entitled Attack On American Free
EnterpriseSystem, Lewis F. Powell Jr., a few months before his
appointment to the Supreme Court, would write, "No
thoughtful person can question that the American economic
system is under broad attack."'8 Leaders of the attack included
Ralph Nader,'79 Yale Professor Charles Reich (for his book, The
Greening of America),"n unnamed "Communists" and "New
Leftists,""' and "active exploiters of the judicial system"
ranging from "'liberal' to the far left."' The success of these
judicial actions, Powell emphasized, "often at business'
MARION LANE ROGERS, ACORN DAYS: THE ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND
AND How IT GREW 23-25 (1990) (describing founding of EDF, now called Environmental
Defense, and early pesticide litigation).
171 See JOHN CRONIN & ROBERT F. KENNEDY, JR., THE
RIVERKEEPERS: TWO
ACTIVISTS FIGHT TO RECLAIM OUR ENVIRONMENT AS ABASIC HUMAN RIGHT 39 (1997).
175 Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United
States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
,76 See Wilderness Soc'y v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970), aff'd, 479
F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The Center for Law and Social Policy represented the
Wilderness Society and other plaintiffs. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
,77 See NADER, supra note 170.
178 Confidential Memorandum, Attack on American Free Enterprise
System,
from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Mr. Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr., Chairman, Education
Committee, U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Aug. 23, 1971). The memorandum was
obtained by syndicated columnist Jack Anderson, who began publishing excerpts in his
columns. The Chamber of Commerce then published the memo in full, as The Powell
Memorandum, WASHINGTON REP., Supp. No. 2900 (U.S. Chamber of Commerce 1971).
As for the scope of the "Attack," the memo explained: "The American political system of
democracy under the rule of law is also under attack, often by the same individuals and
organizations who seek to undermine the enterprise system." Id. at 2 n.1.
179 The Powell Memorandum, supra note
178, at 3.
173

180 Id.
'8' Id.

at 2.

" Id. at 7.
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'
In a word, American
expense, has not been inconsequential. ""
business was stung.
Putting the matter in its most charitable light, the
volume of the new litigation groups and the range of their
interests confused the Internal Revenue Service. As the thenCommissioner explained, they included "organizations opposed
to specific industrial undertakings that may affect the
environment," and others that proposed "to litigate any matter
which affects the environment"; they included organizations
that would litigate "on behalf of consumers generally," and
others that would "litigate on any matter they conceive to be in
the public interest."'" The Service granted exemptions to some
groups, stalled on others, and then granted one that required
further clearance by the Service before the group went to
court." Then it made its move.
On October 9, 1970, the Service issued a press release
announcing that it had "temporarily suspended" its rulings on
"public interest law firms" (the Service's own quotation marks)
and other organizations that litigate "for what they determine
to be the public good," such as "preservation of the
environment, protection of consumer interests, and the like[.1'
It would not decide on their exemptions until the completion of
a study, "now under way[.]"' 8 7 Pending its decision, which the
Service hoped to make within sixty days, it would make no
judgment about the deductibility of contributions to these
organizations."' Six days later, it issued another press release
expressing its "hope" that "major commitments for long-range
funding for such organizations would not be undertaken during

183

id.

Tax Exemptions for Charitable Organizations Affecting Poverty
'84 See
Programs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employment, Manpower, and Poverty of
the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1970)
(statement and testimony of Randolph W. Thrower, Commissioner, Internal Revenue
Service, Department of the Treasury) [hereinafter Poverty ProgramsSenate Hearings].
"5 The extent of the IRS's confusion is reflected in a ruling issued to one
applicant for litigation in the environmental field which recognized the law firm as
charitable, but then required it to submit any proposal for litigation to the Treasury
Department for prior approval. Id. at 90-93 (statement of Mortimer M. Caplin, former
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, concerning the application of the
Natural Resources Defense Council).
186 Id.
at 5 (reprinting IRS News Release IR-1069 (IRS), Oct. 9, 1970).
187 Id.
188Id. at 6.
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the present study."" Public interest litigation, and its funders,
were on hold.
Putting the matter in a less charitable light, the
Service's action was extraordinary and highly suspicious. The
Service did not normally make decisions like this by surprise,
nor by press release; its standard practice was to convene the
interested parties, identify the problems, and work towards a
proposed ruling or regulation. This action looked more like
the kind of thing a bureaucracy did when somebody was
demanding action, now. Critics wanted to know who that was.
"Maybe I did not make myself clear," stated Senator Walter
Mondale at a subsequent hearing held in response to the press
release.19' "What sources came to you and urged that the law
firms protecting the public interest be denied tax
exemption? . . . What sources, for example, set such a
regulation in motion? How is that done? Who does it?""
Congress, the press, and a range of public charities were
quick to draw their own conclusions. The New York Times:
The Internal Revenue Service has previously harassed the Sierra
Club on grounds that the club's public service advertisements on
environmental issues constitute lobbying. Now the IRS is extending
its intimidation and harassment to a much wider range of
organizations. It is time for IRS officials to relax their tender

189

Poverty Programs Senate Hearings, supra note 184, at 7 (reprinting IRS

News Release IR-1072 (IRS), Oct. 15, 1970).
'90
See id. at 136 (Testimony of Mitchell Rogovin, counsel to the Center for
Law & Social Policy). The Service's process - in essence, rulemaking by press release came under heavy fire at the subsequent hearings:
Mr. Chairman, the Revenue Service has in the past conducted studies. The
practice had been to quietly bring in the affected industry groups ....

If

industry were involved, rather than charitable organizations, one might
assume that the industry representatives would have been quietly called in
Washington, and all the information necessary for Revenue to rule - one way
or the other - would have then been obtained. A good example of such
industry type study took place a few years back when the tax treatment of
treble damage payments was under study by IRS. But that type approach did
not take place in this instance.
Id.
See also id. at 48. (reprinting Letter from Sam. J. Ervin, Jr., Senator, U.S.
Congress, to the Hon. Randolph W. Thrower, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service
(Oct. 29, 1970) (expressing "concern[] about the procedures which the IRS... followed
in this matter" and declaring it "highly improper to use a press release to change tax
status of many existing organizations and to suspend the issuance of exemptions to
new organizations of the same kind").
191 Id. at 77 (questioning Commissioner Thrower during
his testimony at the
Senate Hearings, Nov. 16, 1970).
192 Id.
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solicitude for the big polluters and come to the rescue of the ordinary
citizens who pay their salaries.'93

The Washington Post:
Although not all the facts are yet out - if all of them ever will be - a
number of urgent questions need to be asked about the IRS decision.
Who is behind it? This decision is a major move, one that will
prevent qualified lawyers acting on recognized laws going into
established courts. It is no secret that major corporations, already
buffeted by tight money, a bear market and strikes, feel harassed by
court cases in anti-pollution and consumer areas. [T]he thought
occurs - though these things are hard to prove - that business
interests may have sent an SOS to the Nixon administration, saying,
in effect, get the kids off our backs.'

The Minneapolis Star:
A complex and inconsistent Internal Revenue Service (IRS) ruling
designed to protect business will, it appears, throw a body block
against some efforts to work within the local system to attack
polluters and protect consumers.9

The Capitol Times (Madison, Wisconsin):
These [the IRS] arguments are one indication of how far the Nixon
administration is willing to go to protect the sanctity of big interests
against the public."

Unlike the lobbying and electioneering restrictions
discussed earlier, we will never know the full story behind the
Service's proposal and the process it chose to follow. But it
smelled strongly of strike-back politics.
The Nixon
administration knew how to deploy the IRS against its critics.'97
Indeed, it knew how to deploy wiretaps and burglaries.'98 The
' Poverty Programs Senate Hearings,supra note 184, at 405 (reprinting IRS
to the Rescue, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1970). In fairness to the IRS, the Sierra Club had
been engaged in heavy lobbying. On the other hand, so had been a number of nongovernmental organizations on all sides of public issues. The suspicion was and is, that
the Sierra Club was targeted for being (1) opposed to government policy and (2)
effective.
9 Id. at 409 (reprinting The Law, the IRS, and the Environment, WASH.
POST, Oct. 14, 1970, at A18).
195Id. at 406 (reprinting Austin C. Weirwein, IRS Versus Public Interest Law,
MINNEAPOLIS STAR).

' Id. at 415 (reprinting Editorial, IRS and the Public Interest, MADISON
(WIS.) CAPITAL TIMES, Nov. 12, 1970).
'9' See CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN 270-

71 (1974).
'19 See United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (affirming
conviction of White House-directed burglars of the Democratic Party Headquarters and
the offices of a private doctor to obtain medical records of opponent to administration
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deep involvement in that same period of time of White House
Counsel John Dean in the Service's disqualification of a
501(c)(3) charity called the Center for Corporate Responsibility
- whose offending purpose was apparently the promotion of
corporate awareness for the needs of minorities and
environmental protection - led to court review and reversal."'
In reaction to the success of the Legal Services Corporation in
representing indigent clients, the Republican Party spent years
trying to neuter the Corporation and reduce the impact of its
litigation. 00 In short, there was good reason to suspect business
and politics as usual.
Commissioner Randolph Thrower, on the other hand,
vigorously denied outside influence on the Service's action." '
Either to prove the Service's independence or because he had
no other intellectually tenable option, he reversed field
dramatically in the weeks following. Within five days, a
committee of the Senate notified Thrower that it intended to
schedule hearings on the press release in early November.2 2
Thrower asked for a delay.0 The Senate refused." Meanwhile,
Democratic senators wrote the Service in support of full
recognition for public interest litigation.2 5 So did Republican
policy on Vietnam War); United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d 334 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(affirming conviction of White House operative for wiretapping and burglary).
'9 Ctr. on Corp. Responsibility, Inc. v. Schultz, 368 F. Supp. 863 (D.D.C.
1973).

200 See Michael S. Serrill & David S. Jackson, An Organizationat War with
Itself Legal Services Rifles Its Files and Ruffles Some Feathers,TIME, Oct. 3, 1983, at
83; see also Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (holding that a
provision in an appropriations bill restricting arguments lawyers could make on behalf
of indigent welfare clients violated the First Amendment).
201 Poverty Programs Senate Hearings, supra note 184, at 424
(Thrower
"repudiate[d] published speculation that the 'prime movers' had been Commerce
Secretary Maurice H. Stans and Attorney General John N. Mitchell. Purportedly, they
had wanted to cripple the fight against corporate polluters by denying exemptions to
groups that fight them.") (reprinting Morton Minz, For Public Interest Law Firms:IRS
Denies Pressureon Exemptions, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1970).
202 Id. at 36-37 (letter from Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
to
Commissioner Thrower, dated Oct. 14, 1970).
203 Id. at 40, 43-44 (letters from Commissioner Thrower
to Gaylord Nelson,
Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower and Poverty, Oct. 23,
1970 and Oct. 29, 1970).
Id. at 40-41 (letter from Gaylord Nelson to Commissioner Thrower, Oct. 29,
1970).
205 See id. at 378 (letter from Sen. George McGovern, Oct. 8, 1970, expressing
concern that the IRS "may be preparing a ruling which would prevent any organization
engaging in environmental litigation from being classified as a charitable
organization"); id. at 47 (letter from Sen. Sam Ervin Jr., Oct. 29, 1970); id. at 36-37
(letter from Sen. Gaylord Nelson, Walter F. Mondale, Ralph W. Yarborough, Claiborne
Pell, Harrison A. Williams, Jr., Edward M. Kennedy, and Thomas F. Eagleton, Oct. 14,
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Gerald Ford.' Nineteen former federal cabinet members and
agency heads signed a joint letter to the same effect"0 7 and
several former IRS Commissioners submitted documents.' The
press took up the cry. The pressure was on, and Thrower was
scheduled to appear on November 16 before the Senate with
thirty-four witnesses lined up in opposition, including
representatives from the Communications Workers of America,
the American Hebrew Congregations, and the United
Methodist Church. 9 It was not going to be a pretty sight."'
On November 12, four days before the hearings were to
begin, the Service capitulated. "' Before media attention that
appeared to Thrower to be a "new high

. . .

in microphones, " '

he announced a new set of guidelines that defined and
recognized public interest litigation as a charitable activity
under § 501(c)(3) of the Code.2 3 The Service had begun by
considering, and then rejecting, a test based on the charitable
purposes sought to be achieved, be they environmental
protection, civil rights, or whatever rights; all purposes,
including very private ones, could be couched as public ones.2 '
Instead, the centerpiece requirement of the new guidelines was
that the litigation be designed to represent a "public interest
rather than a private interest." As Thrower would stress
several times and in several ways at the subsequent hearing,
the question was whether such a charity is "a satellite or a
captive of a group that is not itself recognized as a charity" or is
1970).

206 Poverty ProgramsSenate Hearings, supra note 184, at 449-50
(letter from
Sen. Gerald Ford, Oct. 26, 1970).
...Id. at 493 (letter from John W. Douglas, Louis F. Oberdorfer, et al., Nov. 4,
1970).
218 Id.
at 90 (statement of Mortimer M. Caplin, Nov. 16, 1970); id. at 330

(statement of Sheldon S. Cohen, Nov. 16, 1970).
209Id. at 398, 265, 380 (respectively).
210For a flavor of the testimony awaiting Commissioner
Thrower:
If one may resort to Biblical imagery, the public-interest law firms represent
a small but courageous David going forth to do battle against a huge,
powerful armored Goliath. The Internal Revenue Service is like a referee who
rushes in to check the weapons. While Goliath hefts his sword and spear and
battle-axe unhindered, the referee threatens to disqualify David for putting
too-large pebbles in his sling!
Id. at 263 (statement of the National Council of Churches of Christ).
21 Poverty
Programs Senate Hearings, supra note 184, at 14-35
(Commissioner Thrower's press conference, Nov. 12, 1970).
212

Id. at 14.

213 Id.
214
215

at 16-35.

Id. at 60-66.
Id at 66.
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controlled by a for-profit corporation; 6 whether it is "acting on
behalf of a substantial financial interest" that would give the
Service concern.2 7 Absent those private interests, litigation on
behalf of public interests was, per se, charitable.
The Service's decision in 1970, under pressure as it was
and in the crucible of highly public and expert scrutiny, has
stood the test of time. To be sure, business and other financial
interests have since found ways to stretch these guidelines in
subsequent years, creating public interest law firms that were
patently their satellites and that brought cases obviously
intended to improve their private commercial interests,"8 but
finding loopholes in the Code are the grits and grease of the
practice and do not seriously challenge the principle. Faced
with deciding on the charitable nature of litigation, the Service
rejected an "ends" test as untenable. It rejected as well either
prohibiting or limiting the litigation to some "insubstantial"
percentage of the group's activity. Instead, it addressed its
primary concern: separating the charity from business
influence and control. This approach would be repeated a few
decades later with federal political campaign laws.
VI. AFTERMATH AND RECONCILIATION
As seen above, the Congress rose to deal with the
political activities of charities under the Internal Revenue Code
at three widely-spaced intervals: first lobbying, next electoral
campaigning, and then litigation. The moving parties were two
frustrated and angry United States senators and one
frustrated and angry administration. The lobbying and
electoral restrictions won out; in a later era more sensitive to
turbulent public interests, the litigation restriction did not.
The restrictions on lobbying and campaigning would be
challenged in the courts, in the literature, and ultimately in
subsequent sessions of the Congress.2 " While on the merits the
216Poverty ProgramsSenate Hearings,supra note 184, at 19.
217

Id. at 30.

211See Oliver A. Houck, With Charity for All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415 (1984)

(describing activities of business-sponsored public interest law firms).
"9 The judicial and congressional responses are described in this Section,
infra. Academics and commentators have provided a rolling drumfire of criticism of the
restrictions on constitutional and policy grounds. See Clark, supra note 73, at 439-65;
David B. Weaver, Taxes and Lobbying - The Issue Resolved, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 938
(1963); Note, The Revenue Code and a Charity'sPolitics, 73 YALE L.J. 661 (1964); Note,
The Sierra Club, Political Activity, and Tax Exempt Charitable Status, 55 GEO. L.J.
1128 (1966-67); Ronald S. Borod, Lobbying for the Public Interest - Federal Tax Policy
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court challenges would lose, and would indeed solidify the
restrictions, they provided an alternative that significantly
softened their impact. Congress, too, would take steps to
ameliorate, or at least clarify, its rules, and through both the
Code and electoral campaign laws, to level the playing field.
A.

The Courts Approve

Judicial approval of the § 501(c)(3) restrictions was not
foreordained. On their face, they are significant restraints on
speech. They apply to thousands of otherwise qualified exempt
organizations in America representing a wide spectrum of
expertise and commitment to public issues, each with a
message, the essence of De Tocqueville's America."' They
and Administration, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1087 (1967); Myron Walker & Tim Rothermel,
Note, PoliticalActivity and Tax Exempt OrganizationsBefore and After the Tax Reform
Act of 1969, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1114 (1970); Theodore L. Garrett, Federal Tax
Limitations on PoliticalActivities of Public Interest and Educational Organizations,59
GEO. L.J. 561 (1971); Thomas Troyer, Charities, Law-Making, and the Constitution:
The Validity of the Restrictionson Influencing Legislation, 31 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 1415
(1973); James H. Fogel, To the I.R.S., 'Tis Better to Give Than to Lobby, 61 A.B.A. J.
960 (1975); Mortimor M. Caplin & Richard E. Timbie, Legislative Activities of Public
Charities, 39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 183 (1975); Note, Lobbying by Section 501(c)(3)
Organizations Under the Tax Reform Act of 1976: A Proposalfor Change, 30 TAX LAW.
214 (1976); Robert S. Hyslop & Walter Ebell, Public Interest Lobbying and the Tax
Reform Act of 1976, 7 ENVTL. L. 283 (1977); James H. Nix, Limitations on the Lobbying
of Section 501(c)(3) Organizations-A Choice for the Public Charities,81 W. VA. L. REV.
407 (1979); Nell Hoffman, Note, The Tax Code's Differential Treatment of Lobbying
Under Section 501(c)(3): A Proposed First Amendment Analysis, 66 VA. L. REV. 1513
(1980); Note, Whose Voice Shall be Heard? Lobbying Limitations on Section 501(c)(3)
Charitable Organizations Held Constitutional in Regan v. Taxation With
Representation, 28 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1017 (1984); Gregory E. Robinson, Note,
Charitable Lobbying Restraints and Tax Exempt Organizations: Old Problems, New
Directions?, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 337; Tommy F. Thompson, The Availability of the
Federal Educational Tax Exemption for PropagandaOrganizations, 18 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 487 (1985); Commentators Say Regulations on Lobbying by Tax-Exempt
Organizations Are Too Restrictive, 34 TAX NOTES 19 (1987); Richard L. Haight,
Lobbying for the Public Good: Limitations on Legislative Activities by Section 501(c)(3)
Organizations,23 GONZ. L. REV. 77 (1987-88); Laura B. Chisolm, Exempt Organization
Advocacy: Matching the Rules to the Rationales, 63 IND. L.J. 201 (1987-88); Laura
Brown Chisolm, Politics and Charity: A Proposal for Peaceful Coexistence, 58 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 308 (1990); Miriam Galston, Lobbying and the Public Interest:
Rethinking the Internal Revenue Code's Treatment of Legislative Activities, 71 TEX. L.
REV. 1269 (1993); Brent Coverdale, Comments, A New Look at Campaign Finance
Reform: Regulation of Non-Profit Organizations Through the Tax Code, 46 U. KANS. L.
REV. 155 (1997); Daniel L. Simmons, An Essay on Federal Income Taxation and
CampaignFinanceReform, 54 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2002).
220 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 517 (J.P. Mayer ed.,
George Lawrence trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1835) ("Nothing, in my view, more
deserves attention than the intellectual and moral associations of America .... If men
are to remain civilized or to become civilized, the art of association must develop and
improve among them at the same speed as equality of conditions spreads.").
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inhibit communication to the general public on these issues,
and flatly prevent comment on political campaigns. They carry
draconian penalties: loss of exempt income and deductible
contributions constitute, for most nonprofits, the loss of life.
Prospects such as these radiate a broad chill. Only the most
secure organizations, or the most reckless, will dare to speak at
or even near the margin.
The restrictions also implicate freedom of religion,
particularly as they impact churches with an agenda of
changing government policy. Religious institutions are the
largest and wealthiest charities in America.22" ' The Catholic
Church dominates this universe, 2 but the evangelical
Protestants, while small in number, are loud in voice." To
religious activists, the inability to lobby or to participate in
election campaigns is the inability to complete their duty on
earth.2
1. Freedom of Speech
The free speech challenge rises from a line of cases
invalidating the conditioning of tax, unemployment, and other
benefits on the relinquishment of a protected interest. The
seminal opinion, Speiser v. Randall,' involved a state property
tax exemption for which a veteran simply had to affirm that he
or she did not advocate the overthrow of the U.S. government
by force, violence, or unlawful means - an activity arguably
more threatening to the national interest than advocacy for the
humane treatment of animals or child welfare laws. By an
eight-to-one margin, the Supreme Court found that "speech can
be effectively limited by the exercise of the taxing power." 6
Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, continued:
22i

In 2002, of $241 billion in total charitable giving, $84.3 billion, or 35

percent, went to religious institutions. See American Association of Fund-Raising
Counsel, Giving USA 2003 (2003), at http://www.aafrc.org/bytypeof.html (last visited
Oct. 25, 2003). The next closest was the category of education with $31.6 billion, or 13.1
percent. Id.
222 See Adherents.com, Largest Denominational Families in U.S., 2001,
available at http://www.adherents.com/relUSA.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2003). In
2001, the Catholic Church claimed 50.9 million members, more than one-quarter of the
population of the United States; the next closest denomination was Baptist with 33.8
million members. Id. No other denomination was in double digits. Id.
2

Id.

See infra text accompanying notes 289-94.
225

357 U.S. 513 (1958).
Id.

at 518 (citing Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1957)
a
tax
on newspapers above a certain subscription level as an unwarranted
(invalidating
22
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To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of
speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech. Its deterrent
effect is the same as if the State were to fine them for this speech.
The appellees are plainly mistaken in their argument that, because
a tax exemption is a 'privilege' or 'bounty' its denial may not infringe
speech. 27

Speiser grew stronger over time, and expanded to
invalidate a range of restrictions, some based on the content of
the speech,228 but others based on reasons that had nothing to
do with content or point of view." 9 In the words of two
infringement on freed speech).
227 Id. Relying on cases forbidding restraints on free
speech through
conditions on mailing privileges, labor mediation privileges and employment rights, the
court went on to hold that "when the constitutional right to speak is sought to be
deterred by a state's general taxing program, due process demands that the speech be
unencumbered" until the State offers "sufficient proof to justify its inhibition." Id. at
528-29. The one dissenting Justice found sufficient justification for the exemption
denial: The state has "an understandable desire to insure that those who benefit by tax
exemption do not bite the hand that gives it." Id. at 543 (Clark, J., dissenting).
22" An illustrative case is Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972), involving
a Texas state college that refused to renew the employment contract of a professor,
allegedly due to his public criticism of the administration. The Court began its
discussion of the law by observing:
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even though a
person has no "right" to a valuable government benefit and even though the
government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are
reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit
to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests especially his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny
a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or
associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and
inhibited.
Id. at 597.
See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1962) (denying unemployment
benefits); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969) (denying welfare benefits);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (denying welfare to resident aliens). There
were also a great number of such cases denying public employment. See United Pub.
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192;
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1960); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 49596 (1960); Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894 (1961); Cramp v. Bd. of
Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 288 (1961); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1963);
Elfbrandt v. Russell, 377 U.S. 360 (1965); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,
605-06 (1967); Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S.
258 (1967); Pickering v. Bd. of Ed., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). Each of these cases rebut,
in explicit language, the contention that, since the benefits at stake were not "rights"
but only "privileges," strict scrutiny under the First Amendment was not required.
Thus the Court in Sherbert stated:
Nor may the South Carolina Court's construction of the statute be saved from
constitutional infirmity on the ground that unemployment compensation
benefits are not appellant's "right" but merely a "privilege." It is too late in
the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed
by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege.
374 U.S. at 404
And the Court in Graham stated, "But this Court now has rejected the
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subsequent courts, "a person may not be compelled to choose
between the exercise of a First Amendment right and
participation in an otherwise available public program";"3° and
the "constitutional challenge cannot be answered by the
argument that public assistance benefits are a 'privilege' and
not a 'right."'' ' Because they conditioned a benefit - very
significant monies - on the relinquishment of the right to lobby
and participate in electoral campaigns, the § 501(c)(3)
prohibitions seemed ripe for the application of Speiser and its
progeny. Because of the way in which the issue first arose,
however, and perhaps because the consequences of applying
Speiser to tax-exempt charities appeared to be so open-ended,
the first amendment challenges to the 501(c)(3) prohibitions
rejected Speiser and turned the tide.
The first federal income tax case to reach the Supreme
Court on the Speiser issue involved deductions for the lobbying
expenses of commercial businesses. In Cammarano v. United
States,2 wholesale beer distributors had mounted a campaign
against state laws placing retail liquor sales under state
ownership and control. The Service denied the deductions, and
the case reached the Court soon after Speiser had been decided.
Speiser may just as well not have happened. The free speech
issue was not raised below, and was only treated in the final
paragraph of the opinion as a "suggestion" that denying the
deduction presented a "substantial constitutional issue."2
Apparently not: "Petitioners [were] not being denied a tax
deduction because they engage in constitutionally protected
activities," but were "simply being required to pay for those
activities entirely out of their own pockets," as everyone else
did.' As even the Court's most liberal member, Justice
concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit is
characterized as a 'right' or as a 'privilege.'" 403 U.S. at 374.
230 Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indian Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707,
716 (1981).
23'

See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 627 n.6.

21'

358 U.S. 498 (1958).

m Id. at 512-13.

23 Id. at 513. This statement was at least questionable when made. If it was

saying that the prohibition did not "deny," and only required affected parties to "pay,"
then the government could require mere payment for the exercise of virtually any First
Amendment right - newspaper and poll taxes come to mind. If instead, the meat of the
sentence is that everyone else also foregoes deductions for lobbying, in 1963 Congress
amended the business deduction provisions of the Code to permit deductions for
lobbying by commercial enterprises as "ordinary and necessary" business expenses. In
the concluding sentence of its opinion in Cammarano, the Court re-emphasizes its
reliance on a congressional policy that places "everyone in the community on the same
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Douglas, put the matter in his concurrence, "[tax deductions
are a matter of grace, not of right. " ' Speiser thus dismissed,
the Court went on to uphold the denial of the business
deductions, which had no explicit basis in the Code, by
analogizing them to the prohibitions against lobbying by
charitable organizations found in 501(c)(3). 6 The restrictions
on charities evidenced a "sharply defined policy" against
deductions for lobbying expenses by whatever organizations."
Citing Slee, the Treasury "stood aside" from this political
agitation.238
In retrospect, Cammarano was the worst possible
context in which the constitutionality of the prohibitions on
charitable lobbying could have arisen. The issue came up as a
matter of corporate lobbying, long suspect for reasons that,
while not stated in the opinion, were widely known."' It came
at a time when corporate rights to free speech were only faintly
recognized," ' and it came in the context of a scheme that only
disallowed the deductions and not the entire status of the
organization itself. Worst, perhaps, the issue came unbriefed or
argued below, considered only as an afterthought in the Court's
opinion. Legal precedent has a way, however, of forgetting
context. Cammaranoset the mold.
The first case to pit the 501(c)(3) prohibitions against
the First Amendment was ChristianEchoes National Ministry
Inc. v. United States, 4' decided in 1972. The circumstances
were certainly provocative. Over a seven-year period the
Ministry had, under the leadership of conservative
televangelist Dr. Billy James Hargis, urged its readers and
listeners to support and oppose a series of laws involving

footing." Four years later, that same footing disappeared.
2" Id. at 515. Justice Douglas had written a stirring concurrence in Speiser,
striking down the California restriction. Id. at 532 (Douglas, J., concurring).
236 Cammarano,358 U.S. at 512.
27 Id.
at 512. This "sharply defined" policy began to blur a few years
following the decision, when Congress reversed the Treasury ruling in Cammaranoto
allow deductions for corporate lobbying expenses. See Act of Oct. 16, 1962, Pub. L. No.
87-834, 3(a), 76 Stat. 960, 973 (1962). As a practical matter, this decision tilted the
playing field between public charities and private industry. See R.T. Boehm, Taxes
and Politics, 22 TAX L. REV. 369, 431-32 (1967).
m3 Id.
239

See supra note 127 and accompanying text.

240See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435

U.S. 765 (1978) (invalidating
restriction of corporate expenditures in local campaign), rehearingden'd, 438 U.S. 907
(1978).
211470 F.2d 849 (10thCir. 1972).
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foreign policy, federal employment, aid to education, and
immigration.42 It urged involvement in politics "at the precinct"
level, attacked Presidents John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson
in their election campaigns, and supported Senator Strom
Thurman.243 Its annual convention endorsed Barry Goldwater
for President. 4 It would be hard to imagine activities more in
the face of 501(c)(3)'s prohibitions.
After rejecting a challenge based on the Free Exercise
Clause, 5 the Court made short work of freedom of speech.
Without reference to Speiser, it reasoned from the timehonored prologue that "tax exemption is a privilege, a matter of
grace rather than right," and found the restrictions
constitutional. The Ministry had a choice as to whether it
wanted to receive the exemption or go into politics, just as
employees had under the Hatch Act, which prohibited federal
employees from election activities. In apparent recognition that
the Hatch Act carried with it an explicit and persuasive
congressional rationale, however - the threat of a
governmental reelection machine - the Court was at last
required to articulate a reason for the prohibitions. In full, it
explained:
The Congressional purposes evidenced by the 1934 and 1954
amendments are clearly constitutionally justified in keeping with
the separation and neutrality principles particularly applicable in
this case and, more succinctly, the principle that government shall
not subsidize, directly or indirectly, those organizations whose
substantial activities are directed toward the accomplishment247 of
legislative goals or the election or debate of particular candidates.

If the study of law teaches any caution, it is that the
adverb "clearly" invites scrutiny. The Court supplied no
citation for its declaration of congressional purposes; given the
legislative history of the 1934 and 1954 amendments, it would
have been hard-pressed to do so. Nor did the Court cite judicial
precedent, which, as seen, was equally scarce. It did offer
"separation and neutrality" as reasons "particularly applicable"
Id. at 855-56.
Id.
244 Id. at 856.
245 Id. at 856-67. See infra text accompanying notes 299-304.
the benefits at
246 ChristianEchoes Nat'l Ministry, 470 F.2d at 857. Of course,
issue in Speiser and its progeny were also privileges, and not rights. Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513 (1958).
242
243

247

ChristianEchoes Nat'l Ministry, 470 F.2d at 857-58.
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in this case, but the "more succinct" principle it provides is
simply a restatement of the prohibition itself: government will
not subsidize political activity. If the Court meant that a
subsidy could be denied because it was only a "matter of grace,"
then at some point it would have to deal with the language of
Speiser: denial of a tax benefit becomes no less a penalty by its
label. Ten years later, the Supreme Court was forced to face
48
the issue, in Regan v. Taxation With Representation.'
Taxation With Representation, a charity with the
quixotic mission of promoting the "public interest" in federal
tax policy, was denied recognition under § 501(c)(3) because its
activities would include substantial lobbying. Taxation With
Representation claimed violations of both its rights to free
speech and to equal protection under the law.2 9 The Court
began, as one might by this time have guessed, with the
observation that the deductions in question were "a form of
subsidy" administered through the tax system; they had "much
the same effect" as a cash grant." Congress had allowed a
limited subsidy in permitting exempt organizations to lobby; in
§ 501(c)(3), it had simply precluded them from receiving tax
deductible contributions. This so, the case was seen to fit
Cammarano, which upheld the denial of lobbying expenses as
business deductions because no further denial was involved."'
Uncomfortable, perhaps, with the flat assertion that
"only a matter of grace" legitimized any and all tax
penalties,
the Taxation With Representation Court, like the Christian
Echoes Court earlier, was forced to look for reasons behind the
501(c)(3) prohibitions themselves. It began by rejecting the lens
of strict scrutiny normally required for many speech
restrictions, reasoning in a somewhat circular fashion that the
248 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
M Id.
at 545-46. The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia
Circuit had granted the equal protection claim, on the grounds that Congress had,
without substantial basis, allowed exempt veterans organizations to lobby without
restriction; the Supreme Court overturned, finding it "not irrational" for Congress to
favor veterans, who merited special favor for their contributions to the national
defense. Id. at 547 n.8, 551-52.
250 Id.
at 544. The Court added, by footnote, that "in stating that
exemptions
and deductions, on one hand, are like subsidies, we of course do not mean to assert that
they are in all respects identical." Id. at 544 n.5 (citing Walz v. Commissioner, 397 U.S.
664 (1970). Walz had found property tax exemptions to churches not to be subsidies,
prohibited by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The line is,
apparently, a fine one.
251 Id.
at 546. The reliance on Cammarano was
something of a trompe d'oeil. It
was Cammaranothat relied on the (c)(4) restriction on charities to reach its conclusion.
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restrictions applied only to subsidies, which were only a matter
of grace."' Strict or not, however, the Court could not avoid all
scrutiny and so, at last, it had to determine whether the
52
prohibition was "within Congress' broad power in this area."
It was:
It appears that Congress was concerned that exempt organizations
might use tax-deductible contributions to lobby to promote the
private interests of their members. See 78 CONG. REc. 5861 (1934)
(remarks of Senator Reed); id. at 5959 (remarks of Senator
LaFollette). It is not irrational for Congress to decide that tax
exempt charities such as TWR should not further benefit at the
expense of taxpayers at large by obtaining a further subsidy for
lobbying. 54

To the extent, then, that Taxation With Representation
offers a rationale for the legislative prohibition, it is a new
arrival on the scene: insulation of Congress from the selfinterest of donors to charitable organizations. The Congress
55
itself was hardly clear in providing this reason. Further, had
it been, first amendment analysis would still call for the
prohibition to be the least onerous means to keep these private
interests away from Congress." Required disclosure of major
donors and their interests, for example, come to mind.
Limitations on major donors and on corporate contributions to
these charities also come to mind. Both alternatives would find
a home in federal election laws some years later.
part of Taxation With
most important
The
Representation for 501(c)(3) charities, however, was not in its
upholding of the lobbying restriction but, rather, in its approval
of closely coordinated lobbying by a companion 501(c)(4) social
welfare organization.257 According to the Court, the reason that
at 548. The Court noted in this regard the absence of any attempt to
suppress "dangerous ideas." Id. The court ignored, or perhaps was not aware, that the
prohibitions arose in large part to eliminate public support for anti-social and
unpopular ideas. See supra text accompanying notes 58-64. The Court's conclusion also
clashes with its later findings in the federal elections cases that the fact that a limit on
political speech is content-neutral does not make it any less limiting. See infra text
accompanying notes 462-64.
Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. at 550.
'5
52 Id.

254

Id.

255 See supra text accompanying notes 120-29. Indeed, Congress gave up on an

attempt to restrict the limitation to self-interested donors. Id.
256 See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (invalidating affidavits for
school teachers). See generally JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 848 (3d

ed. 1986) (describing least restrictive alternative test).
257 461 U.S. at 544.
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the 501(c)(3) restriction passed constitutional muster was that
the prohibition reached no farther than the disallowance of the
deductions for lobbying.'
A charity could promote its
legislative agenda through a separately incorporated alter ego,
also tax exempt, with no more administrative burden than to
keep records "adequate to show that tax deductible
contributions are not used for lobbying."'" In so stating, the
Court was rewriting the law. IRS policy at the time had been
far more restrictive on the permissible relationship between
(c)(3) and (c)(4) organizations, requiring, inter alia, that the
boards of directors of the two organizations be fully distinct
and that the (c)(3) organization not "control" the (c)(4)." ° As the
concurring opinion of the Court noted, however, "[Ilt hardly
answers one person's objection to a restriction on his speech
that another person, outside his control, may speak for him. " 61
After Taxation With Representation, all that was required, in
effect, for (c)(3) organizations to lobby was separate
accounting." A large door had opened.
See id. at 551, 553 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
259 See id. at 551.
26o See Thomas A. Troyer & Albert G. Lauber, Jr., Supreme Court's TWR
DecisionProvides Guidance in 501(c)(3) Lobbying, 59 J. TAX'N 66, 68 (1983).
Before the TWR decision, the nature of the relationships that could properly
subsist between a public charity and a Section 501(c)(4) affiliate was unclear.
Neither the Code nor the Regulations provided any guidance, and the
permissible contours of the "dual structure" were effectively determined by
IRS enforcement policy. At various times in the past, the Service had
challenged (or suggested it might challenge) a charity's exempt status if the
charity controlled the positions taken by a lobbying affiliate; if the charity
shared facilities, policy priorities, and overall strategy with the affiliate.., or
if the two groups had substantially identical directors and personnel.
Id.
For example, the Service had forced the NAACP to sever its connections
with the activist NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund in 1957. Id. at 68 n.10.
The Service also had ruled against the Center on Corporate Responsibility, which
shared personnel and office space with a lobbying affiliate. See Center on Corporate
Responsibility, Inc. v. Shultz, 368 F. Supp. 863 (D.D.C 1973). See also Gen. Couns.
Mem. 33,912 (Aug. 15, 1968) (501(c)(3) subsidiary will defeat charitable exemption if it
is "an arm, agent, or integral part of the parent").
2
461 U.S. at 553 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
262 The D.C. Circuit recently returned
to this line of reasoning in a free
exercise of religion claim. See infra text accompanying notes 299-304.
263 In practice, many 501(c)(3) organizations
that wish to lobby have created
(c)(4) affiliates, and 501(c)(4)'s that wish to fund the educational aspects of their social
welfare organizations through deductible contributions have established educational
charities under 501(c)(3). Some organizations are separate only on paper; other
organizations may have separate facilities and a few different board members, but
work together so closely that they refer to each other as sister organizations. See
websites for the following organizations: National Rifle Association, at http://www.nra-

20031

LIMITS OF CHARITY

The Court reaffirmed the rationale of Taxation With
2
Representationin FCC v. League of Women Voters ' and Rust v.
Sullivan.2 " In League of Women Voters, government grants to
non-commercial radio stations were conditioned by a
prohibition against editorializing. Radio stations only used
government money to fund about one-quarter of their
expenditures, but under the prohibition radio stations could
spend no money - regardless of whether it came from the
government - on editorializing." The majority found the
prohibition went too far. Had the prohibition applied only to
the government monies, however, it would have been
constitutional."7 The Rust Court took this reasoning to a new
level. Citing Cammarano and Taxation With Representation as
precedent, the majority went so far as to approve a ban on
information about abortion by federally-funded medical clinics,
on the basis that the doctors could provide this information in
their spare time.2" Applying Rust to the issue at hand, if a
content-based restriction is permissible because there is an
alternative so slight as the possibility of a doctor providing free
foundation.org/foundation/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2003); American Association for
Retired People, at http://www.aarp.org/press/disclosure.html (last visited Oct. 28,
2003); American Obesity Association, at http://www.obesity.org/subs/about.shtml (last
visited Oct. 28, 2003); U.S. Sportsmen's Alliance, at http://www.ussportsmen.org
/interactive/features/Readl.cfm?ID=32 (last visited Oct. 28, 2003); National Center for
Tobacco Free Kids, at http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/organization/donate.shtml (last
visited Oct. 28, 2003); We The People Foundation, at http://www.givemeliberty.org
aboutus.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2003); Taxpayers for Common Sense, at
http://www.taxpayer.net/about/index.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2003; Coalition to Stop
Gun Violence, at http://www.gunfree.org/contentledfundintro.html (last visited Oct.
28, 2003); Texas Campaign for the Environment, at http://www.texasenvironment.org/
about tce.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2003); Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep
and Bear Arms, Partnership for Caring, at http://www.partnershipforcaring.org/AboutUs/fundset.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2003), Women's World Banking, at
http://www.swwb.org/English/5000/how-can-you-contribute-to wwb.htm (last visited
Oct. 28, 2003), Stephanie Roper Foundation, at http://www.stephanieroper.org/
foundation.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2003); American Association of University Women,
at http://www.aauw.org/about/aauw-corporate overview.pdf (last Oct. 28, 2003);
Handmade in America, at http://www.handmadeinamerica.orglabout/board.htm (last
visited Oct. 28, 2003); and the San Francisco Bicycle Coalition, at
www.sfbike.org/about-sfbc/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2003).
26 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
26 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
26 468 U.S. at 400.
267 See id. The decision in League of Woman Voters calls in question whether
of Taxation With Representation is the availability of an alternative, or
basis
the real
simply the fact that the prohibition does not go beyond the subsidy. In the wake of
Rust, the latter may prove to be the only tenable ground; the alternative suggested in
Rust was illusory. See 500 U.S. at 211 n.3, 217 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
268 Rust, 500 U.S. at 193.
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information to poor clients outside of an official setting, then
challenges to content-neutral restrictions are history.' From a
free speech standpoint, the 501(c)(3) prohibitions are
constitutional.!"0
2. Freedom of Religion
Organized religion has a long history in American
politics, supporting for some a special claim for privileges and
for others a special need for restraint. For their part, the courts
have declared that the current political restraints do not
impair freedom of religion, and their reasoning has sounded
strongly in favor of a need for restraint. The pole stars of this
issue are the First Amendment's guarantee of free exercise of
religion and its prohibition against the establishment of
religion.' It is not always easy to steer a course between them.
a. Free Exercise
The early New England colonies were for all intents and
purposes theocracies, and in the succeeding centuries churches
played important roles in, among other highly-charged political
issues, the anti-slavery and civil rights movements.2 "2 Churches
269But see Legal Servs. Corp. v.

Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 549 (2001)
(discussing Congress prohibiting Legal Services grantees from raising certain
arguments in the defense of their clients, a restriction held to violate the First
Amendment). A vigorous dissent by four Justices pointed out that the case was
indistinguishable from Rust. Id. at 553-55.
270In addition to Speiser and its progeny, tvo other lines
of cases have also
presented free speech challenges to § 501(c)(3). The first concerns its application to
'educational" organizations, stricken for vagueness in Big Mama Rag Inc. v. United
States, 631 F.2d 1030, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1980), which was upheld as applied in Nat'l
Alliance v. United States, 710 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Both cases cited Speiser for the
proposition that "discriminatory denial of tax exemptions for engaging in particular
speech can impermissibly infringe constitutionally protected rights." 710 F.2d at 875;
631 F.2d at 1034. The second line concerns denial of exempt status for segregated
private schools. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); Green
v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1971), affd sub nom.Coit v. Green, 404 U.S.
997 (1971). Each of these latter opinions found the "compelling state interest" in
eliminating segregation to override Speiser-based claims of the denial of a benefit for
the exercise of constitutionally-protected rights. 461 U.S. at 604; 330 F. Supp. at 1167.
Not treated separately in this Article, but at times raised in litigation over Code
restrictions as applied to charities, is freedom of association. This claim, when
addressed, has been subsumed in the free speech and free exercise claims.
271 The First Amendment states, in relevant part:
"Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. .
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
271 See CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICAN HISTORY
(John F. Wilson & Donald
L. Drakeman eds., 2d ed. 1986); ANSON PHELPS STOKES & LEO PHEFFER, CHURCH AND
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of particular faiths engaged openly in the presidential
campaigns of Thomas Jefferson (one preacher warning that, if
Jefferson were elected, his listeners would be forced to hide
their Bibles in wells);273 William Howard Taft (called an
2 Al Smith (a Roman
"infidel" because he was a Unitarian);74
Catholic, about whose candidacy an evangelist preacher told
his congregation, "If you vote for Al Smith, you're voting
against Christ and you'll all be damned");275 and John F.
Kennedy (about whom another evangelist warned that "Roman
Catholicism's bloody hand," could "spell the death of a free
church in a free state and our hopes of continuance of full
religious liberty in America").27
The Catholic Church, for its part, took the lead role in
the anti-abortion movement, opposing vice presidential
candidate Geraldine Ferraro and declaring that particular prochoice candidates risked ex-communication;277 with regard to
the Code's restrictions on political activity, one Catholic
newspaper headlined its editorial, "To the IRS - 'NUTS!!!'""'
Evangelicals took to the field again against Bill Clinton with
full-page advertisements in USA Today and the Washington
Times headlined, "Christians Beware," asserting that Clinton's
9
policies on abortion and homosexuality contravened the Bible."
As if begging the question, the ads concluded with the
solicitation: "Tax-deductible donations for this advertisement
gladly accepted.""
The Service, notwithstanding the petitions of pro-choice
laymen and clergy, was not about to touch the Catholic Church
with the proverbial ten-foot pole."' Nor would it touch the black
STATE IN THE UNITED STATES (1964); RELIGION AND SOCIAL CONFLICT (Robert Lee &

Martin E. Marty eds., 1964).

273 EDMUND FULLER & DAVID E. GREEN,

GOD IN THE WHITE HOUSE: THE

FAITHS OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTS 28 (1968).
2'4 ALBERT J. MENENDEZ, RELIGION AT THE POLLS 33 (1977).
275 Id. at 21.
176

MENENDEZ, supra note 274, at 69.

277 See Robert D. McFadden, Archbishop Calls FerraroMistaken on Abortion

Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1984, at Al.
278 The journal, identified as the official publication of the San Antonio, Texas
archdiocese of the Catholic Church, is identified in Abortion Rights Mobilization v.
Regan. Plaintiffs Amended Compliant at 8, 544 F. Supp. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (No. 80
Civ. 5590 (RLC), Jan. 30, 1981) (on file with author).
279 See Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137,140 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
280Id. at 140.
281 See Abortion Rights Mobilization, 544 F. Supp. 471. The complaint, filed by
individuals and other religious faiths opposed to the Church's abortion policies,
challenged IRS inaction in the face of Church involvement in electoral campaigns. See
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Baptist congregations that formed the financial base and the
get-out-the-vote machine for presidential candidate Jesse
Jackson." What finally bestirred the Service, and the
Congress, to action was the explosion of the religious right into
electoral politics in the early 1980s." By 1984, evangelist
activists claimed that they had taken over more than half of
the Republican Party in Minnesota, adding, "we intend to use
the Republican Party as a vehicle."' Evangelical churches
played strongly in the presidential campaigns of Ronald
Reagan' and George Bush the elder," and ran their own
candidate, Pat Robertson, as well."7 In that same time frame,
the cartoonist Gary Trudeau featured his lead character,
Doonesbury, in front of a television commercial that began ...
and ended:
Hi. This is God. Normally, as the Supreme Being, I try to transcend
partisan politics. But this year is different. This year, for the first
time in your history, you have a chance to vote for the only party
that's actually doing My Work .... Paid for by the Reagan-God ReElection Committee.

Prompted by news accounts and by congressional
hearings in 1987,"9 the Service began moving against the most
egregious examples of electioneering by religious institutions,'
also Plaintiffs Amended Complaint at 8, Abortion Rights Mobilization, 544 F. Supp.
471. After much delay, the complaint was dismissed, for lack of standing.
282 See Richard N. Ostling, Jesse Takes Up The Collection, TIME, Feb. 6, 1984,
at 57 ("At every church he visits, members of the congregation are asked to come
forward with gifts of as much as $1,000 and as little as $20."); Black ChurchesRaise 1
Million for Jackson, JET, July 23, 1984, at 22; Jeannye Thorton, Blacks Turn to Church
in Political Drive, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Feb. 6, 1984, at 45 (NAACP used

church space and resources for voter education and registration).
2m See ROBERT ZWIER, BORN-AGAIN POLITICS: THE NEW CHRISTIAN RIGHT IN
AMERICA (1982); Richard N. Ostling, Power, Glory and Politics: Right Wing Preachers
Dominate the Dial, TIME, Feb. 17, 1986, at 62; Jim Buie, Praise the Lord and Pass the
Ammunition, CHURCH AND STATE, October 1984.
28 Sidney Blumenthal, The Righteous Empire, THE NEW REPUBLIC,
Oct. 22,

1984, at 18, 23 (quoting Gary Jarmin of Christian Voice).
See id; see also Walter Shapiro et al., Politics and the Pulpit: Reagan and
Mondale fought the first battle of the fall campaign last week on a surprise issue religion, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 17, 1984, at 24.
See William Scott Malone, Bush and the Bakker Connection: On His Way to
the White House, the Vice-President Wooed the Preacher,WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 1988, at

Cl.

287 Charles R. Babcock, Robertson Blending Charity and
Politics;Tax Exempt
Television Ministry Was Foundationfor Campaign, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 1987, at Al.
Gary Trudeau, Doonesbury (undated) (on file with author).
289 See infra text accompanying
notes 420-26.

See Letter from Robert I. Braver, Internal Revenue Service, to the Hon.
J.J. Pickle, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight, Committee on Ways and Means,
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moves that continued into the 1990s. 9 ' Whether due to the
deterrent effect of these enforcement actions or to a subsequent
change of philosophy in a new administration, these actions
have since abated. Beginning many years before, however,
churches protested the restrictions on, inter alia, the free
expression of their beliefs. The issue came to a head in
Christian Echoes," whose treatment of the free speech
challenge has been discussed above.
The Christian Echoes National Ministry's other
challenge was that the Service, by restricting the activities of
the church, violated the free exercise of religion and the
"excessive entanglement" prong of the Establishment Clause. 3
The free exercise claim was not superficial. The Ministry, like
many evangelical churches, held political action to conform
government to biblical teachings as central to its practice.' Its
mission was to change the world. Further, probing the
activities of the Ministry to determine which sermon, which
newsletter, which fund-raiser, and which meeting was political
would involve the Service in exactly the type of day-to-day,
case-by-case oversight that was entanglement, pure.'
Dismissing both challenges, the Tenth Circuit found
that the Ministry's argument was "tantamount to the
proposition that the First Amendment right of free exercise of
religion.., in effect, protects those exercising the right to do so
29 Fetters were, indeed, possible "in keeping with
unfettered.""
an overwhelming and compelling governmental interest," as in
the case of the Hatch Act prohibiting federal employees from
electioneering." What was the compelling interest in this case?
"That of guarantying that the wall separating church and state

U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 8, 1989) (on file with author) (stating that "the
Service's continuing to devote significant examination resources to media evangelist
causes," and attaching a docket of pending investigations).
291See Andrew Mollison, Churches' Tax Exemptions Jeopardized
by
Politicking, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), July 20, 1996, at A18; Ruth Muds, FEC
Sues Christian Coalition, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), July 31, 1996, at A2; Peter
H. Stone, One Step Over the Line?, NATIONAL JOURNAL, July 29, 1996, at 1449
(identifying "about 30" IRS investigations of political participation by charities).
22 Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United
States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th
Cir. 1972). See infra text accompanying notes 319-37.
293 ChristianEchoes Nat'l Ministry, 470
F.2d at 856.
29

Id. at 851-53.

295
296

Id. at 856 (citing to the conclusion of the district court below).
Id.

2'97

Id. at 857.
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remain high and firm."' In the mind of this court, then,
preventing undue religious influence in politics, similar to
preventing undue government influence through its employees,
was a trumping state rationale.
Twenty-five years later, the District of Columbia Circuit
had the opportunity to modify or reject the reasoning of
Christian Echoes concerning the need to restrain religion in
politics. It did neither. " In Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, the
Service had revoked the 501(c)(3) exemption of the Church at
Pine Creek for high-profile, public advertising against
candidate Bill Clinton during the 1992 presidential campaign.3 0
As in Christian Echoes, the Church's primary claim was that
the revocation violated the right to free exercise of its religion."'
The D.C. Circuit would not go there. It found, instead, that
even if such a right were implicated here, the requirements of
501(c)(3) imposed no substantial burden on the Church."'
Citing both Taxation With Representation and Cammarano,the
court noted that the Church could opt to forego deductibility
and politic all it wanted, or it could set up a companion
501(c)(4) and through it conduct both its lobbying and electoral
campaigns."' This concluded, the court needed not decide
whether the 501(c)(3) restrictions served a compelling
3
government interest. 11
b. Establishment
Left undecided by Christian Echoes and Branch
Ministries was the effect of the First Amendment's prohibition
against the establishment of religion. Assuming that the Code's
political activity limits do not impair free exercise, the question
remains whether these restrictions are not in fact compelled by
the separation of church and state. More specifically, would the
granting of significant tax benefits to religious organizations
for the purpose of engaging in politics act to establish religion
in a manner prohibited by the First Amendment?

29 ChristianEchoes Nat'l Ministry, 470 F.2d at 857.
29 Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
300 See supra text accompanying note 285.
301 Branch Ministries,211 F.3d
at 139.
302 Id.
at 142.
'o
304

Id. at 142-44.
Id. at 144.
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The framers of the Constitution took establishment
seriously."' Reacting to the history of religion and government
in Europe and the colonies,3" Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison, primary architects of the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights, were both adamant on the need to separate church and
state. Jefferson "contemplate [d] with sovereign reverence [the]
act of the whole American people" in ratifying the First
Amendment and "thus building a wall of separation between
church and State.""3 Madison wrote that "the duty towards the
Creator" must be "wholly exempt from" the cognizance "of Civil
Society.".. 8 Alexander Hamilton was not far behind." The
French scholar and observer of the early American scene Alexis
De Tocqueville was struck by how firmly that principle was
embedded in the new United States, even within the clergy.
"[Aill thought that the main reason" for religious harmony in
America "was the complete separation of church and state," he
wrote, adding "throughout my stay in America I met nobody,
3 . He continued:
lay or cleric, who did not agree about that."
I have shown in the first part of this book how the American clergy
stands aloof from public business. Religion in America is a world
apart in which the clergyman is supreme, but one which he is careful
never to leave; within the limits he guides men's minds, while
outside them he leaves men to themselves[. 3 1

The principle of separation held nearly inviolate well
into the twentieth century. A number of federal courts, up to
305

For a concise summary of the background to the First Amendment's

religion clauses, see Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 8-14 (1946).
30 Id. at 9-10.
307 Letter from

Thomas Jefferson to Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins, and
Stephen S. Nelson, Committee of the Danbury, Connecticut Baptist Ass'n (Jan. 1, 1802)
in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 518-19 (Saul K Padover ed., 1943).
308 James
Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments, reprinted in 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 184 (G. Hunt ed., 1901)
(1784).
309ALEXANDER HAMILTON ET AL., THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 69,
at 422

(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (contrasting the U.S. President with the King of England:
"The one has no particle of spiritual jurisdiction; the other is the Supreme head and
governor of the national church!").
310 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 220, at 295. Describing the separation of
power as a tradeoff, he further observed:
The American clergy were the first to perceive this truth and to act in
conformity with it. They saw that they would have to give up religious
influence if they wanted to acquire political power, and they preferred to lose
the support of the authority rather than to share its vicissitudes.
Id. at 288-89.
311Id. at 448.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69: 1

and including the Supreme Court, had signaled danger in the
influence of religion on politics. Thus, in McGowan v.
3 "2 the Court opined that the state could not "openly
Maryland,
or secretly" participate in the affairs of religious organizations,
and "vice versa."3 3 In Engel v. Vitale, "' the Court's reasons
began to surface:
[The Establishment Clause's] first and most immediate purpose
rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to
destroy government and to degrade religion. The history of
governmentally established religion, both in England and this
country, showed that whenever government had allied itself with
one particular form of religion, the inevitable result had been that it
had incurred the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of those who
held contrary beliefs. 1 5

The Court elaborated on this thesis in Lemon v.
Kurtzman,' holding in the context of support for religious
schools that "entanglement of yet a different character [was]
presented by the divisive political potential of these state
programs."3 "' It would be "unrealistic to ignore the fact that
many people confronted with issues of this kind will find their
votes aligned with their faith." ' With particular reference to
the issue at hand in this study, the Court continued:
Ordinarily political debate and division, however vigorous or even
partisan, are normal and healthy manifestations of our democratic
system of government, but political division along religious lines was
one of the principle evils against which the First Amendment was
intended to protect .... The history of many countries attests to the
hazards of religion's intruding into the political arena or of political
power intruding into the legitimate and free exercise of religious
belief 319

Only seven years after Lemon, however, the Court
invalidated a Tennessee state constitutional provision
prohibiting clergy from serving in the state legislature.
Dismissing the argument that the inclusion of clergy would
embroil the government in religious conflict, the majority in
312

366 U.S. 420 (1961).
at 443.

313 Id.

314370 U.S. 421 (1962).
315
316

Id. at 431.
403 U.S. 602 (1971).

31' Id. at 622.
318
319

Id.
Id. at 622-23 (emphasis added).
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3.. concluded that
McDaniel v. Paty
"the American experience
321
provides no" basis for this "fear." Justice Brennan, who had
authored the opinion in Walz v. Tax Commission approving
state property tax exemptions for the Catholic Church,322
concurred, stating that "the antidote" provided by the
constitution against "zealots who would inject sectarianism
into the political process" is to subject them to "the marketplace
of ideas," the Great Religious-Political Bazaar.
Having lowered the wall of separation in McDaniel, the
Court raised it again in Larkin v. Grendel's Den,32" where the
state of Massachusetts had granted both churches and schools
the opportunity to veto liquor licenses within five hundred feet
of their premises. The majority began its analysis with the
principle of separation, through which "[rieligion and
government, each insulated from each other, could then
coexist." 2 Citing its own precedents, the separation was soon to
work in both directions, with "churches excluded from the
affairs of government,"32"' thereby "rescu[ing] the temporal
institutions from religious interference."32 7 Under the statute at
hand, the church power was "standardless, calling for no
reasons, findings or reasoned conclusion,"' which created the
"danger of political fragmentation ... on religious lines. " The
mere appearance of such authority provided "significant
symbolic benefit " "° to religious institutions in the mind of the
public, for whom these institutions would be political decision
makers. All of which, the Court concluded, had the primary
effect of advancing religion," ' violating the Establishment
Clause.
Of course, the word "establishment" is not self-defining.
Beginning in the 1940s, a series of closely-divided cases has
permitted an ever-widening range of state support for religious

320435 U.S. 618 (1978).
321Id. at 629.
322Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
3M McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 642 (Brennan, J., concurring).
324
325

459 U.S. 116 (1982).
Id. at 122.

326Id. at 126 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614
(1971)).
327Id. (citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 679, 730 (1872)).
32 Id. at 125.
329Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116, 127 (1982) (citing Lemon,
403 U.S.

at 623).
33
331

Id. at 125.
Id. at 126.
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activities, including property tax exemptions,332 school busing,'
after school meetings,' and most recently, school vouchers."
33' upheld
The seminal decision, Everson v. Board of Education,
public funding for transportation to public and parochial
schools. The majority opinion reads as if written by two
different, and differing, individuals. It opens with a paean to
the Establishment Clause, its history, reasons, and continuing
vitality.37 It closes with the statement that, "[tihe First
Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That
wall must be kept high and impregnable. We would not
approve the slightest breach."' This said, however, somewhere
beyond the rhetoric, the Court found that no establishment
occurred.3" Justice Jackson, dissenting, pointed out the
anomaly with an analogy to Lord Byron's Julia who,
"whispering 'I will ne'er consent' - consented."" 6 Justice
Rutledge, also dissenting, prophesied that following this breach
of the wall would come a second, third, and fourth, and thus
"the most solid freedom steadily gives way before continuing
corrosive decision. " "
and
the
proved
prescient,
Justice
Rutledge
establishment principle has remained under siege. Originally
guided by a "three-pronged test" requiring "a secular purpose,"
a "primary effect" that neither "advances nor inhibits religion,"
and the avoidance of "excessive government entanglement, ' "'
more recent majority opinions boil the inquiry down to a
question of "neutrality" of benefits among secular and nonsecular institutions." To a majority of the current Court, so
332 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 554, 678-79 (1970). See also Mueller v.

Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1953) (permitting state tax deductions for religious school
expenses).
333See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947).
Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990). See also Prince v. Jacoby, 303
F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2002); Ceniceros v. Bd. of Tr., 106 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 1997).
33'See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
336330 U.S. 1 (1947).
337Id. at 8-14.
31 Id. at 18.
339 Id. at 17-18.
340 Id.
at 19.
341 Everson, 330 U.S. at 29.
342See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). See generally
NOWAK
ET AL., supra note 256, at 1047-48 (discussing three-part test).
See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); see also William P.
Marshall, What is the Matter with Equality?: An Assessment of Equal Treatment of
Religion and Nonreligion in FirstAmendment Jurisprudence,75 IND. L.J. 193, 196-200
(2000); Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation of Neutrality, 46 EMORY
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long as the state support is provided neutrally and not for a
facially religious purpose - even if religious institutions receive
the lion's share of the benefits3" - it has a good chance of
dodging the "establishment" bullet."
At first blush, any attempt to separately limit churches
from political activity would seem to run afoul of the neutrality
principle and be unconstitutional. The cases applying this
principle to date, however, have involved state support for
educational and other apolitical activities."6 There is a major
difference in empowerment between allowing religious groups
to meet after-hours at a public school, and subsidizing a church
slate of political candidates. The subsidy is large, and the
activity goes to the heart of democratic government. To some,
including members of the Supreme Court, if the involvement of
religious organizations in politics is threatening, then the
antidote is more of it - the more the better, and may the better
view win."7 Religion and politics are inseparable, indeed they
L.J. 43 (1997). For a thoughtful development of this thesis, see Keith Werhan,
Navigating the New Neutrality: School Vouchers, the Pledge, and the Limits of a
Purposive Establishment Clause, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 603 (2003) (criticizing the Court's
reluctance to look beyond "facial" or "purposive" neutrality).
344 In Zelman, for example, the facially neutral Cleveland
school voucher
program was, in the words of Professor Werhan, a "strikingly disproportionate
financial benefit to the city's religious schools." See Werhan supra note 343, at 621.
"Forty-six of the fifty-six participating schools were religious in nature, and ninety-six
percent of the children receiving the vouchers used them to enroll in religious schools."
Id.
3
With the Court so narrowly divided on these issues, however, every vote
counts, and Justice O'Connor, who concurred with the majority in Zelman, refused to
join the same Justices in Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000), opining that "a
government-aid program [does not pass] constitutional muster solely because of the
neutral criteria it employs as a basis for distributing aid." Id. at 839. In short, federal
subsidies to religious charities may not pass the establishment bar simply because they
subsidize religious and non-religious groups alike.
346 See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (tax
deduction for school
expenses); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 694 (1970) (church property tax exceptions).
For the inconsistency of results in aid-to-education cases under the Lemon test, see
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 534 (1999), cited
in Werhan, supra note 343, at 610-11. See also 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-(1)(d)(2) (2003)
(the "advancement of religion"); RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS §371 cmt. a (1959)
(describing such advancement as including the construction of church buildings and
the dissemination of religious creeds). The question here is whether subsidies for
political activities are qualitatively different.
3
See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 629 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring);
Walz, 397 U.S. at 670 (opinion of Chief Justice Burger) ("Adherents of particular faiths
and individual churches frequently take strong positions on public issues including...
vigorous advocacy of legal or constitutional positions. Of course, churches as much as
secular bodies and private citizens have that right."). One difficulty with this argument
is that a strong majority of churches and clergy believe church involvement in politics
to be improper, see infra text accompanying notes 493-94, giving them the choice of
acting contrary to their beliefs or abandoning the field to politically active minorities.
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complement each other, and to attempt to separate them, to
say nothing of discriminating against the former, is to forego
the beneficial effects of religion on public life, and, indeed,
abandon the field to atheism."' By the very language of the
First Amendment, the wall between church and state operates
in one direction, to keep the state out of religion, not to keep
religion out of the state." Indeed, to some jurists the church
reigns supreme even in secular matters."
To others, however, organized religion plays a
dangerous role in American political life, and threatens basic
Further, as strong as the Justices' statements are, they were not made in the context of
tax subsidies for religious political activity. McDaniel did not involve a public subsidy
for clergy in the legislature, and the subsidy in Walz was not for lobbying or political
campaigns. The fact that we have not experienced a serious polarization of politics in
America over religious beliefs may be in part due to our tradition of tolerance, but may
also be in no small part due to the 501(c)(3) restrictions.
3" For a sample of the considerable literature running in this direction, see
Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., On Not Rendering to Caesar: The Unconstitutionalityof
Tax Regulation of Activities of Religious OrganizationsRelating to Politics, 40 DEPAUL
L. REV. 1 (1990) (emphasizing the history and value of religious organizations in
politics); Michael W. McConnell, Five Reasons to Reject the Claim that Religious
Arguments Should be Excluded from Democratic Deliberation, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 639
(arguing that churches are no different than other participants in public debate); Anne
Berrill Carroll, Religion, Politics, and the IRS: Defining the Limits of Tax Articles on
PoliticalExpression by Churches, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 217 (1992) (arguing, inter alia, for
reduced sanctions for political involvement); Symposium, The Conflicted First
Amendment: Tax Exemptions, Religious Groups and PoliticalActivity, 42 B.C. L. REV.
733 (2001) (presenting seven articles that, in their sum, challenge every aspect of the
political activity restrictions from their history to their constitutionality and effect on
religious freedom and political discourse; several of these articles are cited individually
in this study). See also KENT GREENWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL
CHOICE (1988); Laurence Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1282 (2d ed. 1988);
RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA (2d ed. 1984) (secular argument leaves the "public square" bereft of religionbased civic virtue).
349 See Gaffney, supra note 348, at 9, 51 (quoting the Williamsburg Charter, "a
bicentennial document celebrating the meaning of the religion clauses" of the First
Amendment, which declared, "the No Establishment Clause separates Church from
State but not religion from politics or public life"); Michael W. McConnell, Why
'Separation'is Not the Key to Church - State Relations, THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Jan.
18, 1989; Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible: Settling the Just Bonds Between Church
and State, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2255 (1997).
m See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV.
1, 11-12 (1985).
[R]eligious claims - if true - are prior to and of greater dignity than the
claims of the state. If there is a God, His authority necessarily transcends the
authority of nations; that, in part, is what we mean by "God." For the state to
maintain that its authority is in all matters supreme would be to deny the
possibility that a transcendent authority could exist. Religious claims thus
differ from secular moral claims both because the state is constitutionally
disabled from disputing the truth of the religious claim and because it cannot
categorically deny the authority on which such a claim rests.
Id. at 15.
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principles of democracy: discourse, reason, and compromise."'
The special difficulty of religion is that its arguments are based
on the word of God, which do not lend themselves easily to
debate, reason, or a search for consensus."' The discourse
threatens to become one God against another, or worse, antiGod, 3u the pernicious results of which were as apparent to the
framers as they may be to even a casual reader of the
newspaper today."M A second danger is an electorate prepared indeed commanded in some churches - to vote by faith,35 and of
351 See Robert Audi, The Separationof Church and State
and the Obligations
of Citizenship, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 259 (1989) (arguing that a free and democratic
society requires a secular basis for decision making); Steven C. Gey, When is Religious
Speech not Free Speech?, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 379 (maintaining that religious speech in
a political context is different from secular speech and argument); Arlen Specter,
Defending the Wall: MaintainingChurch/State Separation in America, 18 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 575 (1994-95); see also Mario Cuomo, former New York Governor, Remarks
at Panel Discussion on Religion on the Stump: Politics and Faith in America, available
at website of The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life Pew Foundation,
http://pewforum.org/events/index.php?EventID=34 (Oct. 2, 2002).
35'See Robert Audi, The Place of Religious Argument in a Free and
Democratic Society, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 677, 691 (1993) ("Where religious convictions
are a basis for a disagreement, it is, other things being equal, less likely the disputants
can achieve resolution or even peacefully agree to disagree."). See also Audi, supra note
351, at 275-83, 295-96; Gey, supra note 351, at 455-56 n.331 (describing an activist
religious scholar as "declaring aloud that as a 'traditional theist' what [the scholar]
wants is a chance to win out over the 'modernist liberals' . . . it is a victory he seeks,
and he is even willing to acknowledge that if he gains it, the losers will not be treated
fairly but will 'live in a society that is hostile to the continuance of their way of life'")
(quoting Fish, supra note 349, at 2330-01).
35 Presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan described members
of the
electorate concerned with environmental issues as follows: "They turned Easter into
Earth Day and worship dirt." It's Soil We Worship, Pat, Not Dirt, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS,
Sept. 4,
1995, available at http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.PrintableArticle?articleid=1294 (last visited July 18, 2003) (quoting from a campaign speech). In
addition, the response of U.S. Senator Arlen Specter to Buchanan's "jihad" was, "Our
nation has no place for holy wars." Specter, supra note 351, at 589. For the rapid fusion
of a secular controversy with a religious one, see the remarks of Rev. Jerry Falwell in
support of American military action in Arab countries, calling the prophet Muhammad
a "terrorist." Mark O'Keefe, Anti-Islam Remarks Called Inflammatory, TIMESPICAYUNE (New Orleans), Oct. 6, 2002, at A36. See also Cal Thomas, The Terrorist
Threat Among Us, THE AUGUSTA CHRONICLE, May 23, 2003, at A4 (raising the alarm
that "our enemies have invaded the United States through immigration for the express
purpose of organizing themselves politically" and pointing out that, "[iun it least 16
states, Muslim groups, by their own admission, are organizing voter-registration drives
and political consciousness-raising events"). For true believers, democracy has its
limits.
". One may take notice of the numerous religious differences
underlying
political and armed conflicts throughout the world. Indeed, one cannot avoid it.
35 See Dissenting PoliticiansFace Catholic Scrutiny, TIMES-PICAYUNE
(New
Orleans), Nov. 11, 2003, at A4 ("The nation's Roman Catholic bishops Monday said
they are considering whether to recommend sanctions for Catholic politicians who
favor policies contrary to church teachings on abortion and other issues .... [One
member of a task force of bishops] said some dioceses already ban from church property
elected officials who support abortion rights."); James N. Goodsell, Cardinal'sAbortion
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legislators beholden to (or intimidated by) the power of this
command by a dominating church in a state or region. ' 6A third
difficulty, noted by the Court in another context, relates to
money and the nature of religious giving, which is more in the
order of a tithe than a contribution to promote a particular
belief. In their sum, these are large tithes, more than one-third
of all charitable contributions."7 As the federal courts have
noted with the aggregation of for-profit corporate wealth,3 " the
sum does not necessarily represent the stockholders.'
Letter Stirs Political Controversy, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 15, 1980 (describing
a Catholic cardinal's letter urging Catholics to vote against political candidates
favoring Medicaid funding of abortions); Bruce Alpert, Landrieu, Opponents, Divided
on Abortion, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Oct. 13, 2002, at Al ("In the final days of
the 1996 U.S. Senate race, retired Archbishop Philip Hannan sent shock waves
through the state's political world with a public declaration that it would be a sin for
Catholics to vote for Mary Landrieu because of her support of abortion rights.").
356See El Papa Insta a los Politicos Catolicos a Legislar Conforme a la
Doctrina de la Iglesia [The Pope Insists That Catholic Politicians Legislate in
Conformity with Church Doctrine], EL PAIS (Spain), Jan. 17, 2003, at 1; see also Audi,
supra note 351; Gey, supra note 351, at 456-57 (continuing controversy over religious
teaching in Atlanta public schools). There are similar pressures at the local level. See
James Gill, Candidate Targeted for Backing the Law, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans),
Oct. 23, 2002, at B7 (describing continuing controversy over religious teaching in public
schools); Ed Anderson, 'Choose Life" Plates Hit Road in La., TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), Nov. 2, 2002, at A4 (describing controversy over new state license plate
reading 'Choose Life"). The impact of church involvement in politics is felt in indirect
proportion to the level at which it is exercised, and is at its strongest at the local level
with school boards, cities, and counties - the foundations, one could argue, of
democracy. The impact, nonetheless, can also reach the highest levels of government.
See supra notes 289-293. For a remarkable insight into the impact of religious
involvement in electoral campaigns at the presidential level, see Specter, supra note
351, at 575, describing the grip of the Religious Right on the 1992 Republican
Presidential Convention and commenting on how the author's 'incidental reference to
the 'basic American principle of separation of church and state' caused the hall to erupt
with boos." If this impact can be so strongly felt by a senior and established United
States senator whose reelection was not even at issue, one gets a sense that, for more
vulnerable elected officials, the impact is an order of magnitude greater.
357 See supra note
221.
". See Beaumont v. FEC, 278 F.3d 261, 272 (4th Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted), rev'd, 123 S.Ct. 2200 (2003):
[Tihe possibility of distortion of political support for corporate causes has
been recognized as a form of corruption significant enough to warrant
government regulation. Distortion involves the concern that '[tihe resources
in the treasury of a business corporation ... are not an indication of popular
support for the corporation's political ideas." Instead, these resources may
reflect only 'the economically motivated decisions of investors and
customers." The fear here is that shareholders or members of certain
corporations will have an 'economic disincentive for disassociating with [the
corporation] if they disagree with its political activity." Accordingly, the
potential for distortion is also a compelling governmental interest for limiting
political expression.
319It is not difficult to encounter an active church member who strongly
opposes his or her church's political position on a given issue, and even the idea of the
church taking a political position at all. See Review of Internal Revenue Code Section

2003]

LIMITS OF CHARITY

These kinds of arguments may well have persuaded the
founding fathers. To Jefferson, Madison, and company,
separating churches from political activity was probably
axiomatic: if one were concerned about the state establishing
religion, funding religious organizations to elect the state's
legislature would be about the most counter-intuitive step
imaginable, a straight shot down the wrong road. Times do
change, however, and by luck, tolerance, and the reinforcing
influence of the Internal Revenue Code in this century,
government has managed to keep religious involvement in
politics down to a dull roar.3" Correspondingly, we have tended
to disregard the threat."' The current trend in Congress, 62 the
Court, 3 and President George W. Bush's administration' is to
provide religious institutions an increasing amount of federal
support. We are in an establishment mode, not a separation
mode.
As the dust settles, we have a line of cases permitting
federal subsidies for religious activities on the basis of
neutrality. On the other hand, another line keeps churches out
of government decision making, for the very danger they pose
to the American political system. Where between these two
poles federal subsidies to religious institutions for political
501(c)(3) Requirements for Religious Orgs.: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight
of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. 39 (2002) (statement of
Reverend C. Welton Gaddy, Ph.D., Executive Director, Interfaith Alliance Foundation)
("When people of faith give money to their congregations as an act of devotion to God,
they should not have to worry about a portion of that money going to politicians."). To
these arguments could be added the argument made by de Tocqueville, Jefferson, and
Madison, namely that it is in the churches' own interest to keep their affairs separate
from secular political decisions, lest they bring discredit upon themselves. See DE
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 220, at 297.
360 See supra text accompanying notes 283-311.
3 See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978); but see Larkin v. Grendel's Den,
459 U.S. 116 (1982).
362 See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141, §
1, 107 Stat.
1488 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb - 2000bb4 (2000)); Houses of
Worship Political Speech Protection Act, H.R. 2357, 107th Cong. (2002) (permitting
church involvement in electoral campaigns; the bill failed in the House of
Representatives on Oct. 2, 2002 by a vote of 178-239). See also Steven Patrick, House
Shoots Down Bill Allowing Religious Groups to Fund Political Campaigns, CONG. Q.
WEEKLY, Oct. 5, 2002, at 2591.
30 See supra text accompanying notes
338-50.
36 See Press Release, White House, President Names New Faith-Based and
Community Initiatives Director (Feb. 1, 2002); Dana Milbank, Bush Issues 'FaithBased Initiative' Orders; Decrees Would Allow Religious Programs to Get Federal
Money, Contracts, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 2002, at A4; Kate Schuler, GOP May Spread
Faith-BasedLegislation Over Several Social Policy Bills, CONG. Q. WEEKLY, May 10,
2003, at 1105.
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activity falls will depend in large part on how seriously one
perceives the danger of that activity to be.' Which, in turn,
may depend on one's own religious beliefs3" - the difficulty in a
nutshell.
B.

Congress Clarifies

In the 1970s, while challenges to the 501(c)(3)
restrictions mounted in the courts, Congress stepped back into
the picture with legislation intended to soften their impact on
lobbying but to hold firm on electoral politics. The moving
impulses of these interventions were familiar, led by the same
wave of social concerns that had justified public interest
litigation, followed a decade later by a counter-attack from the
Internal Revenue Service, accompanied by a different wave of
right-wing political activity, this time in favor of the Contras in
the Nicaraguan civil war.
1. Section 501(h)
The early 1970s were America's environmental moment.
Environmental literature led the best seller list of The New
York Times,"7 and the massive public response to Earth Day
1970 took the entire country by surprise. On New Year's Day,
1970, President Richard Nixon signed the seminal National
Environmental Policy Act,6 9 to be followed by major legislation
on air, water, toxic substances, safe drinking water, solid
waste, hazardous waste, strip mining, off-shore leasing,
36 While this discussion has focused on whether subsidizing political activity
by religious institutions would violate the Establishment Clause, a free expression or
free speech challenge to the 501(c)(3) restrictions by these same institutions would turn
on the same issue of the perception of the danger and, thus, the strength of the state
interest. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. -707, 718 (1980) ("The mere fact that the
petitioner's religious practice is burdened by a governmental program does not mean
that an exemption accommodating his practice must be granted. The state may justify
the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest.").
As would be natural to expect, the most vigorous criticism of the 501(c)(3)
restraints on political activity by religious organizations comes from commentators
associated with religious and religion-affiliated institutions. See supra notes 354-56.
361 See RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962); FRANK GRAHAM, JR., SINCE
SILENT SPRING (1970).
38 See BARRY COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE, 5-11 (1971) (describing the
unexpected outpouring of public participation in Earth Day and Earth Week 1970, and
the surprise of the government). See also 117 CONG. REC. 10,313 (1971) (statement of
Sen. Muskie introducing FBI report, which alleged communist influence).
Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-4367 (2000)).
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forestry, fisheries, public lands, and endangered species. 7°
Many Americans could take legitimate credit for these
accomplishments, but anyone involved recognized the
leadership in nearly all of them of the senior Senator from
Maine, Edmund Muskie."7 ' In 1970 and 1971, Muskie was leadsponsoring and maneuvering through Congress both the Clean
Air and Clean Water Acts. He was also introducing a bill to
loosen the restrictions on public interest lobbying.
On March 30, 1971, Muskie presented his bill. "I
believe," he stated, "that voices of the environmentalists, of the
civil rights and poverty groups, of public interest law firms, are
just as important - if not more important today - than the
already finely orchestrated views of private business pursing
public policy."3 2 Muskie's bill redefined 501(c)(3) to exclude
lobbying by charities on any matter of "direct interest" to them,
which included matters "directly affecting any purpose for
which [the organization] is organized and operated."373 Over the
370

See Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 89 Stat. 1676

(1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), completed revised by the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000));
Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.) (current version at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000));
Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (current version
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2000); Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-523,
88 Stat. 1660 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-25 (2000)); Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-850, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000)) (amending
the Solid Waste Disposal Act, which regulated both solid as well as hazardous wastes);
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 85-97, 91 Stat. 445
(1977) (current version at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328(e) (2000)); Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (1978) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., and 30 U.S.C.) (current version
at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (2000); Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources
Planning Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-378, 88 Stat. 476 (1974) (current version at 16
U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687 (2000)); Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (1976) (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 (2000));
National Park System General Authorities Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-383, 84 Stat.
825 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. (2000)); Endangered
Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. and 7 U.S.C.) (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544
(2000)).
371 See
Robert F. Blomquist, Nature's Statesman: The Enduring
Environmental Law Legacy of Edmund S. Muskie of Maine, WM. & MARY ENVTL L. &
POLY REV. 233 (2000) (describing environmental record of Senator Muskie); Robert F.
Blomquist, What is Past is Prologue: Senator Muskie's Environmental Policymaking
Roots as Governor of Maine, 51 ME. L. REV. 87 (1999).
372 117 CONG. REC. 8517, 8518 (1971).
373Id.; 119 CONG. REC. 5746 (1973).
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next five years, Muskie would hound and bird-dog his proposal
into law, the new § 501(h) of the Internal Revenue Code. 74
Section 501(h) evolved from the general to the specific.
The bill's direct interest test borrowed language from a
resolution of the American Bar Association,"' which had also
caught the liberal spirit of the time. Opponents in Congress,
however, feared that this language would free charities for
unlimited lobbying, which caused Muskie to begin to draw lines
circumscribing "substantial lobbying," starting with an outer
boundary of sixty-five percent of a group's activities.1 6 His bill
picked up support from congressmen of both parties, 77 whose
primary concerns were the vagueness of the existing
"substantial" test, and the harsh and mandatory punishment
for violations, in Muskie's words, "the death penalty."37 A wide
range of testimony from the nonprofit sector reinforced these
concerns.1 9 Even the Service announced itself bedeviled with
the almost impossible task of line drawing between
"substantial" and "insubstantial," and the lack of an alternative
response between simply overlooking a violation on the one
hand, and revoking charitable status outright."
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 provided greater definition
for lobbying: objective, numerical limits qualifying substantial,
and graduated penalties depending upon the severity of the
offense."1 For the great majority of 501(c)(3) charities, small
and local organizations with budgets under five hundred
thousand dollars per year, a total of twenty percent of their
374 117 CONG. REC. 8517 (1971). See also 118 CONG. REC. 843 (1972);
119

CONG. REC. 5746 (1973); 122 CONG. REC. 13,306 (1976).
375 117 CONG. REC. 8518 (1971). See also 122 CONG. REC. 13,306 (1976); 119
CONG. REC. 5746 (1973); Kim Bouchillon, Guiding Lobbying Charities Into a Safe
Harbor: Final Section 501(h) and 4911 Regulations Set Limits for Tax-Exempt
Organizations,61 MISS. L.J. 157, 162-63 n.44 (1991).
116 See 118 CONG. REC. 843 (1972).
377 122 CONG. REC. 13,306 (1976). See also 122 CONG. REC. 12,254 (1976); 122
CONG. REc. 16,883, 16,886 (1976).
378 117 CONG. REC. 8517 (1971). See also 122 CONG. REC. 12,254, 12,255
(1976); 122 CONG. REC. 13,306 (1976); 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4029, 4104; Bouchillon, supra
note 375, at 162.
379Nonprofit groups testifying before Congress about their difficulty
understanding the vague "substantial part" test and the chilling effect of this vague
limit and its attendant sanction, included: Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts, a
YWCA in Delaware, the National Association of Mental Health, the National Audubon
Society, the American National Red Cross, and the League of Women Voters. See 119
CONG. REC. 5746 (1973).
380 119 CONG. REC. 5746 (1973).
31

Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.

§ 501(h) (2000)).
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budgets could be spent on lobbying." A charity could elect to
fall under these provisions or to remain subject to the
"substantial" test of the earlier Code. Election required no more
than filing a form with the Service; compliance meant no more
than keeping records of time and expenses - always a
nuisance, rarely a bar."3' Major violations would be taxed .
Only the egregious excesses would lead to revocation of exempt
status, the death penalty.Paradoxically, churches and religious charities were not
allowed to elect to be governed by 501(h), a restriction enacted
at their own request."' It was a tactical decision. Churches
were hoping to succeed in invalidating all such restrictions on
their activities and expenditures as unconstitutional, and
apparently felt that acquiescence in the 501(h) scheme could
compromise their position. 7 The congressional record is thus
replete with statements by House and Senate members
assuring churches that they would not be included in the §
501(h) option.' In this manner, both Congress and the
churches also avoided the tricky question of how such
382

26 U.S.C. §501(h)(1)(A) (2000); 26 C.F.R. § 56.4911-1(c)(1)(ii) (2001). Larger

organizations might expend 15% of the next $500,000, and a diminishing percentage
beyond. 26 C.F.R. § 56.4911-1(c)(1)(ii). Within these total expenditures, no more than a
quarter of the total could be used for grassroots lobbying, defined as communications to
the general public. 26 U.S.C. § 501(h)(1)(B) (2000); 26 C.F.R. § 56.4911-1(b)(2), (c)(2)
(2001). The remainder might be used for direct lobbying, which included both lobbying
of individual members of Congress and communications to members urging them to
contact their legislators. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(h)(1)(A) (2000); 26 C.F.R. § 56.4911-02(a)
(2001). See also 26 U.S.C. § 501(h)(2)(A) (defining "lobbying expenditures") (2000).
W See ELIZABETH KINGSLEY ET AL., E-ADVOCACY FOR NONPROFITS:
THE LAW
OF
LOBBYING
AND
ELECTION
RELATED
ACTIVITY
ON
THE
NET,
at
http://www.allianceforjustice.org/images/collection-images/eadvocacy.pdf (last visited
July 20, 2003).
384Violations of up to 150% of the lobbying limits - i.e. up to 30% of the
budget of an organization with a 20% ceiling - would be penalized by tax. 26 U.S.C. §
501(h)(1) (2000); 26 C.F.R. § 56.4911(c)(1)(ii) (2001); 122 CONG. REC. 12,255 (1976).
395An example of a violation of this extent would be a violation of
more than
150%, and then only if averaged over a four year period. 26 U.S.C. § 501(h)(1) (2000);
26 C.F.R. CONG. REC. 12,255 (1976).
38 122 CONG. REC. 16,886 (1976); Report and Recommendations
on Lobbying
and Political Activities by Tax-Exempt Orgs.: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversightof the House Comm. on Ways and Means, at 28, 100th Cong. 28 (1987); JOINT
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 2 GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976:
(H.R. 10612, 94TH CONGRESS, PUBLIC LAw 94-455), at 419-20 (1976); Reka Potgieter
Hoff, The Financial Accountability of Churches for Federal Income Tax Purposes:
Establishmentor Free Exercise?, 11 VA. TAX REV. 71, 146 (1991).
317 Bouchillon, supra note 375, at 164 n.56 (citing statement of James E.
Woods, Jr., Executive Director of the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, to the
House Committee on Ways and Means in 1976). Hoff, supra note 386, at 90-91 n. 97.
W8 122 CONG. REC.
12,254 (1976); 122 CONG. REC. 16,886 (1976); 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4029, 4104 (1976); Hoff, supra note 386, at 91.
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expenditures would be measured in the context of, say,
sermons advocating particular legislation.
In the same years that the Code was moving to
liberalize public interest lobbying, the Service conformed its
policies to the ruling in Taxation With Representation, allowing
full control of a 501(c)(4) organization by a 501(c)(3)
organization."s The controlled 501(c)(4) could, in turn, engage
in an unlimited amount of lobbying so long as it was related to
the social welfare purpose of the organization." A few years
later, the Congress, in an unheralded amendment, changed the
Code to disqualify corporate lobbying deductions as a necessary
business expense, leveling this part of the playing field
between business and charity."' For the next decade, this is
where matters stood until the political activities issues were
reopened by the Internal Revenue Service, and then from an
unexpected quarter, the National Endowment for the
Preservation of Liberty.
2. IRS Regulations
In 1976, Congress liberalized the lobbying rules but, in
a concession to its critics, agreed to revisit the question along
with the Service after a ten-year trial.392 Over that time, not
many 501(c)(3)'s had elected to switch to 501(h), in part
because of uncertainty over what the term "influencing
legislation" would include, and in particular, whether it would
include grassroots lobbying. 3' In 1986, the Service proposed new
regulations that proscribed grassroots lobbying broadly, very
broadly from the point of view of the affected charities, for
a39 See discussion supra notes 257-63 and accompanying text. Essentially, full
control is now permitted so long as tax exempt funding and functions are kept separate
from non-exempt functions. See Ward L. Thomas & Judith E. Kindell, Internal
Revenue Service, Affiliations Among Political Lobbying and Educational
Organizations,available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/topicsOO.pdf (2000). See also
Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,776 (Aug. 25, 1988) (501(c)(3) charity may control non-exempt
subsidiary investment fund). This said, the Service has not clarified the degree of
control permitted through Regulation or other binding pronouncement, which leaves
501(c)(3) advocates somewhat uncertain as to how far they can go before being
challenged. Telephone conversation with John Pomeranz, Alliance for Justice (Oct. 28,
2003) (Mr. Pomeranz represents 501(c)(3) charities on federal tax matters).
390 See HOPKINS, supra note 1, at 280, 290-92,
799.
391 Pub. L. No. 103-66 1322(a), 107 Stat. 312 (1993). See also FISHMAN &
SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 728. For Congress' earlier approval of the deduction, see
supra note 237.
392 122 CONG. REC. 12,255 (1976); Bouchillon, supra
note 375, at 163-64.
393 Bouchillon, supra note 375,
at 163.
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whom a broader definition meant less action. It proposed,
further, to implement the new definition on a retroactive
basis." The proposal was a shocker and, once again, the roof
fell in.
The 1986 Service proposals prompted tens of thousands
of comments by nonprofits and the legal community,
overwhelmingly opposed. 9 Leading the charge were Planned
Parenthood and an umbrella group of charities called
Independent Sector, which recommended a narrower definition
of grassroots lobbying limited to bills actually pending, and
efforts that included a "call to action."9 Also taking the lead, as
with the public interest litigation regulations a decade before,
were leaders of Congress itself. In February 1987, sixteen
members of the Senate Finance Committee wrote to IRS
Commissioner Lawrence Gibbs expressing their deep concern
that the proposal would "introduce ambiguity" into the 501(h)
scheme, and "restrict lobbying in ways not intended by the
1976 Act."397 Adding to the din were the chairs of the House
Ways and Means Committee and the House Government
Operations Committee,39" no small voices on Capitol Hill.
In the end, aided by a change in administration, the
Service read the score and changed its mind. In 1988, it
released a new proposal for "substantially" revised regulations
that defined grassroots lobbying in narrow terms - pending
legislation, specific point of view, call to action - an approach it
adopted finally in 1990." From the point of view of the
charities, it was another bullet dodged.

394 51 Fed. Reg. 40,211, 40,214-22 (November 5, 1986); Lee A. Sheppard,
Sweet Charity and the Lobbying Taint, 34 TAX NOTES 848 (1987); I.R.S. News Release,
Service Announces Release of Grass-Roots Lobbying Regulations, IR-88-168 (December
22, 1988); 53 Fed. Reg. 51,826, 51,828-29 (December 23, 1988); Bouchillon, supra note
375, at 164.
395Sheppard, supra note 394, at 848; Bouchillon, supra note 375, at 164; I.R.S.
News Release, supra note 394; 53 Fed. Reg. 51,826, 51,828-29 (December 23, 1988).
39
Sheppard, supra note 394, at 849-50; Bouchillon, supra note 375, at 164;
I.R.S. News Release, supra note 394.
397 Letter from Senate Finance Committee to Lawrence B. Gibbs, IRS
Commissioner, March 2, 1987, reprintedin 34 TAX NOTES 929 (1987).
398 34 TAX NOTES 929 (1987) (noting that a letter similar
to the Senate
Finance Committee letter, supra note 397, was also sent to IRS Commissioner Gibbs by
the House Ways and Means Committee); Sheppard, supra note 394, at 849-50.
399 53 Fed. Reg. 51,826, 51,828-29 (December 23, 1988); I.R.S. News Release,
supra note 394; 55 Fed. Reg. 35,579, 35,580 (August 31, 1990). Bouchillon, supra note
375, at 164 & n.54-55.
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3. Electoral Politics and the Contras
Meanwhile, the Congress was spurred to action on
another front when, for yet a third time, one of its members
was gored by a right-wing charity crossing the political line.
The year was 1986 and the causa belli was United States policy
on the Nicaraguan civil war.
The provocation came from the National Endowment for
the Preservation of Liberty, one of a network of ultraconservative tax-exempt organizations that also included the
Anti-Terrorism
America
Committee,
the
American
Conservative Trust, and the Sentinel." At issue was the U.S.
reaction to the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, elected to
power in 1979." The Reagan administration moved to arm and
fund a revolution in Nicaragua, directed from the White House
by Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North."' Disagreeing with at least
the administration's tactics, Congress reacted by banning
federal funding for the Contras."' The White House counterreacted by continuing to raise money from outside sources,
including the sale of arms, in secret, to Iran, a country that we
had only recently attempted to invade in order to free U.S.
hostages." The White House also reacted by proposing
legislation to override the ban and resume Contra funding, and
by promoting groups to support its cause."5 In short, it was
another Great Bazaar, highly politicized, and unfolding in the
midst of congressional and senate electoral campaigns.
The position of the National Endowment and its
brethren was clear: The Sandinistas were Communists, end of
story. With the assistance of North, the Endowment and its
cohorts went on the attack, financing, among other things, a

400 See Thomas B. Edsall, Tax, Election Law Questions
Arise On Activist's ProContra Efforts: Lawmakers Seeking Investigations of Channell, WASH. POST, Dec. 18,
1986, at A30; Mark N. Uhlfelder, Iran-ContraAid Scandal Develops Tax Twist; Pickle
Meets with Gibbs to Discuss Activities of Tax Exempt Organizations,33 TAX NOTES
1093 (1988).
401

Id.

Private Diplomacy, Exposed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1987, at A16; Iran-Contra
Hearings; The Colonel Presents His Case: His Beliefs, His Work and His Grievances,
N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 10, 1987, at A6.
40 Private Diplomacy, Exposed, supra note 402; Iran-Contra
Hearings, supra
&2

note 402.

Joel Brinkley, The White House Crisis: Getting Supplies To The Contras;
U.S. Got Reports On ContraArms, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1986, at A20.
40r See Edsall, supra note
400.
4.
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television campaign promoting Contra aid." In a press release
during congressional hearings on the issue, the Endowment
announced that it would raise $2.5 million - in its words, the
"most expensive, privately funded education and information
program on a foreign policy issue ever undertaken" - in
support of one hundred million dollars in aid to the Contras. ' °7
It did more. It produced and aired television advertisements
that supported conservative political candidates who favored
the aid package, and then targeted incumbent opponents.0 8
That was a major tactical error. One of the targets was
Senator Howard Metzenbaum, known for his independence as
well as his liberal views, who quickly raised the issue of these
campaigns to the Service." °9 For whatever reason, the Service
took no action against the Endowment.' Then the Endowment
made its second mistake: it targeted the reelection campaign of
Congressman J.J. Pickle, a senior member of the House Ways
and Means Committee and chair of its Subcommittee on
Oversight, which includes oversight of the Service. 1
Congressman Pickle already had his eye on the apparent use of
charities in political campaigns. 2 Suddenly, the issue became a
priority.
The hearings that followed surfaced the problem."2
Senator Gary Hart and other presidential candidates had
created charities to promote their images and issues.'
Churches had suddenly thrown themselves into politics: The
evangelist Pat Robertson was electing delegates to the

406

Id.

407

Id.
401 Id.;
409

Uhlfelder, supra note 400, at 1093.
Uhlfelder, supra note 400, at 1093.

4 0 Id. One reason that certainly comes to mind, of course, is that the
Endowment was supporting the administration's war in Nicaragua. Indeed, it was
acting as the administration's agent.
411 Edsall, supra note 400. By no small coincidence, Representative Pickle had
been a staff aid to Lyndon Johnson during the congressional campaign that led to the
original electoral activity prohibition. See O'Daniel, supra note 132, at 749.
412 UhIfelder, supra note 400, at 1093.
413 See H.R. REP. No. 391(11), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.A.A.N. 2313-378; H.R.

CONF. REP. No. 495, reprintedin 1987 U.S.C.A.A.N. 2313-1245.
414 Charles R. Babcock, Use of Tax-Exempt Groups Integral to Political
Strategy, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 1997, at Al. The practice continues. See Note, Use and
Abuse of Non-Profit Organizations for Partisan Political Activities in FISHMAN &
SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 514-16; Robert P. Meier, Comment, The Darker Side of
Nonprofits: When Charities and Social Welfare Groups Become Political Slush Funds,
147 U. PA. L. REV. 971 (1999).
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upcoming Republican convention;..5 white churches in the
South were openly supporting David Duke for Governor of
Louisiana;"' black churches were openly supporting Jessie
Jackson's bid for the presidency;"7 and the Catholic Church was
pronouncing the moral obligations of candidates on the issue of
abortion."8 Throughout it all, the Service was silent."'
Congressman Pickle chaired congressional hearings in
1987, prompted in his words by "recent events" that had "raised
questions" about the engagement of charities in politics, the
scope of the law, and the Service's enforcement. 2' His
subcommittee found an "alarming use" of tax exemption in the
electoral process, and "deficient and misleading" disclosure of
the charities' activities. 2 1 Its recommendations culminated in
the Tax Exempt Organizations Lobbying and Political
Activities Accountability Act of that same year, broadening the
definition of political activity to include use of an organization
for the "primary benefit" of a candidate, and requiring more
regular and specific reporting.22
In the same legislation, Congress reaffirmed the
absolute nature of the prohibition on electoral politics, without
dissent." With language unambiguous in its intent but no
more illuminating than that of the court in Slee, the House
report explained that "the prohibition on political campaign
activities and the restrictions on lobbying activities by charities
reflect Congressional policies that the US Treasury should be
neutral in political affairs."424
"' Charles R. Babcock, Robertson Accused of Using Tax-Exempt Group for
Politics; Ex-Officials Say PresidentialBid Was Aided, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 1988, at
A17.
416 Roberto Suro, Duke Recasts His Religious Claims, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11,
1991, at A12.
4' Jackson to Pass the Plate at Churches Sunday, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1988,
at A23.
,,8 Goodsell, supra note 355; Kenneth A. Briggs, Debate is Growing on
Legalities of Religious Activism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1980, at A22.
419 Anne Berrill Carroll, Religion, Politics, and the IRS: Defining
The Limits of
Tax Law Controls on Political Expression by Churches, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 217, 241-45
(1992).
120 Report and Recommendations on Lobbying
and PoliticalActivities by TaxExempt Orgs.: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 100th Cong. 3 (1987).
421 Id. at 38.
112 Id.
at 39-46; Tax-Exempt Organizations' Lobbying and Political Activities
Accountability Act of 1987, H.R. 2942, 100th Cong. (1987).
" H.R. 2942.
424 H.R. REP. No. 100-391, at 1621,
1625 (1987), reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1, 2313-1201, 2313-1205.
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The net effect of all of these developments - § 501(h),
the Service implementing regulations, and the Act of 1987 was to diminish the sting of the political restrictions, and to
level the playing field between corporate and charitable
subsidies under the Code. The charitable organization had the
option of conducting significant, if not "substantial," lobbying,
including grassroots lobbying, with considerable security and
predictability under § 501(h). If it wanted to be more active, it
could launch a 501(c)(4) organization down the hall with the
same board of directors, personnel, and overhead, and with
only the restriction of keeping records to ensure that deductible
contributions did not flow to the non-deductible (c)(4). These
organizations would, further, no longer be competing for
legislative attention with industry lobbyists whose influence
taxpayers subsidized as necessary business expenses. With
regard to electioneering, the controlled 501(c)(4) organization
could not only lobby freely but, pursuant to Service rulings,
engage in political campaigns as well through a separate
segregated fund or a political action committee, 25 so long as
that campaigning did not become its principal activity.426
None of this is to say that the remaining prohibitions
freed charities completely for the political fight. They remained
largely limited to acting through 501(c)(4)'s, to which
contributions were not deductible. In the competition for the
donor dollar, the deductibility of contributions is key. Only the
most committed donors are willing to forego the tax break for
the. cause. Unless (c)(4)'s are sponsored by for-profit
corporations, private foundations, or a few multi-millionaires,
the (c)(4) world for genuinely public interests, as opposed to the
world of commercial interests masquerading as public
interests, will always be limited by funding. The leash on
charities was loosened, but it remained securely fastened at the
neck.427
4
Enacted in 1974, § 527 of the Internal Revenue Code adds political action
committees (PACs) and other campaign committees and political parties to its list of
tax exempt organizations. I.R.C. § 527 (2003). PACs are defined as any organization
operated primarily to fund an "exempt function," id. § 527(e)(1), which in turn is
defined as the "selection, nomination, election or appointment of any individual" to
federal, state or local office, including officers of political parties and members of the
electoral college, id. § 527(e)(2). PACs are established as independent organizations, or
as "separate segregated funds" (SSFs) of other organizations; 501(c)(3) charities but not
501(c)(4)'s, are specifically disqualified from maintaining SSFs or PACs, id. § 527(f).
See also HOPKINS, supra note 1, at 373-75.
116 Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1
C.B. 332.
427 At the same time, however, commentators and
the Congress, impulsed by
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Election Campaign Laws
For a century, with the overwhelming support of the public,
Congress has struggled to curb the corrupting influence of corporate,
union and large, unregulated contributions in Federal elections.
Time and time again, this Court has agreed that achievement of that
goal is critical to avoid erosion of public confidence in representative
government to - and I'm using the Court's words - to a disastrous
extent.
But concentrated wealth is nothing if not creative. As this
Court has observed, the history of campaign finance reform has been
a cycle of legislation followed by the invention and exploitation of
loopholes, followed by more legislation to cut off the most egregious
evasions and circumventions.
Theodore B. Olson, Solicitor General
of the United States, 2003.28

Federal election laws offer a different set of answers for
nonprofit organizations. In contrast to the political restrictions
of the Internal Revenue Code, federal election laws have a long
history of legislative development with a rather wellunderstood objective: that elections be fair and be perceived as
fairly won.2 9 Over time, electoral fairness has come to mean
limiting the effect of money.
As early as 1867, Congress first banned solicitation of
political contributions at the federal Navy Yard. 3' For the next
forty years, this and similar efforts to control political spending
came as ad hoc responses to particular abuses, generally ones
publicized from the previous campaign.4 3' Loopholes abounded;
the media, have noted a trend towards using (c)(4) nonprofits, even those allied with
(c)(3) charities, for political campaigns, the so-called "stealth PACs," in an attempt to
circumvent the reporting requirements for PACs under federal election laws. See David
S. Karp, Note, Taxing Issues: Reexamining the Regulation of Issue Advocacy by Tax
Exempt Organizations Through the Internal Revenue Code, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1805,
1805-11 (2002). Congress attempted to close this loophole with legislation in 2000
requiring, inter alia,the disclosure of donors, Pub. L. No. 106-230, 114 Stat. 477 (2000)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (2000)), and again in the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.A., 18 U.S.C.A., and 47 U.S.C.A.
(West Supp. 2002)). See also infra text accompanying notes 480-85.
428

Oral argument of United States Solicitor General Theodore B. Olson, at 50

(Sept. 8, 2003), McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 919 (D.D.C. 2003).
429 Albert J. Rosenthal, Campaign Financingand the Constitution, 9 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 359, 360 (1972).
430

Naval Appropriations Act of 1867, Ch. 172, § 3, 14 Stat. 489, 492 (1867).

431 See CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS [hereinafter CRP], Important
Dates:

Federal Campaign Finance Legislation, in A BRIEF HISTORY OF MONEY IN POLITICS:
CAMPAIGN FINANCE - AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM - IN THE UNITED STATES (1996),
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no unifying scheme could be found."2 In 1905, President
Theodore Roosevelt, locked in a struggle against large,
corporate interests over trusts, taxes, banking, and
conservation, called for public financing of congressional and
presidential elections as a means of reducing the influence of
"big money. "4 "
Congress would not go that far, but it did pass the
Tillman Act,4 " which prohibited corporations and banks from
contributing to federal candidates. Three years later Congress
adopted the first federal campaign disclosure requirements. In
1939, Congress passed the Hatch Act, ' prohibiting federal
employees from engaging in election activities. The following
year it amended the Act to limit individual contributions to
candidates.' In 1943, Congress turned to the influence of
organized labor, and imposed a temporary ban on labor
contributions, paralleling the ban on corporate contributions."7
At the close of World War II, it reenacted both prohibitions in
the Taft-Hartley Act.
In the continuing game of regulation and evasion,
however, the evaders had developed a new mechanism for
avoiding the effect of the election laws.4 3 To circumvent limits
on candidates' committees, they created multiple committees."'
at http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs/history/historyindex.asp (last visited July 17,
2003). The history that follows is taken largely from this and two other publications:
CRP, How Americans Have Financed Elections in the Past, in A BRIEF HISTORY OF
MONEY IN POLITICS: CAMPAIGN FINANCE - AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM - IN THE
UNITED STATES, supra; FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, TWENTY YEAR REPORT, ch. 1
(1995), availableat httpJ/www.fec.gov/pages/20year.htm (last visited July 17, 2003).
432 For much of this period, the Federal Corrupt Practices Act
of 1925 served
as the basic federal campaign law. "[Niotoriously devoid of enforcement procedures,"
the Act led to no prosecutions over its nearly fifty-year existence. CRP, Reform
Attempts at the Federal Level, in A BRIEF HISTORY OF MONEY IN POLITICS: CAMPAIGN
FINANCE - AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM - IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 431.
President Lyndon Johnson described the act as "more loophole than law." Id.
433 James L. Huffman, Campaign Finance Reform in North Carolina:
An Act
to Limit Campaign Expenditures and to Strengthen Public Financing to Political
Campaigns,67 N.C.L. REV. 1349, 1352 n.31 (1989).
434 Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907).
135 Hatch Political Activity Act, ch. 410, 53 Stat.
1147 (1939) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
4,1 See Huffman, supra note 433, at 1352 n.31.
431 Constitutionality of Restrictions on Individual Contributionsto
Candidates
in FederalElections, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1609, 1616 (1974).
438 Id.

439Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 141 (2000)).
440 Joel
L. Fleishman, Freedom of Speech and Equality of Political
Opportunity: The Constitutionalityof the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1917, 51
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In 1944, the first labor political action committee (PAC) was
formed, and by 1956, labor PACs were contributing $2.1 million
to federal campaigns.44 ' Corporations were quick to catch on
and by the 1970s PACs were contributing money freely to
federal campaigns through organizations that were technically
separate from both a union or a corporation and thus not
limited in contributions, and from candidate committees, thus
avoiding the expenditure ceilings. 4
In 1971, Congress took its first step towards
comprehensive election reform. One concern was escalating
federal campaign costs that seemed to confirm the impression
that politics was reserved for the wealthy. Another was the
impression that contributors got what they paid for, a quid pro
quo" that would only increase as politicians became more
dependent upon their contributors to meet the costs of media4
based campaigns. The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) "
addressed the problem in several ways. It limited expenditures
on campaign communications, restricted a candidate's use of
personal funds, and imposed reporting requirements for
candidates and their campaigns. "' It was almost immediately,
however, overtaken by events.
The 1972 elections brought the Watergate scandal and
the disclosure of widespread, illegal campaign contributions by
such influential corporations as Gulf Oil, 3M, Ashland Oil, and
Northrop. Disclosure reports listed various individuals and
corporations contributing millions of dollars illegally and in
secret to President Nixon's campaign. ' Spurred by these and
N.C. L. REV. 389, 391 (1973).
441 See
Hoover Institution,

Campaign Finance: History, available at

(last visited Oct. 26,
http://www.campaignfinancesite.org/history/financingl.html
2003); Joseph E. Cantor, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress,
PoliticalSpending by OrganizedLabor: Background and CurrentIssues (1998).
4" See id. at 391. These were only some of the more lawful ways of avoiding
the campaign restrictions. In combination, they were so extensive and their
enforcement so weak that no case reached the Supreme Court to challenge their
constitutionality. See Rosenthal, supra note 429.
443 Rosenthal, supra note 429.
444 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3
(1972) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 591, 600, and in scattered sections of 2
U.S.C and 47 U.S.C. (2000)). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 7 (1976) (quoting
Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (characterizing the 1971 and 1974
FECA as "the most comprehensive reform legislation [ever] passed by Congress
concerning the election of the President, Vice-President, and members of Congress")).
445 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
46 Center for Responsive Politics, A Brief History of Money in Politics,
How
at
the
Past,
available
Elections
in
Have
Financed
Americans
http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs/history/history2.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2003).
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other revelations, Congress amended FECA in 1974 to address
campaign costs that continued to soar, and the ever-present
447
specter of the quid pro quo. Reacting to abuses on the
contributions side, it imposed a one thousand dollar ceiling on
"8
the amount any individual could give any candidate. On the
expenditure side, Congress extended FECA's limits on
communications expenditures to all campaign expenditures.
The amendments streamlined campaign disclosure and placed
9
new filing requirements on PACs and individuals." To
administer these requests, Congress also created, after long
reluctance, a Federal Election Commission with powers of
investigation and enforcement."u
These additions unified the federal campaign laws into
a single scheme. They were the product of a century of trial and
error, of extensive hearings in the Senate and House, and of a
widely-felt desire to reduce campaign abuses and the influence
of money in politics. The scheme did not last two years, which
was the shortest time it would take for First Amendment
challenges to reach the Supreme Court.
If FECA was the most comprehensive campaign
legislation ever enacted, Buckley v. Valeo"' was certainly one of
the most comprehensive assaults on legislation ever to reach
the Court. Mounted by candidates of both major parties, the
Libertarian Party, the Conservative Party of the State of New
York, the New York Civil Liberties Union, and the

4' Securities and Exchange Commission, Report on Questionable and Illegal
Corporate Payments and Practices Submitted to the Senate Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs Committee, reprinted in 353 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 36-41 (1976). See also
CRP, How Americans Have Financed Elections in the Past, in A BRIEF HISTORY OF
MONEY IN POLITICS: CAMPAIGN FINANCE - AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM - IN THE

UNITED STATES, supra note 431:
A turning point in campaign finance history took place after the scandalous
"Watergate election" of 1972, in which President Nixon's re-election
committee received millions of dollars in secret, and often illegal, donations
from, among others, Robert Vesco ($200,000 cash delivered in an attachd
case), Howard Hughes ($100,000 contribution purportedly via a locked safe
deposit box belonging to Nixon's long-time friend, Bebe Rebozo), Clement
Stone ($73,000 reported, $2 million unreported) and, according to a 1974
Senate Select Committee, "at least 13 corporations" and their "foreign
subsidiaries" (which made over $780,000 in "illegal corporate contributions").
448 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263
(1974) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 315, and in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.
and 26 U.S.C. (2000)).
449 Id.
450 Id.
451 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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Conservative Victory Fund, among others,"' the suit challenged
virtually every major feature of the Act, including the various
contribution limits, expenditure limits, reporting requirements,
public campaign financing, and the Federal Election
Commission itself. The crux of the case was that the Act
infringed on political expression. At opinion's end,"' the
expenditure limits on campaigns, groups, contributors, and
candidates were dead.
In contrast to the approach in Cammarano and
Taxation With Representation, Buckley focused first on the
speech and then on the nature of the restriction. Money is
speech in today's world, hence, restrictions on money restrict
speech."
This equation established, the "advocacy of the
election or defeat of a candidate" is "no less entitled to
protection under the First Amendment than discussion of
political policy generally or advocacy for the passage or defeat
of legislation. " "4 Congressional findings to the contrary - and
one would think that members of Congress would be in a
particularly good position to know - the dangers of unrestricted
expenditures on electoral campaigns were too attenuated to
raise legitimate fears of corruption."
Of the few requirements of FECA that survived Buckley,
the ones of primary significance, beyond disclosure, were the
limits on contributions.'
Corporate contributions were the
problem. In CaliforniaMedical Association v. FEC and FEC
v. National Right to Work Committee," the Court upheld limits
on corporate contributions to PACs and a ban on corporate
contributions to federal candidates. Both opinions, echoing
452

Id. at 7.

It takes a while; the opinion runs for 294 pages, and consists
of a plurality
per curiam opinion and separate opinions, each concurring and dissenting in part, by
Chief Justice Burger, id. at 235, and Justice White, id. at 257, Justice Rehnquist, id. at
290, and Justice Blackmun, id. at 290. Justice Stevens took no part in the decision, id.
4&

at 5.

454 Id.
at 11, 21, 92-93. They also restricted freedom
of association: "[elffective
advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is
undeniably enhanced by group association." Id. at 15. (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449, 460 (1958)).
45 Id. at
48.
45 Buckley, 424 U.S.
at 45-58.
457 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283,
tit. I, § 112, 90 Stat. 475 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.
and 26 U.S.C. (2000)) (following Buckley and amended by Congress to conform to the
opinion).
4.

453 U.S. 182 (1981).

459 459

U.S. 197 (1982).
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Buckley, turned on the particular dangers corporate money
posed to the political process. Evincing a somewhat unusual
deference to congressional findings that these contributions led
to a quid pro quo, the court would not "second guess" this
judgment.46 '
Where the limits did not implicate corporate
contributions, the Court was overtly hostile. FEC v. National
6
Conservative PoliticalAction Committee . involved a challenge
by two of the nation's largest ideological PACs to the
Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act," which limited PAC
expenditures in support of a candidate who elected to accept
public financing. 4u The Congress had enacted this provision in
order to prevent high-powered PACs from circumventing their
ceilings; without the provision, the Senate committee report
had found, the law would be ineffective to combat favoritism
and corruption." The stipulated record of the case included
evidence that the expenditures of these two PACs were largely
devoted to the election of President Ronald Reagan, and were
directed by political professionals closely associated with the
The PACs avoided the "coordinated
Reagan campaign.4
expenditure" prohibitions simply by avoiding direct contact
with campaign officials. 67
The Court acknowledged that these PAC monies were
6
what Congress "plainly intended to prohibit." Moreover, they
See id. at 209-10; CaliforniaMed. Ass'n, 453 U.S. at 198 n.19.
461 See Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. at 210.
462 470 U.S. 480 (1985). For the 1979-1980 election cycle, NCPAC reported
spending $3.3 million and FCM another $2.06 million in independent expenditures on
federal campaigns, ranking them second and third in the political committee spending
of that year. See Gregory O'Brien, Federal Campaign Finance Laws and the First
Amendment: Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political Action
Committee, 9 BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 409, 428 n.115 (1986).
4" Pub. L. No. 89-809, 80 Stat 1587 (1967) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.
§§ 9001-9013 (2000)).
4' 26 U.S.C. § 9012 (2000) (providing criminal penalties for candidates who
elect to accept public financing and accept illegal contributions).
465 S. REP. No. 93-689, at 19 (1974).
46 See O'Brien, supra note 462, at 429, 468 n.116.
467 Id.
at 429 n.117. As one campaign official explained the game, "I wouldn't
have to talk to Bill Casey [Ronald Reagan's 1980 campaign director]. I'd have a friend
of mine talk to Bill Casey. I wouldn't have any problem getting that done." See id.
(quoting Lyn Nofzinger). As the former Executive Director of one of the plaintiff PACs
was quoted as stating, also in the record of the case, "[aill independent PACs ... dance
around the law in a way that never breaks the letter but breaks the spirit of the law but we don't agree with the law, anyway." Id. (quoting Paul Dietrich).
'r' FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 498
(1985).
460
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were demonstrably larger - and thus their potential for
corruption greater - than the individual expenditures in
Buckley. Once again, however, the judgment of Congress was
simply wrong: the "absence of prearrangement and
coordination" removed the danger and the justification for the
statute."u
The focus on corporate contributions reached its apex in
a trio of cases dealing with FECA prohibitions on campaign
activities by nonprofit organizations. During the 1970s, the
Massachusetts Citizens for Life conducted a campaign on
abortion laws that included a "Special Election Edition,"
published and distributed just prior to the 1987 primary
elections. Headlined "Everything You Need to Know to Vote
Pro-Life," it rated candidates in accordance with abortion
issues.7 ° At issue in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life was
whether Massachusetts Citizens had violated the spending
limits imposed on all corporations,"' and if so, whether these
limits could survive their First Amendment impact.
The FECA violation was easy to find: The Special
Election Edition expressly advocated the election of its favored
candidates. However, the Edition was political speech; for the
Court's majority, this aspect again controlled. Congress had no
compelling reason to limit the political expenditures of
nonprofits such as Massachusetts Citizens, the Court ruled. '2
Nonprofits were not the problem. The "corrosive influence of
concentrated corporate wealth" was the problem, aggravated by
the "special advantages" which go with the corporate form of
organization. 7 . Where an organization, such as Massachusetts
Citizens, (1) was formed for promoting political ideas, (2) had
no shareholders or others who could privately profit from its
earnings, and (3) was not established by a corporate or labor
union and did not receive funding as a conduit for them, the
First Amendment freed it from FECA 4"
The courts clarified and reinforced the "MCFL test" in
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce... and Beaumont v.
469

47 (1976)).
470

Id. at 519 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238,
243 (1986).

471 Id. at 241.
472

473
474
475

Id. at 267 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
Id. at 257.
Id. at 239.
494 U.S. 652 (1990).
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476 Both cases involved nonprofits, one a 501(c)(6) business
FEC.
league and the other a 501(c)(4) social welfare organization
promoting a right-to-life agenda. The Michigan Chamber failed
the test. Its business members received benefits from the
Chamber's agenda, and the Chamber, in turn, depended on
7
business contributions for seventy-five percent of its budget.
In Beaumont, on the other hand, the National Committee on
the Right to Life had a political, nonprofit agenda, its activities
spun off no economic benefits to its members, and its funding
78 The
was essentially, although not entirely, non-corporate.
Chamber presented a significant danger of undue corporate
7 The National Committee did not.
influence."
Electoral campaign law remained with the courts until
2002, when Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002."' A polarizing issue within both the Republican
and Democratic parties, the Act's main purpose was to limit
the influence of "soft money," unregulated contributions to
8'
political parties and, hence, political campaigns. Republicans
feared a replay of the massive soft money fundraising at which
former President Clinton had been so adept, Democrats feared
corporate contributions to Republican coffers that would dwarf
theirs over time, and both feared an electorate that, by all
public opinion polls, had been made cynical and restless by the
influence of money in politics. 8
Once again, Congress drew the line between for-profit
and not-for-profit corporations. As in predecessor laws, the Act
barred corporations and unions from electioneering except

476

417
478
479

278 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 123 S. Ct. 2200 (2003).
Austin, 494 U.S. at 656.
Beaumont, 278 F.3d at 265.
Id. at 271. The Beaumont court explained:

Corporations benefit from state laws that grant them special advantages
such as limited liability, favorable treatment for asset accumulation, and
perpetual life. These state-created advantages allow corporations to attract
capital and deploy resources in order to maximize shareholder wealth in
ways that other business forms cannot. Corporations could use that wealth to
influence federal elections.
Id.
"" Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 2 U.S.C.A., 18 U.S.C.A., and 47 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 2002)) [hereinafter
BCRA].
4.1 See H. REP. No. 107-331, pt. 1, at 1 (2001).
482 See Jonathan Rauch, OK, Sign the Campaign Finance Bill. But First,Veto
It, NAT'L J., Mar. 23, 2002, at 839. In the end, the Act was a trade-off allowing higher
(hard-money) contributions in turn for restricting soft money. Id.
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through tightly-regulated PACs." It broadened the definition of
electioneering to include media advertising that even referred
to a candidate, in that candidate's state or district, close to
election day." It then made an exception for nonprofit 501(c)(4)
organizations, which would be free (under the elections laws) to
campaign all they wished, providing that they used only
contributions from individuals and not corporations or unions.
The Court has yet to pass on the constitutionality of
these new limits, although challenges are now pending. ' " The
'a See H.R. REP. No. 107-31, pt.1, at 51; see also BCRA, 116 Stat. at 89, 91
(2002).

41 BCRA, 116 Stat.
at 89.
48 See id. at 91-92. The Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, however,

proceeds to prohibit 501(c)(4)'s from electioneering for targeted candidates during the
same 30 to 60 day period prior to elections noted above. See id. at 92.
46 On May 2, 2003, a three-judge panel composed
of two Federal District
Judges, Colleen Kollar-Kotelly and Richard J. Leon, and one Judge from the DC
Circuit Court of Appeals, Karen L. Henderson, issued an extremely long ruling of over
700 pages on the constitutionality of the BCRA. See McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d
919 (D.D.C. 2003); see also McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C. 2003).
Judge Kollar-Kotelly, a President Clinton appointee, found the BCRA's provisions
constitutional on the grounds that money in politics contributed to corruption or the
appearance of corruption and that the six-year, deliberate effort of Congress to reach
consensus on the Act deserved deference. 251 F. Supp. 2d at 433-36; see also Neil A.
Lewis & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Campaign Finance: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, May 3,
2003, at Al; Bradley A. Smith, No Money Where Your Mouth Is, WALL ST. J., May 8,
2003, at A18; Tony Mauro, Something for Everyone to Hate, LEGAL TIMES, May 12,
2003, at 1; Spencer Overton, Lost in Law, LEGAL TIMES, May 12, 2003, at 58. Judge
Henderson, a President Reagan appointee, ruled that most of the Act's provisions
violated the First Amendment. 251 F. Supp. 2d at 266. Judge Leon, an appointee of
President George W. Bush, adopted a middle position and his opinion was decisive on
many of the Act's provisions. Id. at 756. One provision of the BCRA barred corporations
and unions from spending money on television or radio ads that mention the name of a
candidate who is running for federal office and are aired in that candidate's district 60
days before a general election. Judge Kollar-Kotelly found this provision constitutional.
Id. at 568-88. Judge Henderson found the provision was expressly unconstitutional,
while Judge Leon ruled that this provision was unconstitutional because it was
.substantially overbroad." Id. at 798-99. However, the BCRA also included a
backup,
referred to as the "electioneering communications or sham issue ads" provision that
was upheld by both Judge Leon and Judge Kollar-Kotelly. As interpreted by Judges
Kollar-Kotelly and Leon, this provision prohibits the use of third-party funds for any ad
that "promotes or supports or attacks or opposes" candidates, provided the ads "have no
plausible meaning other than exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate"
and lack any geographic or temporal limits. Id. at 212-13. Another provision of the
BCRA, which banned soft money fundraising by national parties, was also partially
upheld and partially rejected. Also, Judges Henderson and Leon struck down a
provision of the BCRA that prohibited national parties from transferring soft money to
501(c)(4) and 527(e)(3) political organizations. Id. at 417-17, 790-91. These conflicting
rulings may be, in turn, contrasted to those of the Second Circuit in Landell v. Vermont
Public Interest Group, 300 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2002), withdrawn, 2002 WL 31268493 (2d
Cir. Oct 3, 2002), giving much greater deference to the legislative purposes of the 1997
Vermont Campaign Finance Reform Act. On May 19, 2003, the ruling in McConnell
was stayed pending resolution by the Supreme Court; Judges Kollar-Kotelly and
Henderson ruled in favor of staying the entire opinion, while Judge Leon, who
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lesson for this study, however, is that Congress has tried to
limit the effects of money in electoral politics in several ways.
The most direct, public financing, remains only a partial option
and available only at the level of presidential campaigns. Most
scholars, as well as a majority of the current Supreme Court,
believe that overall campaign and individual expenditure
limits are unconstitutional."1 The remaining option is to
channel corporate and union contributions towards regulated
PACs, and to free up the activity of organizations that are
independent of corporate and union influence. Unlike the
tax-exempt
on
restrictions
Code
Revenue
Internal
organizations, FECA does not try to limit a group's activities by
percentage, or by the type of advocacy used - but rather by the
sources of its funding.
VII. REFLECTIONS
The Internal Revenue Code restraints on the political
activities of charities have been in evolution, and in dispute, for
nearly a century. They represent no grand plan, but rather a
design arrived at in pieces by the impulses of the moment.
They have been looking for a reason since the time they first
appeared, and it was half a century before the Congress even
attempted one. Reading their histories, one is struck by the fact
that each of the limitations, in a different climate, could have
come out quite differently. Congress enacted the lobbying
restriction of 1934 almost apologetically for its failure to
distinguish what it was attempting to restrict from what it
wanted to protect. At that time, Congress rejected the electoral
restriction and passed it twenty years later only by stealth. The
litigation restriction of 1970 was all but adopted when it ran
into a one-of-a-kind Congress at the apogee of a liberal moment
dissented in part, would not have stayed the entire ruling. McConnell v. FEC, Civ. No.
02-582, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11006 (D.D.C. May 19, 2003). See also Richard Oppel,
Jr., Court Stays Its Ruling on FinancingCampaigns, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2003, at A21.
487 Whatever the ultimate fate of the BCRA, Buckley v. Valeo has forced the

Supreme Court to, in effect, re-legislate every proposed campaign limitation using
constitutional standards that draw no consensus between the Court and the Congress,
nor among jurists or the judges themselves. See 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Perhaps someday
the Court will reexamine the assumptions of Buckley in light of this experience, as
Buckley itself implicitly invited. 424 U.S. at 46, 97 n.131, 137 n.175 ("the independent
advocacy restricted by the provision does not presently appear to pose dangers of real or
apparent corruption") (emphasis added). In the meantime, and for as long as the courts
treat political money as speech, election financing in the United States seems doomed
to complexity, evasion, and public mistrust.
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in American politics. Twenty years earlier, or yesterday for
that matter, it could have easily prevailed." Perhaps the best
that can be said is that we have never been of a clear mind
about what to do with the political activities of charitable
organizations, and we still are not clear today.
A.

The Hierarchyand Its Reasons

As the dust has settled, we have a hierarchy of activities
that are considered charitable under the Code. At the top,
unquestioned at any time in history, are educational activities,
so long as they are not intended to affect the workings of
government. At a slightly lower rank comes litigation,
approved for 501(c)(3) charities across the board so long as it
advances public and not private ends. Yet lower on the scale
comes lobbying, permitted to charities within limits, and to
companion 501(c)(4) organizations without limits. At the
bottom of the scale we find participation in electoral politics,
which is flatly prohibited to charities but allowed to companion
(c)(4)'s so long as it is not their primary activity. In diagram
and colloquial form, the hierarchy appears:
Education: Go for it.
Litigation: Go for it, so long as public.
Lobbying: Be careful, approved only in a small way (twenty percent)
for charities, but without limits through a non-deductible,
companion 501(c)(4).
Electioneering: Do not go there, unless through a 501(c)(4), and then
only up to fifty percent.

One aspect of this evolved scheme is that, over time, it
has become less harsh. Congress significantly loosened the
lobbying restriction on charities, as did the Supreme Court in
Taxation With Representation, by freeing charities to conduct a
full lobbying agenda through controlled 501(c)(4)'s. The
electoral restriction has similarly been softened by the (c)(4)
4' Given the "only-a-subsidy" rationale that underlies the Court's approval of
the other restrictions, no reason comes to mind why an administration hostile to public
interest litigation could not prohibit charities from engaging in it as well. For
constitutional arguments that would be raised against such a prohibition, however, see
Poverty Program Senate Hearings, supra note 184, at 156-60 (Memorandum of Michael
Rogovin for the Senate Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower and Poverty, Nov.
23, 1970) (citing, inter alia, NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (public interest
litigation a lawful means of vindicating fundamental rights)).
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option, limited only by a fifty percent primary activity rule. 89
These developments, coupled with Congress' long-overdue
elimination of the subsidy for business lobbying as ordinary
business expenses, have begun to level the playing field
between public and private interests in the decision making of
the country.
A second aspect of this hierarchy is that, the loosened
restrictions notwithstanding, it stands on their head
commonly-held notions about the value of free speech and
political debate. The Court's FECA opinions place electoral
speech at the top of the constitutional pedestal; its 501(c)(3)
opinions approve flat prohibitions on political speech. We are
left with something that approaches, in effect, a hierarchy of
ineffectiveness in civic life. Education that does not touch
politics is at the top, followed by litigation, which only touches
political decisions already made and which has only indirect
and uncertain outcomes. Further down stands lobbying, the
first amendment right to "petition the Government for a
redress of grievances," which receives only limited approval.
Electioneering, free speech in its most politically important
role, comes last, and banned.
A third aspect of this hierarchy is that the reasons
provided by the courts and Congress do not hold water today, if
they ever did. Indeed, one unstated explanation for the Court's
defense of the restrictions as "only a subsidy" is that it avoids
the embarrassment of strict scrutiny and the search for a
reason. The most oft-given rationale for the restrictions, that
the Treasury "stands apart" from "political agitation," derives
from Slee. Of course, the Treasury does no such thing. It is
involved in political activity up to its eyeballs, starting with
exemptions for PACs. It also frees up veteran's organizations,
and only veteran's organizations, for unlimited lobbying. If Slee
means that the Treasury stands apart from particular points of
view, that explanation holds only until one appreciates that
across-the-board exemptions and deductions for participants in
political activity would do the same, supporting a wide range of
political views - the Great Bazaar itself." Read in context, the
9 To be sure and as noted earlier, these measures are limited by the reality
that contributions to (c)(4) organizations are not deductible, limiting the scope of their
involvement in the legislative and electoral processes and skewing the playing field
towards organizations patronized by interests so wealthy that they do not need or seek
deductions.
490 Moreover, it ignores Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), which
upheld
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stand-aside language of Slee and the 1987 Code amendments
emanate a feeling that politics is beneath the dignity of charity
- decent people don't do this - the English law of charitable
trusts come to America.
A more recently acquired rationale for the political
restrictions on charities argues that tax deductions for
contributions to 501(c)(3) organizations confers a double
9 ' and would give (c)(3)'s an unfair advantage in the
benefit,"
political arena. Whether, even with such benefit, charities
could offset the power of private money in politics seems highly
questionable. The argument also overlooks the same
consequences that Slee did: benefits to all (c)(3)'s would favor
none, and would promote a wide spectrum of political
participation.
Moreover, to the extent that charitable organizations
are favored by a "double" benefit, the question arises: Why not?
American political debate is increasingly divided between
private and public interests, which are nearly coextensive with
for-profit and not-for-profit interests. This distinction, and
conflict, is probably the clearest line of difference in the politics
of all three branches of government. That economic interests
hold trump cards in this debate is, or should be, beyond cavil.
One need look no further than the costs of litigation, lobbying,
and political campaigns. The more appropriate inquiry is not
whether Treasury would be in fact conferring a "double benefit"
upon charities - of course it would be - but rather, whether it
should.
B.

Three Different Reasons

We arrive at the nub of the issue. If public charities
have much to contribute to public policy and are outgunned by
private interests in the debate, why doesn't the Treasury
support them? Three distinct but related answers come to
mind: public acceptance, the impact of money, and the impact
of religion.

very targeted denials of government benefits for no more than particular political
views.
491 Anne Berrill Carroll, Religion, Politics, and the IRS: Defining the Limits
of
Tax Law Controls on Political Expression by Churches, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 217, 253
(1992).
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1. Public acceptance
The concept of charity has traveled a great distance
since the times of the Bible and the common law of England. In
any era, it has been based on a consensus about what was
"worthy." Over time, what is charitable has come to be defined
more by what it is not (e.g., private gain), than what it is (e.g.,
the recognition of both pro-abortion rights and anti-abortion
rights as charitable purposes). The equation of "charitable"
with "worthy," however, remains. If one were to ask a friend,
any friend, whether lobbying the legislature and campaigning
for candidate X were charitable activities, four out of five
answers would likely be quick, and negative. 9 For most people,
it is hard to consider worthy the schmooze, pressure,
blandishments,
paid
vacations,
former-congressmen-onretainer, hype, horse trades, and quid pro quo that go on in
lobbying - without even mentioning what they think of
electoral campaigns. As noted at the beginning of this study,
the attitude that politics is more catfight than charity pervades
the restrictions in the British rule on trusts, and much of the
still-cited decision in Slee. Rightly or wrongly, people are not
ready to consider large-scale lobbying and electioneering
charitable activity. To declare them so could shake the
legitimacy of the 501(c)(3) world.
People are even less ready to see religious charities
engage in electoral politics. A recent public opinion survey by
the Pew Foundation, asking whether churches should endorse
candidates, found seventy percent of all respondents saying no,
and only twenty-two percent saying yes. 4 Noteworthy is the
fact that ninety-five percent of the respondents identified
themselves as religious. 94 This was not an anti-religion vote;
rather, it was a religion-should-stay-out-of-politics vote. More
"

49 The author has tested this question with better than four-in-five
results.
To be sure, such an anecdotal sample is close to worthless. The thesis is, nonetheless,
that a more valid poll would produce similar results.
493 The highest negatives were found in the White Mainline
Protestant (78%)
and White Catholic (73%) communities; the lowest among those identifying themselves
as "High Commitment White Evangelical Protestant" (48%). News Release, The Pew
Forum on Religion and Public Life, Americans Struggle with Religion's Role at Home
and
Abroad,
March
20,
2002,
at
21,
available
at
http://pewforum.orgpublications/reports/po112002.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 2003).
494 Id.
at 49. Eighty-seven percent of the poll respondents identified
themselves with a particular religion; another 8% held no single religious preference;
and the remaining 4% identified themselves as either agnostic or atheist, or refused to
answer.
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strikingly, a similar poll of American clergy found seventyseven percent opposed to church endorsement of political
candidates.49
Whether protecting the image of charities in general
would, in and of itself, support restrictions on speech is another
matter. Were the restrictions not justified as conditions on
subsidies, these reasons would have a difficult time with First
Amendment scrutiny. Indeed, a strong argument can be made
that, precisely because of the increased sophistication of
lobbying and campaigning, greater support for the
participation of public interests in these activities is called for,
not less." In terms of understanding policy, however, and the
motives for which we do things as opposed to the reasons
offered, the thesis here is that we limit charities in politics
because we don't believe in our gut that they belong there. This
may not be a constitutionally sufficient reason, but it may well
explain the staying power of the restrictions against near
constant assault, decades after their enactment.
2. The impact of money
A second reason for restrictions relates to the power of
concentrated wealth on public decision making. The
ineffectiveness hierarchy described above carries its own
controls. Litigation is inherently limited by its after-the-fact
nature, and by rules of evidence, opposing counsel and an
independent adjudicator; victories in public litigation,
moreover, are subject to review and reversal by the Congress.
Lobbying is a more powerful and proactive political process, but
it is controlled to some extent by partisan politics, public
participation and the media scrutiny that usually accompanies
legislative decision making. Electoral politics, by contrast,
stands out as the most powerful and ruleless process of all,
delivering not only the outcome of a particular issue but the
495 See Review of Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3) Requirements
for
Religious Orgs.: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Committee on
Ways and Means, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Brenda Girton-Mitchell, Member,
Associate General Secretary for Public Policy, and Director, Washington Office,
National Council of the Churches of Christ in the USA) (citing a Gallup/Interfaith
Alliance Foundation poll).
'9
This argument, the provision of a necessary service for public interests,
was of course the basis for the Service's acceptance of public interest litigation. See
Poverty ProgramsSenate Hearings, supra note 184, at 82 (Statement of Commissioner
Thrower) ("I think that is the basis, the availability of the representation, rather than
the evaluation of the case that we have recognized here.").
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decision maker as well. It may be the essence of American
democracy, but it also presents its greatest risk - the capture of
the system by money.
In this light, one may view the halting, unsteady
evolution of the Internal Revenue Code's restraints on charities
as an instinctual thrashing towards identifying this problem.
Senator Reed in 1934 had the influence of wealthy selfinterests, and only wealthy self-interests, in mind. Senator
Johnson in 1954 had the influence of a multi-millionairebacked challenger in mind. The more effective restraints on
charities under the Code are not those that require pious
statements of charitable ends, but rather, those that limit
private interests in their beneficiaries, management, and
activities. These restraints were the upshot of the Service's
qualification of public interest litigation in 1970, so long as it
was not acting as a conduit for moneyed interests. Some years
later they became the upshot of FECA's permission for
501(c)(4)'s to engage in political activity, so long as they were
not conduits for corporate interests.
Would the adoption of similar laws under the Internal
Revenue Code suffice? Suppose one were to delete the existing
restrictions as accidents of history, and start anew. One would
certainly require of charities a "charitable purpose," knowing
full well that it would screen out only the most inept attempts
by private interests to wiggle their way into the tent. One
would rule as well against "private inurement," and could
usefully add both criteria and disclosure requirements that
would help make this principle more of a reality. Taking a page
from FECA's book, one could rule out corporate contributions
as the price charities would pay for political activity. This
prohibition is already in effect through FECA for the
electioneering activity of charity-controlled (c)(4)'s. What would
be new is its application to lobbying as well, either by
prohibition or by limitation to a percentage of total revenue.
Still left to decide would be the question facing Senators
Reed and Johnson: what to do about charities as conduits for
the super-wealthy. Senator Reed might have acted in a fit of
pique, but he was onto something that has endured. Senator
Johnson might have acted both in pique and in panic, but he
too was onto something that called for restraint. The superwealthy may of course, and will under Buckley, spend their
own money freely. The addition of tax deductions for their
political agendas, however, serves no obvious public purpose.
As the difference between the super-rich and all other
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Americans continues to widen, there is a reason for an
institutional balance. The Internal Revenue Code's controls
evolved in a ham-handed manner, but as modified, they have
come to limit the impact of disproportionate concentrations of
wealth. It seems worth the risk to subsidize some lobbying by
charities, accepting the inevitability of their manipulation for
the offset they provide to private interests and the raw power
of money. It seems more risky to subsidize the electoral
activities of charities, at least until better rules are in place to
limit their manipulation by the same private interests. The
FECA approach forbidding corporate contributions is a good
start. Ceilings on individual contributions might be useful also,
as well as a demonstrated, major percentage of general
support. With these or similar assurances, we should be ready
to revisit the question.
3. The impact of religion
The most sensitive issue remains: the role of religious
charities in politics, and more specifically, in lobbying and
electoral campaigns. To some, this involvement is necessary to
fulfill the mission of their faith and to improve the world. To
others, it is a large part of what's wrong with the world. The
separationists appear to be in a clear, if more passive, majority.
For many Americans, more than ninety percent of whom
identify themselves as religious,497 the thought of unleashing
churches for all-out lobbying and electioneering may be reason
enough to oppose any relaxation of the 501(c)(3) restrictions. If
that means muzzling secular charities such as Save The Birds
as well, then so be it.
But it is not necessarily so. Since the time of its
enactment, § 501(c)(3) has lumped all charities, secular and
non-secular, together, they having arisen out of a tradition of
similar good works. Political action may be, however, a good
reason to distinguish among them. If the potentially powerful
influence of religious organizations on politics is perceived as
an establishment threat to a secular democracy, then Save The
Birds may be separated from the Christian Echoes National
Ministry, and have its leash removed. No such proposal is
imminent. This discussion is simply to suggest that it is
possible, and that it may make increasing sense over time.
'9' See supra note 494.
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Conclusion

The Internal Revenue Code restrictions on political
activities by charities have traveled an uneven road for more
than a century, and we are even now not certain what to do
with them. Re-examining the history of the restrictions, one is
left with the impression that they were onto a problem but
chose the wrong cure. The fact that they were enacted in haste,
even in revenge, does not make them wrong; they are, however,
and they have always been, overbroad. A better approach to the
participation of charities in political life is evolving, providing
greater leeway, although it is still neither comprehensive nor
particularly coherent. Greater latitude still is desirable, given
the imbalance between private and public interests in this
country, but the price of that latitude will be having to decide
more precisely what we are afraid of - be it the influence of
corporate money, organized religion or yet something else and tailoring the restrictions to those ends.

